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DEFINITION OF TERMS 
 
1. Consensus 
 
 
In general sense, consensus means harmony, and general agreement by a group of 
people. It stipulates common consent. For purposes of this study, consensus means a 
group discussion where everyone’s opinion is heard as well as understood; and a 
solution that respects those opinions is arrived at. It is not the preference of the majority, 
but rather the best solution that can be arrived by a group at a particular time. 
 
 
2. Liberal Democracy 
 
 
In this study liberal democracy is a political system, which allows citizens to engage in 
free political competition, periodic multiparty elections. It is a political system in which 
there is the choice of political leaders by the people through competitive elections, a 
guarantee of extensive civil and political rights, the rule of law and public 
accountability.  
 
 
3. Western Democracy 
 
 
Western democracy refers to the form of governance that was introduced in Africa 
during the period of European colonial contact with the continent. It is a type of 
democracy that is perceived to be fostering colonial tendencies; and yet it is still being 
imposed as the only legitimate form of governance towards the realisation of human 
wellbeing in contemporary Africa. 
 
 
4. True Democracy 
 
Is a type political governance that generates hopes and aspirations in the lives of the 
governed by establishing principles of political equality, freedom and dignity; and 
brings about a concrete sense of empowerment and opportunity to the populace. It is 
characterised by popular participation and consent as necessary conditions for the 
promotion of the common good and human wellbeing. 
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ABSTRACT 
 
That there is an incessant struggle for the establishment of a viable and meaningful 
democracy in post-independence Africa is not in doubt. Contemporary Africa is 
characterized by political instability and abysmally poor governmental performance 
indicative of lack of consonance and congruence between traditional African political 
values on the one hand, and the practice of Western democracy on the other. In 
contradistinction to pre-colonial polity that had highly developed democratic political 
systems, almost all political regimes in post-colonial Africa have consistently claimed 
to be democratic and yet their rule has largely been characterized by political 
authoritarianism, illegitimate seizure of power, massive corruption, political 
assassinations, escalating insecurity, food crisis et cetera. These challenges are further 
compounded by the fact that the practice of Western democracy in Africa has created 
of the African populace a dichotomy, which is diametrically opposed to African 
humanism. Against this backdrop, the study employs textual and conceptual analysis 
of philosophical inquiry to appraise the practice of democracy; and investigate the basis 
of traditional African democratic polity. It also examines whether Western notions of 
democracy are well-suited for contemporary African polities by asking the following 
fundamental questions: a) What makes democracy democratic? b) In what ways can 
traditional African system of government benefit contemporary democratic practice in 
Africa? In view of the foregoing, the study concludes that: a) The failure of democracy 
to function properly in post-independence Africa is hinged on illegitimacy and 
ineffectiveness of Western democracy, which is an illegitimate colonial construct: b) 
For democracy to be meaningfully and viably established in contemporary Africa, it 
should be hinged on political communal existence of Africans, which in effect relates 
to equality within a polity; and, c) There is need for an alternative form of democracy 
in Africa hinged on African cultural values and practices. In the foregoing respect, the 
study proposes “Integrated Consensual Democracy” as an alternative form of 
democracy for contemporary Africa. It is argued that this is a viable form of self rule 
responsive to the needs and aspirations of Africans as it is premised on their cultural 
values and practices. The study makes, however, among others, the recommendation 
that further research should establish why even with communal solidarity, which is so 
widespread in rural societies of Africa, contemporary Africa is still far from producing 
modes of governance that the populace can freely accept. 
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INTRODUCTION 
 
  
 
 
 
Any programme of social transformation, which would succeed in 
addressing the question of how Africans can develop and maintain viable 
social orders within which individuals can exercise their rights, perform 
their obligations, and realise their genuine human potentials, has to 
contend with the problem of the entrenchment of ethnic/clan 
consciousness in most African societies. What is required in this respect 
is not to obliterate this consciousness or pretend that it is not important. 
What is required is the construction of political systems within which this 
aspect of our social experience can be accommodated in a manner that 
it does not threaten social cohesion.  
 
[Olusegun Oladipo, “Tradition and the Quest for Democracy in 
Africa”, 2000] 
 
 
 
There is an incessant struggle for the establishment of true, viable and meaningful 
democracy in post-independence Africa. A critical look at contemporary Africa reveals 
a type of democratic dispensation that is characterized by political instability and 
abysmally poor governmental performance indicative of lack of consonance and 
congruence between traditional African political values on the one hand, and the 
practice of Western1 democracy on the other. It is argued in this study that what accounts 
for the myriad challenges facing democracy in contemporary Africa is the fact that the 
state in post-independence Africa has politically held too tightly to its colonial 
antecedent. Nevertheless, as William Turdoff observes, colonialism was not merely a 
system of exploitation but one whose essential purpose was to repatriate the profits to 
the so called ‘mother country’ (Turdoff, 1984:33). Thus, politically, colonial rule was 
authoritarian without any meaningful outlets for political expression.2 This is in 
contradistinction to traditional African political systems, which according to Claude 
Ake, were invariably infused with democratic values, communal consciousness and 
stricter standards of accountability (Ake, 1993:72). The study points out that African 
                                                 
1 This study uses the term Western democracy to refer to the form of governance that was introduced in 
Africa during the period of European colonial contact with the continent. Since that type of democracy 
is mostly manifested in its liberal form, the term Western democracy is used interchangeably with liberal 
democracy; and what Kwasi Wiredu simply calls majoritarian democracy. 
2 See (Turdoff, 1984: 33-34).   
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traditional institutions display, incontestably, a process of government that is democratic 
in the sense that complete participation of the people is in-built. It is on this 
understanding that the study advances that African traditional institutions provided 
‘participatory communality’3 which rendered political relevance to the practice of 
democracy within a people’s cultural milieu. 
 
In view of the foregoing, it is argued that in Africa, democracy is unlikely to work, or 
to endure, unless it is compatible with the fundamental beliefs of the people. As such, 
the legitimacy of democracy derives from the principle of popular sovereignty. That is, 
ordinary citizens are equally endowed with the right and ability to govern themselves. 
In disregard of this fact, democracy is bound to face challenges of deep uneasiness by 
the populace about its actual workings. Thus, in order to achieve democratic legitimacy 
in Africa, the people must fully be allowed participate in its creation through a 
deliberative process of consensus building that allows for their fundamental values to 
be revealed.  
 
 
Resultantly, there is a need to jettison the mistaken assumption that Western democracy 
transplanted in Africa during the colonial period carries with it the seed of liberation for 
Africa’s socio-political maladies. Western democracy, as the study further points out, is 
hinged on the concept of colonial domination, which devalues the culture of the African 
people and denies them the existence of a distinctive political system. This is an 
assumption of cultural superiority of the colonizer that suggests, as Segun Gbadegesin 
rightly points out, the burden of ‘civilising’ the subjugated territories; and legitimising 
an otherwise unpopular rule by means of ideological distortion of the reality that 
underlies the relationship between the metropolis and the colony (Gbadegesin, 
1991:177-8). Besides, as Eghosa Osaghae argues, Western democracy at best only 
fosters colonial tendencies in contemporary Africa, yet it is still being imposed as the 
only legitimate form of governance towards the realisation of human wellbeing 
                                                 
3 The concept of participatory communality simple means that the populace shares a communal image; 
and there is concern for the wellbeing of each other. The disadvantaged are supported and everyone feels 
a sense of belonging by the simple fact that they are. It is a shared form of life where everything is 
everybody’s affair.  
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(Osaghae, 1999:10). It, thus, remains one of the crises of contemporary Africa. Put 
differently, colonial democracy was a perfect means of expropriating Africa’s resources. 
Unfortunately, nothing has changed in the postcolonial state. There appears to be an 
unceasing attitude of alienating the ruled from the rulers; as well as non-accountability 
to the governed.  
 
Thus, with bribery, carelessness about state property and other un-ethical acts 
deleterious to the development and welfare of the state, the practice of Western 
democracy has failed to generate sentiments of personal commitment to the state. It has 
created of the African people a dichotomy, which is diametrically opposed to African 
humanism. Instead, citizens are divided into those who “belong” on the one hand and 
“outsiders” on the other. The latter being ordinary citizens who in Paulin Hountondji’s 
description are those: 
 
...living far from the mysterious workings of power, a stranger to 
all inner circles where momentous events and actions that would 
only later break out in broad daylight were secretly planned 
(Hountondji, 2002:115-116). 
 
 
 
Undoubtedly, it is against these observations that it is imperative to take recourse, as 
Gyekye argues, to those African atavistic political values and attitudes relevant for the 
creation of a meaningful and viable democracy in modern Africa.4 Arguably, therefore, 
this study underscores that there is an urgent need for the establishment of a legitimate 
basis of democratic governance in Africa, which recognises the fundamental cultural 
fabric that holds Africans together. Such a basis, the study points out, should be 
reckoned against African humanism essentially described as: 
 
A philosophy that sees human needs, interests and dignity as of 
fundamental importance and concern. For the art, actions thought 
and institutions of African people, at least in the traditional setting, 
                                                 
4 Kwame Gyekye is an ardent supporter of the fact that if democracy is to be viable in contemporary 
Africa, then recourse to Africa’s traditional political values that could be incorporated into modern 
democratic system cannot be gainsaid. See (Gyekye, 1997:136ff). 
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reverberate with expressions of concern for human welfare 
(Gyekye, 1997:158).  
 
 
Against the foregoing, the realisation of true, meaningful and viable democracy in post-
independence Africa can  only possible by way of eclecticism – that is, by way of a 
people validating their heritage, by exploring their cultural practices and incorporating 
those Western political values that are in line with the values that underpin democracy 
sui generis. In consequence, the study proposes a type of democracy – Integrated 
Consensual Democracy – hinged on cultural values and practices of the African people 
in order to cater for their needs and aspirations. It is a type of democracy which ought 
to be characterised by popular participation and consent as necessary conditions for the 
promotion of the common good and human wellbeing (Osaghae, 1999:10). This 
democratic typology, built on a pro-people foundation and responsiveness to their 
needs, is what is at stake in contemporary Africa since it is bound to be “more 
performance-cum-welfarist oriented and accountability demanding...” (Osaghae, 
1999:22). Joseph Nyasani also captures this necessity of grounding true democracy on 
a people’s cultural values by asserting that:  
  
...all human beings possess a unique capacity to develop in a 
variety of ways always in proportion to and in conformity with the 
peculiar prevailing circumstances, people’s attitudes, social 
sophistication, the pressures of social and intellectual challenges 
and many other relevant considerations (Nyasani, 2010:57).  
 
 
In view of the foregoing, it is argued that in the proposed Integrated Consensual 
Democracy, civil liberties and human rights as well as commitment to the common good 
are espoused as fundamental democratic principles. As such, it is a type of democracy 
that offers the citizens means of access to governmental processes and participation in 
collective decision-making. As Kwasi Wiredu argues, consensus was a system, “set up 
for participation in power, not its appropriation, and the underlying philosophy was one 
of cooperation, not confrontation” (Wiredu, 1996:187).  
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In sum, the viability and meaningfulness of Integrated Consensual Democracy as a 
democratic option for post-independence Africa lies in the fact that it is not only 
characterised by genuine participation, but also, consistent and effective channels of 
accountability between the populace and public officials.5  
 
Methodological Approach 
 
In order to meet its set objectives, this study, being philosophical in nature, primarily 
employs philosophical methods of textual and conceptual analysis to investigate the 
philosophical basis of democracy both in traditional and modern day Africa. This 
approach is reminiscent of the Socratic critico-analytic method of philosophical 
investigation, which consists in awakening self-reflection. As such it provides insight 
into African traditions of political thought and practice into which the study delves.  
 
The practice of Western democracy in contemporary Africa necessitates an in-depth 
examination, a subjection to ‘Socratic sting’ in order to conceptualize possibilities of 
ways of governance appropriate for Africa today. It is in so doing that Africans may 
reach the fullness of democratic experience: “the unexamined life is not worth living” 
(Plato, 1966:38). In view of the foregoing, the study analyses concept that relate to 
democracy in a traditional African set-up, and proposes an eclectic approach to 
integrating such features into the practice of democracy for the realisation of true 
democracy in contemporary Africa.  
 
There is also another way in which the critico-analytical method is important in the 
context of this study. It enables the study to consider questions about the practice of 
Western democracy in a more in-depth and analytical manner. For example, many states 
in post-colonial Africa are held to be democratic because they follow a democratic 
process normally conceived in the context of holding periodic elections. Often it does 
not matter whether there are flaws in the election process or not. Rather, what matters 
                                                 
5 See (Wiredu, 1996:185).  
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is that a regime is ‘democratically elected’ and placed in power. In view of this, other 
than just ask whether a regime is procedurally and legally in power or otherwise, this 
methodology opens up new horizons of analysis by focussing on how concepts precede 
each other in the practice of democracy – conceptual priority.  That is, it leads to 
reflection on the general fact that if one has to make a general claim that the subject 
democracy “S”, possesses some fundamental characteristics or property “P”, then it 
follows of necessity that such a one must have some prior means of identifying the 
subject “S”.  
 
In respect to such in-depth analysis, the study poses certain fundamental questions such 
as: a) What makes democracy democratic? b) Is a democratic process equivalent to 
democracy per se? c) Is to be declared a leader in contemporary democracy the same as 
to be appointed a leader in African traditional context? d) What constitutes democracy 
sui generis? The understanding of what democracy means is filtered through a system 
of values, normative priority6 whereby, the notion of the common-good is brought to 
bear on the question of legitimacy of democracy. It is argued in this regard that 
democracy is predicated upon the meeting of its obligations to the citizenry.   
 
Most importantly, both textual and conceptual analysis within the framework of 
comparison of political institutions and practices across African traditional set-ups,   
allows the study a degree of legitimacy to generalise about Africa; and possibly speak 
about African culture and way of life. People who disagree with such possibilities and 
generalisations may opt to argue that Africa is a diverse continent; and to lump all her 
independent states together and talk about an African something could be misleading. 
In fact, they may hold the view that Africa is too varied and complex to be encompassed 
in such a broad sweep.  
 
                                                 
6 Normative priority refers to the fact that in defining what democracy is, the value it ought to bring 
about in people’s lives – their welfare - should come prior to any other consideration.  
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Nevertheless, it should be noted that my main contention on this issue is not necessarily 
about how Africa is constituted in complexity as a continent but, as Chabal rightly 
observes, “on the grounds of discussing it as a whole for analytical purposes” (Chabal, 
2009:21). This is to say that philosophical inquiry or analysis does not look at Africa in 
purely geographical and numerical terms to ask how many states constitute it. Rather, 
Africa is regarded as a concept for holistic analysis.  
 
Philosophical inquiry follows a tri-dimensional process of philosophical analysis – the 
logical, the factual and the normative. First, in philosophical inquiry, we make use of 
implicit logic. For instance, in analysing what democracy is, the concept itself is taken 
to fit into a whole nexus of other concepts. Consequently, a logical implication of a 
system of government being democratic is taken to mean that the inhabitants enjoy 
political equality and justice (Keith, 1973:9).  
 
Secondly, philosophical inquiry also imparts matters of fact. It is not only concerned 
with a priori arguments for we know empirically from the world in which we live that 
democracy is incompatible with vast differences in personal wealth. As such the 
importance of a posteriori arguments is also considered. Lastly, a philosophical inquiry 
encompasses a normative aspect in that it elicits why the concept democracy is favoured 
and how it connects with other values of human existence (Keith, 1973:9). It is to be 
noted, however, that these three aspects of philosophical inquiry are really three aspects 
rather than three distinct parts. They combine to provide the analytical nexus between 
textual and conceptual analysis yielding a plausible interpretation of the meaning of true 
democracy as such. 
 
Theoretical Framework 
This study is based on the philosophical theory of communitarianism. As such, 
arguments that build up to the viability of democracy in post-independence Africa are 
hinged on the fact that we human beings share enough with others around us that a well-
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intentioned democratic government could, by drawing on the wisdom and experience 
of others, arrive at reasonable set of beliefs about its citizens’ good – the common good, 
which defines the community’s way of life rather than adjusting itself to the patterns of 
individual and jingoistic interests of the political class (Kymlicka, 1990:206).  
Accordingly, in line with Masolo’s argument, the study upholds the view that:  
 
The status of the political and moral community have rights that 
are not just independent from those of the individual but are 
also more important in some crucial ways that warrant the 
freedoms of the individual for the goodness of the collective 
whole (Masolo,  2010:222).  
 
In consequence, arguments are advanced to the effect that what is regarded by the 
populace as the good of the whole is tied in important ways to the cultural practices they 
share with others within the community (Kymlicka, 1990:203). That is, within the 
confines of communitarian thought, the study advances that the practice of democracy 
entails the way a person feels and thinks in union with all other people around him or 
her.7 In view of this, it is argued that the practice of democracy in post-independence 
Africa should promote traditional attitudes and freedoms that enable people to judge 
what is valuable in life by exploring the different aspects of their shared cultural 
heritage. 
 
In sum, since communitarianism represents “the sum of all ethical values, all shared 
experiences and responses, the consciousness of belonging together through history, 
reinforced by religious and cultural homogeneity” (Masolo, 2010:223),  it leads to an 
ethical state where subjective freedom is valued against its contribution to the 
prescriptions to the common good. It is against this understanding that the study makes 
the conclusion that a consensual type of democracy in line with communal ethos of 
Africans is more viable and meaningful in modern times. This is basically because it is 
a type of democracy which sustains itself through a process of communication and 
dialogue leading to consensus on values and cultural norms (Masolo, 2010:224).  
                                                 
7 See (Senghor, 1964:94). 
  
9  
  
 
 
Chapter organisation  
 
The study is organised into six chapters, which give a detailed critical and analytical 
account of what can be rightly termed as fundamental issues on culture and democratic 
practice in contemporary Africa. These chapters constitute the major analytical 
engagement of the study. Chapter 1 deals with democracy in Africa. It espouses a 
philosophical understanding of the concept of democracy; and provides the context 
within which the concept is to be understood in respect to this study.  
 
In Chapter 2 the study principally provides a philosophical account of the failure of 
Western democracy in Africa. This chapter points out that the failures of democracy in 
Africa are associated with the fact that liberal democracy emerged from the experience 
of a culture – the European culture. As such, being culture-specific, it cannot be 
universally applied to other cultural contexts without qualification. To do so would not 
only render democracy a bad name but also make it illegitimate and ineffective.  
 
Chapter 3 picks from the discussions of the previous chapter and gives a detailed 
account of the nexus between African culture and democracy. It provides an analysis of 
African traditional cultural values and practices that are deemed appropriate for the 
establishment of a meaningful and viable democratic practice in contemporary Africa. 
A philosophical position is presented on how such practices can be brought to bear on 
modern democratic practice and experience on the continent by drawing primarily on 
the work of Gyekye and Wiredu.  
 
Chapter 4 makes a presentation of traditional antecedents of democracy. This is done in 
a bid to bridge the chasm between modernity and tradition. It gives a philosophical 
roadmap of how to forge a new understanding of the concept of democracy in modern 
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day Africa. The chapter proposes Integrated Consensual Democracy as a new form of 
self rule for contemporary Africa. It makes the argument that this new form of 
governance is based on a pro-people foundation; and is, as such, responsive to their 
needs and aspirations.  
 
Chapter 5 gives focus to the feasibility of the new theory that the study proposes by 
looking at possible criticisms that are likely to emerge from the analyses already 
undertaken. Responses to such possible criticisms are offered against the backdrop of 
rigorous philosophical contemplation to provide prospects for the study as such.  
 
In Chapter 6, the study makes a presentation of summary, conclusion and 
recommendations. With the presentation of conclusion, the study has put forward 
certain philosophical positions that definitely invite argumentation.  
 
In sum, these six chapters share a linking thread as they mirror the cycle of democratic 
governance as experienced in contemporary Africa. They unravel the incremental 
complexity of democratic practice in contemporary Africa. It is hoped that this study 
brings analytical clarity to democratic practice in Africa in contemporary times. 
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CHAPTER ONE 
 
 
 
DEMOCRACY IN AFRICA 
 
 
 
 
While democracy has triumphed as the political system of choice, it is 
showing an increasing degree of popular disaffection. [...] The average 
citizen is feeling estranged from the political process and the more-or-less 
permanent political class.... This is causing a crisis in the meaning of 
democracy... 
[Richard Swift, The No-Nonsense Guide to 
Democracy, 2002] 
 
 
 
1.1 Introduction 
 
This chapter is about democracy in Africa. It provides an analysis of the African 
understanding of democracy by attempting to respond to certain fundamental questions 
such as: What is the African understanding of democracy? Is African understanding of 
democracy similar to or different from the European or American understanding of the 
same? Implicit in these questions is the larger issue and concern about the nature and 
meaning of democracy – about the universality of democratic ideals and practices.  
 
 
It is to be noted that among scholars, attempts to define democracy has often led to many 
“frames of reference”. This is why Frederic Schaffer raises the question whether “the 
Senegalese understanding of demokaraasi relates to American understandings of 
democracy” (Schaffer, 2000:x). In the same vein, Pratap Mehta asks whether one “can 
fix the meaning of democracy, the hopes and aspirations it generated, in a setting as 
socially diverse as India’s” (Mehta, 2003:2). Both views point to the complexity of the 
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nature of democracy as well as the dynamism of its applicability to a particular socio-
cultural context.  
 
 
Nonetheless, Frank Cunningham holds that an understanding of democracy should 
entail in various ways the interpenetration of: 
 
…normative questions about the value of democracy; the 
descriptive questions concerning the way societies called 
democratic actually function or might realistically be 
anticipated to function; and semantic questions about the 
meaning of democracy (Cunningham, 2002:11).  
 
As result of this, the debate on the meaning of democracy has led some scholars to argue 
for a widening of the ‘democratic canon’; that is, what passes for an appropriate meaning 
of democracy should be enlarged so that, as is the case with “bio-diversity”, so should 
there be “demo-diversity” (De Sousa and Avritzer, 2007:lxii). 
 
 
In consideration of the foregoing, this chapter not only confronts the challenges of 
democratic practice in contemporary Africa, but also provides a profound sense of what 
democracy means or is all about. By considering the challenges democracy faces, it 
suggests a new ideological imagination that can contextualise and throw light on 
problems associated with it.  
 
 
1.2 The concept and practice of democracy 
 
 
The concept and practice of democracy require in-depth analysis and understanding. In 
this section I attempt to respond to the question, “What is democracy?” The question of 
what democracy really is has serious analytical implications. It is important to state from 
the onset what such implications are. That is, prior to the unraveling of what democracy 
is, it is crucial to unravel the fundamental issues underlying the concept itself. At the 
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centre of the question, ‘What is democracy?’ lie three fundamental issues – the question 
of political standing, the issue of quality of life, and the explanation (Tilly, 2007:6-7)8 
of democratic practice. An exposition of these fundamental issues helps, to a greater 
extent, in deciding how a system of governance qualifies to be democratic or otherwise. 
  
 
a) The Political Standing  
 
By political, I have in mind those institutions that allocate power. I place analytical 
primacy on the interaction between the three nested levels of political traditions, 
political regimes as well as political institutions. In this regard, therefore, the question 
of political standing simply means that political power holders must know whether they 
are dealing with democracies or not. This distinction is crucial and heuristically useful 
because, as Charles Tilly rightly observes, “democracies behave differently from the 
rest” (Tilly, 2007:6). In fact, democracies meet their commitments or even break them 
differently; and this affects the political question, particularly international relations and 
political alliances. It is in this sense that the issue of political standing should be taken 
to be primarily concerned with political traditions. That is, in the words of Michael 
Bratton and Nicolas Van de Walle, those “long-standing cultural legacies that over time 
come to suffice political institutions and societal attitudes and thus achieve an 
autonomous capacity to influence political outcomes” (Bratton and Van de Walle, 
1997:37).  To my mind, what this means is that the presence of democracy or its absence, 
heavily depends on the attitudes and practices of a people; and that these attitudes and 
practices must be taken into account in establishing what democracy means and entails 
as such.  
 
 
                                                 
8 One cannot take the question of democracy seriously without exposing the concept to such threefold 
understanding and analysis. The concept of “democracy” has become so universally sanctified that it 
means too many things – as to mean anything at all. From the most authoritarian regimes to the most 
open political systems, all swear by democracy. See (Tilly, 2007:6-7; Sartori, 1987:22; Schaffer, 2000). 
 
  
14  
  
 
 
b) The Quality of Life 
 
The issue of quality of life refers to the support people give to democracy. This can be 
instrumental or intrinsic. It is intrinsic, on the one hand, when democracy is regarded as 
good-in-itself – possessing intrinsic value by rendering the populace a collective power 
to determine their socio-economic and political fate. According to Michael Bratton and 
Robert Mattes, the intrinsic value is embedded in the fact that democracy will deliver 
the citizens from authoritarian formulae – thus leading them to appreciate political 
freedom and equal rights that democracy entails (Bratton and Mattes, 2001:448).  
 
On the other hand, the support is instrumental if it is based on whether democracy 
actually delivers better living conditions with regard to provision of and access to social 
services – education, medical care and security, et cetera. Consequently, democracy 
should not be supported if it does not meet the dreams and aspirations of populace in 
the ordinariness of their daily lives.   
 
 
c)  Explanation 
 
Explanation means that democracy occurs under social and cultural conditions. 
Nevertheless, it has profound effects on the lives of the citizens in respect of how they 
identify and explain its impact on their collective or communal wellbeing.  
 
With respect to these three fundamental issues, if we define democracy incorrectly, then 
we belittle its meaning as well as reduce people’s chances for better lives, which is 
quintessentially the purpose of democracy. What is at stake, therefore, is to 
contextualise the extent and character of democracy. In order to do this, it is necessary 
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to draw up a precise definition of democracy, which incorporates the different 
fundamental issues regarding its nature as discussed above (Tilly, 2007:7). The 
establishment of a precise definition of democracy requires that the study looks at the 
various ways of defining democracy; and subjects them to critical analysis in order to 
establish which of the approaches can yield a plausible and precise definition of 
democracy.  
 
1.2.1 Approaches to the definition of democracy 
 
 
In order to take the discussion about democracy seriously, it is critical that we establish 
what exactly we are talking about. It is imperative that we develop a precise definition 
if we have to analytically explain the variation and change in the extent and character 
of democracy. Implicitly or otherwise, it is to be noted that scholars generally identify 
four different typologies of definitions of democracy9 – the constitutional, substantive, 
procedural and process oriented (Tilly, 2007:7). An analysis of each of these is 
necessary to delineate the character of democracy as such. 
 
a. Constitutional Approach 
 
 
As the name suggests, a constitutional definition of democracy puts emphasis on laws 
that a regime enacts concerning its political activity. It is the legal referent that 
differentiates polities and distinguishes them as oligarchy, monarchy or even as 
republics (Tilly, 2007:7). For most contemporary polities, democracy is a matter of 
constitutional declaration. This explains why most states make prominent claims in the 
constitution of their polities being a democracy with the hope that because the 
constitution so declares, the people will “obey” and have the political will to be nothing 
else but democratic – that is to say, the populace will think and act democratically.  
                                                 
9 These are the main types or approaches from which most scholars on democracy and democratisation 
choose their definition. See (David Held, 1996; O’Donnell, 1995, Ortega Ortiz, 2001).   
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A critical look at the opening chapters of the constitutions of both Kenya and South 
Africa10 reveals this phenomenon. The Republic of South Africa makes a constitutional 
declaration of her “democratic-status” in Chapter one, thus:  
 
1. The Republic of South Africa is one, sovereign, democratic 
state founded on the following values: 
(a) Human dignity, the achievement of equality and the 
advancement of human rights and freedoms. 
(b) Non-racialism and non-sexism. 
(c) Supremacy of the constitution and the rule of law. 
(d) Universal adult suffrage, a national common voters 
roll, regular elections and a multi-party system of 
democratic government, to ensure accountability, 
responsiveness and openness (Constitution of The 
Republic of South Africa, No. 108 of 1996, Chapter 1, 
Section 1). 
 
 
In the same way, Kenya makes an explicit claim to democracy in the second chapter of 
its Constitution, which is specifically dedicated to the nature of her Republic in the 
following manner:  
 
4.  (1) Kenya is a sovereign Republic. 
(2) The Republic of Kenya shall be a multi-party 
democratic State founded on the national values and 
principles of governance referred to in Article 10 
(Constitution of Kenya, 2010. Chapter 2, Article 4, 
Sections 1 & 2). 
 
Article 10, referred to above, spells out the values associated with democracy in Kenya 
as follows:  
(2) The national values and principles of governance include– 
 
(a) patriotism, national unity, sharing and devolution of power, 
the rule of law, democracy and participation of the people; 
                                                 
10 My preferential reason that necessitated the choice of these two states is familiarity. I am a Kenyan 
and I have had the chance to live in South Africa. As to how these two states are closer to or further from 
the realisation of the ideals of (true) democracy despite such constitutional declarations, is a project 
beyond the scope of this study.  
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(b) human dignity, equity, social justice, inclusiveness, 
equality, human rights, non-discrimination and protection of 
the marginalised; 
(c) good governance, integrity, transparency and 
accountability; and 
(d) sustainable development  (Constitution of Kenya, 2010. 
Chapter 2, Article 10, Section 2). 
 
 
 
What can be pointed out and is evident from the excerpts above is the fact that there is 
a glaring connection between democracy and the values that ought to accompany its 
practice. In essence, democracy ought to foster human dignity and equity, liberty, 
integrity, transparency, et cetera.  Nevertheless, one does not fail to raise a very simple 
yet fundamental question of whether the explicit mention of a polity as “democratic” in 
the constitution really makes it so in respect to the values associated with it. It is argued 
that there are bound to be large discrepancies between the announced principles and the 
daily practices – that is, the empirical lesson often goes counter to the constitutional 
proclamation; and to equate the two is to fall victim of the fallacy of non sequitor – it 
does not follow.   
 
In view of the above, it is argued that a constitutional approach to the definition of 
democracy is misleading. Such a definition puts us in danger of ‘knowledge is virtue’ 
of Socrates11 – and, of course, if to know good is to do good, then there would be only 
one law to know, but this is not the case. Those who know often go contrary to what 
they know – the essence of free choice. As a result, the constitutional approach to the 
definition of democracy does not hold since democracy is a good-in-itself that must go 
beyond self-declaration of the state, which merely portrays how a state views itself. 
 
The opinion of the state about itself cannot be the truth and the essence of the state per 
se. This phenomenon explains why in most cases there are institutions that monitor the 
                                                 
11 See Socrates as quoted by Enoch Stumpf in Socrates to Sartre: A History of Philosophy, 3rd edition, 
(1983:40).   
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democracies of different states based on both political and civil rights.12 In most of 
Africa’s contemporary democracies – despite their constitutional declarations as being 
democratic – there is a consolidation of autocratic power and inner circle control over 
revenues. The clique surrounding the political leadership grows richer as the rest of the 
country usually grows poorer (Wing, 2008:1). This, to my mind, is what betrays equality 
and justice, which are key elements of democracy per se.  
 
Susanna Wing, in her book Constructing Democracy in Africa: Mali in Transition, 
observes that: 
 
Since 1989, when democracy’s third wave began to sweep 
across Africa, over fifty-seven new constitutions have been 
adopted in fifty one African countries. And yet only a 
handful of these laid the groundwork for more democratic 
states (Wing, 2008:1).  
 
The question that flows logically from Wing’s observation is: why has Africa’s 
constitutionalism failed so consistently to produce a viable democratic practice on the 
continent? The answer lies neither in the fact that democracy depends on formulating 
and reformulating the rules that govern society nor by writing new constitutions; but 
rather on establishing governmental and institutional legitimacy. To my mind, therefore, 
constitutionalism matters but it is not the only thing that matters in a democracy. There 
is a need for both the political leadership as well as the populace to follow certain 
guidelines for purposes of social and political order in the society. It is human to be 
orderly and whether legislated or not there is some constitutional way of operation that 
defines the way people ought to behave.  
 
                                                 
12 Freedom House (based in New York) is one such institution that monitors the democracies of different 
states. It assigns annually to every recognised country ratings on both the political and civil rights based 
on a scale of 1 (high) to 7 (low). It is to be noted that such institutions reserve the right to define what 
passes as both political and civil rights. However, a country may do well on the political rights wing but 
terribly fail on the civil rights wing. This may make it less democratic. Thus, how a country balances 
between the two rights is fundamental to its democratic ranking (For an in-depth discussion on this see 
Charles Tilly, 2007:2-3).  
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In  consequence, despite the sonorous self-description – as a democracy – a state 
characterised by ills such as autocratic exercise of political authority, patriarchy leading 
to sectarian politics where only a few people benefit from a regime because they are 
“connected” to those at the helm of power, cannot pass as a democracy in any usual 
sense of the word.  The question that ensues is, how should we decide how a system of 
governance qualifies to be a democracy or otherwise? In other words, what makes 
democracy democratic? This leads us to look at another way of defining democracy – 
the substantive approach.  
 
b. Substantive Approach  
 
One of the misgivings with the constitutional approach to the definition of democracy, 
as I have laboured to show above, is that human welfare within the state may be 
flagrantly opposed to what the constitution declares. Thus, in contradistinction to the 
constitutional approach, the substantive approach raises the fundamental question of 
whether a regime fosters or promotes human welfare – individual liberty, equity, 
deliberation, security, peaceful conflict resolution, et cetera. This approach advances 
the view that if a regime promotes human welfare, then it is democratic (Tilly, 2007:7). 
Nevertheless, as Tilly argues, it raises the problem of how to handle trade-offs among 
estimable principles – for instance, one wonders whether a desperately poor regime with 
citizens enjoying rough equality would be more democratic than that which is 
prosperous but in which the citizens are fiercely unequal (Tilly, 2007:7). With this 
consideration in mind, it is important to know, therefore, under what conditions and how 
a regime can be said to promote human welfare as such. 
 
 
 
c. Procedural Approach 
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Under the procedural approach, a narrow range of governmental practices are singled 
out to determine whether a regime qualifies to be democratic or not. In his book 
Capitalism, socialism, and democracy, Joseph Schumpeter defines democracy as a 
political system in which free elections with universal suffrage create vertical 
accountability, as governors depend on the vote of the mass of population rather than 
being horizontally accountable to an undemocratic assembly of notables (Schumpeter, 
1952:269). Undoubtedly, this is a minimalist conception of what democracy entails. It 
is to be pointed out that by making free elections the essence of democracy, Schumpeter 
basically ignores the empirical evidence of widespread existence of un-free and unfair 
elections that abound in most states in the world today. 
 
While free elections are necessary for a state to be termed democratic in the 
Schumpeterian epistemic orientation, Terry Karl is of the view that they are not 
sufficient for democracy per se. He argues that defining democracy in this manner is 
bound to privileging elections – whether free or not – over all dimensions of democracy 
leading to what may be rightly termed as the “fallacy of electoralism” (Karl, 2000:95-
96). In essence, free elections matter in determining a state as democratic but it is not 
all that matters.  
 
This is why Tilly raises a fundamental concern about this approach. He argues that since 
this approach pays attention to such procedures as elections, the question that emerges 
is whether genuinely competitive elections, regularly engaging large numbers of 
citizens, produce change in governmental personnel and policy? (Tilly, 2007:8). The 
logical unraveling of Tilly’s concern can, at best, produce hypothetical results. That is, 
the procedural approach focuses mainly on elections – and, if elections actually cause 
significant governmental changes, then there is a procedural presence of democracy. In 
this respect, it is not clear what the cause or effect is with regard to elections and 
democracy. It is neither affirmed that elections actually cause significant government 
changes so there is electoral presence of democracy; nor is it denied that there is not 
electoral presence of democracy, so elections do not cause significant changes in 
government.  
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George Philip, in his article titled “Democracy in Latin America” also regards the 
equation of democracy to competitive elections as a minimalist approach to the 
definition and understanding of the concept democracy (Philip, 2001:164). It can be 
argued against the equation of democracy to competitive elections that democracy 
requires a more complex set of conditions – rule of law, respect for minority rights, 
respect for individual liberty, et cetera. 
 
As a result, some scholars identify criteria that determine procedurally whether a regime 
is democratic or not to include the following: 
 
 
1. A competitive, multiparty political system. 
2. Universal adult suffrage for all citizens (with exception for 
restrictions that states may legitimately place on citizens 
for criminal offences). 
3. Regularly contested elections conducted in conditions of 
ballot secrecy, reasonable ballot security, and in the 
absence of massive voter fraud that yields results that are 
unrepresentative of the public will. 
4. Significant public access of major political parties to the 
electorate through the media and through generally open 
political campaigning (Piano and Puddington, 2004:716). 
 
 
According to Piano and Puddington, the determination of the democratic status of a 
polity rests on multipartyism and periodic elections involving universal adult suffrage. 
This line of argument can be logically challenged. It can be argued, on the contrary, that 
these elements – periodic elections and adult suffrage – render the very determination 
of a regime as democratic or otherwise a difficult exercise. In themselves, they are a 
mere veneer of convenience working with an extremely thin conception of the political 
processes under consideration.  
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Proponents of this approach would further advance the argument that it offers citizens 
the possibility to exercise their freedom of choice, which is so basic to the meaning of 
democracy. This is because by it citizens do not only enjoy rights, but also exercise 
choice, a choice to make and remake the social world in accordance with their will 
(Mehta, 2003:8). It does not succeed in two respects: first, it is unclear whether the idea 
of choice itself is a meaningful claim or simply an illusion. Second, even if it were a 
meaningful claim, the exercise of political choice by the populace, their use of political 
opportunities that ‘democracy’ affords them, does not necessarily – and empirically so 
– lead to the creation of a better social order. In fact it can be argued that political choices 
have come to bear the imprint of social inequality that permeates democratic practice in 
contemporary Africa (Mehta, 2003:9).  
 
In sum, even though the right to participate in choosing one’s electors is the most 
dramatic way of affirming democratic equality of all citizens, such a right is only a 
meagre right whose exercise in Africa is a periodic ritual with little or no bearing on the 
enhancement of the wellbeing of those who exercise it. There is an inherent failure of 
choice to determine whether a regime is a democracy or not – this necessitates a look at 
process-orientated approach. 
  
d. Process-oriented Approach   
 
In contradistinction to the constitutional, substantive and procedural ways of defining 
democracy, this approach is an amalgamation of processes that must be continuously in 
motion for a system of governance to be termed democratic. Robert Dahl acknowledges 
that there is an enormous and impenetrable thicket of ideas regarding democracy from 
which he identifies five criteria for process-oriented approach as follows: 
 
1. Effective participation. Before a policy is adapted by the 
association, all members must have equal and effective 
opportunities for making their views known to the other 
members as to what the policy should be. 
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2. Voting equality. When the moment arrives at which the 
decision about policy will finally be made, every member 
must have an equal and effective opportunity to vote, and 
all votes must be counted as equal.  
 
3. Enlightened understanding. Within reasonable limits as to 
time, each member must have equal and effective 
opportunities for learning about the relevant alternative 
policies and their likely consequences.  
 
4. Control of the agenda. The members must have the 
exclusive opportunity to decide how and, if they choose, 
what matters are to be placed on the agenda. Thus the 
democratic process required by the three preceding criteria 
is never closed. The policies of the association are always 
open to change by members, if they so choose.  
 
5. Inclusion of adults.  All, or at any rate most, adult 
permanent residents should have the full rights of citizens 
that are implied by the first four criteria (Dahl, 1998:37-38) 
 
 
As already pointed out, Dahl’s criteria differ in meaningful ways from the constitutional, 
substantive and procedural yardsticks for democracy. By avoiding building social 
prerequisites and consequences into the definition, Dahl specifies no constitutional 
provisions. His enlightened understanding refers to experience within the organisation 
rather than consequences or prerequisites (Tilly, 2007:9). It is argued here that 
enlightened understanding is a necessary component of deliberation which is a conditio 
sine qua non for democracy.  
 
Dahl’s conception of modern representative democracy – which he terms “polyarchal 
democracy” – is that which consists of political institutions that endure. He identifies 
those institutions as: elected official; free, fair and frequent elections; freedom of 
expression; access to alternative sources of information; associational autonomy; as well 
as inclusive citizenship13.   
 
                                                 
13  For further insights into this see (Dahl, 1998:85; 2005:188-189).  
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In view of the foregoing consideration, this study holds that the process-oriented 
approaches to the definition of democracy lead to a more plausible conception as to 
what democracy actually entails. What defines democracy should be the extent to which 
the parties involved accept the end result about the issue at hand. This certainly implies 
that some people may have to convincingly sacrifice their stance in order to adopt a 
different position. It is in such a situation that the process through which they arrive at 
such decision, counts over and above the end decision itself. According to Ake, this 
approach is preferred to the rest because “It is the involvement in the process than the 
acceptability of the end decision, which satisfies the right to participate” (Ake, 1993:43).  
In consequence, this calls for an attempt at a precise definition of democracy. 
 
1.2.2 Definition of democracy 
 
Frederic Schaffer in his book Democracy in Transition: Understanding Politics in an 
Unfamiliar Culture, holds the view that: 
 
The concept of democracy itself can be so stretched so widely 
that it rarely appears without a modifier – pluralist, direct, 
liberal, participatory, representative or the like (Shaffer, 
2000:1). 
 
 
In respect to Schaffer’s view, it can be pointed out that a definition of democracy should 
qualify ipso facto – to the minute detail – the type of democracy one is referring to. As 
a result, Ivor Jennings observes in her (his?) book Democracy in Africa, that an attempt 
to define democracy often leads to the conclusion that there are several forms of 
democratic government; and also there are several forms of governments that are called 
democratic (Jennings, 1963:33). Undoubtedly, both Schaffer and Jennings do not offer 
us any definition of democracy as such. Nevertheless, they raise the awareness that the 
nature of democracy is a complex one; and that it is dependent on social and cultural 
contexts, at least going by Jennings’ observation.  This, however, still leaves the 
innocent question of what democracy is, unresolved.  
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The word ‘democracy’ etymologically derives from the Greek word demokratia that 
can be broken down into demos meaning ‘the people’ and kratos meaning ‘rule’. 
Literally, therefore, the term “democracy” translates to ‘rule by the people’14. This 
literal meaning of democracy is the most basic and the most widely used definition. 
 
While it is noted that this definition spells out the centrality of people to the 
understanding of democracy, it requires one major amendment from the onset. This 
amendment is occasioned by the fact that when we speak of democracy in a large scale 
nation-state, the acts of government are usually performed not by the populace but rather 
indirectly by the representatives whom they freely elect on equal basis. Consequently, 
as Arend Lijphart observes, democracy may be defined not only as a government by the 
people but also as a government in accordance with the people’s preferences (Lijphart, 
1984:1). That is to say, an ideal democratic government would be one whose actions are 
always in perfect correspondence with the preferences of all its citizens – a government 
that has a complete responsiveness to the populace.  
 
While it can be advanced that no such government has ever existed, it is argued here 
that a government whose actions are in perfect correspondence with the preferences of 
all its citizens remains an ideal to which a democratic government should aspire. A 
government that continually aspires to meet the preferences of her demos by deed and 
not by sheer rhetoric can, thus, be regarded as true democracy. It is in this sense that the 
“people” as Kwame Gyekye argues, must remain the yardstick of defining democracy; 
that is, the degree of adequacy allowed for the expression of the will of the people; and 
the extent to which the people themselves are involved in the decision-making process 
(Gyekye, 1997:124).  
 
                                                 
14  ‘Rule by the people’ is a notion famous for multiple meanings. It appears as a modifier to the term 
democracy, but it does not set limits to how the term ‘democracy’ may be used. The translation of 
democracy as rule by the people implies decision making. Nevertheless, to primarily view democracy in 
this way covers only some of the meaning often assigned to the word (Catt and Hellena, 1999:4).  
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In view of the foregoing, democracy ought to generate hope and aspiration in the lives 
of the governed – by establishing, on the one hand, the principle of political equality, 
freedom and dignity; and on the other hand, by bringing about a concrete sense of 
empowerment and opportunity (Mehta, 2003:2).  
 
Nevertheless, it should be pointed out that this is what really confounds the true meaning 
of democracy to a greater or lesser extent – not all people in a democracy share the same 
aspirations. The landless peasantry, the internally displaced persons (IDPs), bonded 
labour, the untouchables of the society, middle-class lawyers who draw up a country’s 
constitution – all have different aspirations and on this understanding, it is to be noted 
that the most fundamental features of democracy have turned out to be elusive in 
contemporary Africa, rendering democracy’s hopes and aspirations at experimental 
crossroads. Resultantly, there is ever persistent social inequality and a mistaken view of 
a state’s proper function and organisation. Arguably, these two factors have modified 
and impeded the workings of democracy and its effects in all kinds of perverse ways. 
What is at stake, therefore, is how to manage these disparities. In consequence, as 
Emmanuel Chukwudi Eze argues, democracy should be a form of:   
 
 
…social framework that a people adopt in order to mediate the 
struggles and conflicts that necessarily arise from the 
necessarily competitive nature of individuated identities and 
desires (Eze, 1997:320).   
 
In line with the foregoing, what counts as democracy or its instance thereof, in 
contemporary Africa, must not only literally take into account Dahl’s five criteria for 
the process-oriented definition, but also in a more profound manner, consider the 
expansion of the same to encompass a form of consensus building and communal 
solidarity15. That is, as far as consensus is concerned, democracy must reflect deep 
mutual understanding. Such consensus may be the product of compromise ironed out 
                                                 
15 This explains why Wiredu argues that consensus as a political decision procedure requires that each 
representative should be persuaded not only as a matter of the optimality of each decision but also of its 
practical necessity, all things considered (Wiredu, 1996:189).  
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between hostile camps (Wiredu, 1996:186); or it may rise from a desire to conform to 
social norms (Schaffer, 2000:58). In this context, democracy should involve 
deliberation or consensual quality16. 
 
Schaffer comes to the conclusion that democracy should, in all, be identified with 
community solidarity basically by considering a statement made by an elder in Ngabu 
village in Senegal regarding their understanding of demokaraasi that: 
 
When there is work to do, we come together to do it. When 
someone falls ill, we come together to cultivate his field. If 
something happens to one of us, everybody helps him 
financially. When someone is sick, the women go to the well to 
fetch him water. That is our demokaraasi here in Ngabu 
(Schaffer, 2000:60).  
 
The identification of democracy with a comprehensive form of community solidarity, 
as Schaffer further observes, simply means that democracy must involve the recognition 
of mutual dependence and the consequent importance of sharing responsibility for one 
another’s wellbeing (Schaffer, 2000:61). From the way of life of the Ngabu people, it 
can be taken as glaring evidence in Africa that democracy does not mean spreading 
some foreign or Western systems of governance. While it may be argued against this 
point that such a democracy may only pass as a village type of democracy, which is ill 
suited for more advanced modern Africa, it is worth noting that the values that define it 
– mutual dependence and responsibility for one another’s wellbeing – are the very ones 
that ought to define democracy even in a more advanced society such as modern Africa. 
Besides, it is such values that render democracy to be both legitimate and effective, and, 
therefore, worthy to observe.  
 
                                                 
16 It to be noted that what makes democracy possible is an underlying societal consensus. Dahl, for 
instance, wrote that “prior to politics, beneath it, enveloping it, restricting it, conditioning it, it is the 
underlying consensus on policy that usually exists in the society among the predominant portion of the 
politically active members. Without such a consensus, no democratic system would survive the endless 
irritations and frustrations of elections and party competition.” (Dahl, 1956:132). 
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In sum, it is to be noted that implicit in what passes as a plausible definition of 
democracy is its intrinsic value, which defines the whole question of its legitimacy and 
effectiveness in pursuit of the interests of the governed. In the section that follows, the 
study analyses how these elements can be realised and assessed in a democratic practice.  
 
1.3  Legitimacy and effectiveness of democracy 
 
I have argued that the true meaning of democracy should be hinged on its intrinsic value, 
which is what explains the fact of its legitimacy and effectiveness in pursuit of the 
interests of the governed. As such, it is both legitimacy and effectiveness that affect 
people’s attitude toward democracy.  
 
Goran Hyden, in his article “The governance challenge in Africa”, provides a definition 
of both concepts. He outlines, on the one hand, that effectiveness refers to the actual 
performance of a system of government; that is, the extent to which democracy satisfies 
the basic fundamental functions of a government as both leaders and followers see it. 
On the other hand, he says, legitimacy involves the capacity of a system of government 
– democracy – to engender and maintain the belief that the existing political institutions 
are the most appropriate for the society (Hyden, 2000:11). What stands out from 
Hyden’s definitions is that both concepts must not overlook the socio-cultural 
specificity of a people. To assume or overlook a people’s concern and interest – their 
cultural and social orientation – may contribute to making democracy alien and 
incongruent – illegitimate and ineffective – to Africa’s political needs.  
 
Louis Jeevanantham and Gerard Hagg in the “preface” of the book Governance in the 
21st century, capture the possible negative effect of such assumption when they write 
that: 
Despite the attainment of political independence, Africa is 
largely in chains because the minds of its diverse peoples are 
enslaved to thoughts that are inimical to the continent’s 
development and progress. Outsiders are quick to arrogate the 
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privilege to set the agenda of discourse on Africa’s issues and 
challenges to themselves for selfish gains and advancements. 
By so doing, they circumscribe the discourse time and time 
again to the utmost disadvantage of the continent and its 
peoples (Jeevanantham and Hagg, 2011:xv).  
 
 
 
They are, however, quick to add that “the time is therefore overdue…to reinvent 
Africa’s discourse” (Jeevanantham and Hagg, 2011:xv). My reading and analysis of 
these views is that an understanding and establishment of democratic legitimacy is what 
may enable Africa to instantiate its own type of democracy – African democracy. This 
is a type of democracy which increases a state’s capacity to provide robust institutions 
and implement policies that support the general wellbeing of the citizenry; that is, the 
type of democracy that provides answers to the questions with which Africans are 
bothered in contemporary times. Basically, these are the reduction of the modern state 
to a mere instrumental role and a set of resources that the rulers use to foster their 
power17. In consequence, Africans are concerned about how fiscal revenues are 
distributed to create networks of political support as rulers use public funds to finance 
political allegiance (Englebert, 2000:5). What is at stake, therefore, is legitimacy that 
ensures that the practice of democracy is responsive to the needs of the governed.  In 
essence, democracy has failed to address the challenges of poverty, disease and 
illnesses, food security et cetera that Africans encounter in the everydayness of their 
existence.    
  
It is in view of the foregoing that Kwandiwe Kondlo and Chinyengozi Ejiogu in their 
article titled “Towards a ‘new’ consciousness about Africa’s imperatives in the twenty-
first century” allude to the question of lack of legitimacy of democracy in post-colonial 
Africa. In a sense, they see democracy to be alien to the African context; and describe 
it as “the historically imposed predicament” (Kondlo and Ejiogu, 2011:xvii). In 
                                                 
17 See Pierre Englebert’s view on what the challenge of modern states in Africa entails. He argues that 
the reduction of the modern state to a merely instrumental role may make leaders more likely to resort to 
patronage, nepotism, corruption and other patterns of political behaviour that can be all subsumed under 
neo-patrimonialism (Englebert, 2000:5).  
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consequence, democracy lacks the legitimacy it requires in order for the populace to 
appreciate its value.  
 
In view of the foregoing arguments, the status of democracy in Africa can be said to be 
that of legitimacy-cum–effectiveness crisis. Nonetheless, the arguments so far advanced 
on the crisis of democratic legitimacy – other than prefiguring it – fail to state how to 
evaluate the phenomenon of legitimacy. In consequence, they fail to lay a foundation 
for what may pass as an African democracy. In other words, if democratic practice in 
post-independence Africa is actually a post-colonial predicament – illegitimate and 
ineffective for that matter – then the critical concern about what makes a democracy 
democratic remains unexplained. An analysis of how to deepen the roots of democracy 
– make it more legitimate and effective – so as to be responsive to the needs of the 
governed is, therefore, urgently called for.   
 
Christiano Thomas, in the article titled “The Authority of Democracy”, likens legitimacy 
to authority of democracy and argues that it should be assessed following what he refers 
to as a dualistic account. That is, it should be based on two irreducible evaluation 
dimensions; first, is the tendency to produce good outcomes; and, second, it should be 
measured in terms of the quality of the democratic procedure (Thomas, 2004:266).   
 
In response to Christiano Thomas, Steven Wall, in a debate article “Democracy. 
Authority and Publicity”, opposes the dualistic account. He instead proposes that 
democracy’s legitimacy should be assessed following only one account – based on the 
dimension of its outcome. He calls this one account Instrumentalist Monism (Wall, 
2006:85). Wall argues that it is only instrumentalist monism that can guarantee holistic 
justification of democracy; that is, its directives are uniformly binding all who are 
subject to its authority such that “the reasons against its acceptance do not outweigh the 
reasons for its acceptance” (Wall, 2006:86).  
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Following this line of reasoning, one may advance that an appropriate democratic model 
for Africa should be that which is in pursuit of consensus building since decision-
making in traditional African life and governance was by consensus (Wiredu, 
1996:182). Arguably, therefore, such a model of democracy, which seeks consensus, is 
actually one that is premised on holistic justification. What this means is that authority 
of democracy is completely justified in Wall’s context as opinions of all were sought 
before a decision could be reached, and when a decision was reached, there was neither 
a loser nor a winner in the strictest sense.  
 
The decision reached normally served the common good; and so it was acceptable even 
by those who were initially opposed to it. This is the context of Wiredu’s consensual 
democracy as defined by dialogue and willingness to give up one’s position without 
forsaking the truth (Wiredu, 1996:183). Arguably, therefore, it can be deduced, as a 
matter of fact, that traditional African political decisions commanded holistic 
justification and not what Wall would call ‘piecemeal justification’. By piecemeal 
justification, Wall means the bindingness of authoritative directive that is not uniform 
across the range of subjects to whom the directive applies (Wall, 2006:86). Piecemeal 
justification rightly applies to the practice of Western democracy whose authority lies 
in the mere aggregation of numbers – the principle of majoritarianism. Thi s normally 
leaves the minority not only with their voices not heard, but also with their needs not 
met18.  
 
Joshua Kassner, in the article “Debate: Is everything really up for grabs? The 
relationship between democratic values and democratic process”, looks at Jeremy 
Waldron’s argument that democratic legitimacy requires: 1) that all “good faith” 
political disagreements must be resolved through a democratically legitimate decision-
making process; 2) for a decision-making process to be democratically legitimate it must 
                                                 
18 This point relies on Kwasi Wiredu’s criticisms of majority opinion. See (Wiredu, 1996:186).  
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instantiate a fundamental democratic value – that each individual ought to be as a 
“separate moral agent with sense of justice.”19  
 
In view of this, Kassner argues that an assessment of legitimacy of democracy and its 
corresponding effectiveness in any culture must follow both conceptual priority as well 
as normative priority (Kassner, 2006:484). That is, if we have to assess what passes as 
good ‘democratic practice’ – what makes democracy democratic – it is first and 
foremost important to understand what the concept ‘democracy’ itself is. This is what 
he underlines as a case of conceptual priority. That is, one concept is prior to another 
concept if an understanding of the latter requires the former (Kassner, 2006:484).  
 
What Kassner appears to be pointing out is that it is improper to postulate whether 
democracy is legitimate or otherwise without first establishing the values associated 
with good democratic practices. For instance, following Kassner’s own illustration, one 
cannot understand what the concept “bicycle-race” means without first understanding 
what “bicycle” is as the prior concept. Resultantly, the values of democracy have a 
conceptual priority because they are the conditions under which democracy can be 
justifiably called democratic (Kassner, 2006:484).  
 
It is, therefore, clear according to Kassner that to argue as Waldron would, that the 
determination of what it means to be democratic is dependent upon a decision-making 
process that must itself be democratic for its determination to have authority, would be 
a regression and misunderstanding of conceptual priority20. 
  
                                                 
19 Waldron as quoted by Joshua Kassner (Kassner, 2006:483).  
 
20 This is one of the criticisms that Joshua Kassner labels against Jeremy Waldron’s understanding of 
conceptual priority and democratic legitimacy. See (Kassner, 2006:485).  
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In order to avoid such a misconception, Kassner proposes “Normative Priority” as a 
complementary assessment procedure to conceptual priority for what it is that passes as 
“democratic”. He argues that: 
 
What should be valued in a democratic decision-making 
process is the degree to which the process protects and 
maintains the values of democracy and the right that instantiate 
such values (Kassner, 2006:492).  
  
 
I am of the position that neither Wall’s view nor Kassner’s position can stand alone in 
determining democratic legitimacy in contemporary Africa.  Thus, in combining Wall’s 
instrumentalist monism with Kassner’s conceptual priority as well as normative priority, 
it is possible to arrive at a workable criterion of determining both legitimacy and 
effectiveness of democracy in contemporary Africa which is culture-centric. Such 
criterion may need to: 
 
…take into account not only how well political procedures 
yield correct outcomes over time for the issues for which they 
are designed to resolve, but also how they affect the welfare (in 
other ways) of those who are subject to them (Wall, 2006:95). 
 
 
It is the maintenance of the values of democracy in a decision-making process, not the 
democratic process itself, which makes the directives of a democratic process 
praiseworthy. For example, if the majority, as is the case with Western type of 
democracy, decide that an individual does not have a right that previously he/she was 
presumed to have, then the process turns out to be a mere democratic-valueless 
procedure. This explains why Kassner further argues that:  
 
A conception of democratic legitimacy that gives priority to a 
democratic process over the values the process is supposed to 
instantiate is one that fails to recognise the normative priority 
of the values of democracy (Kassner, 2006:494).  
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It can be advanced, therefore, that it is the maintenance of the values of democracy, not 
the democratic process itself, which makes democracy legitimate, effective or even 
praiseworthy for that matter. In other words, if adherence to a decision-making process 
or its directives is likely to undermine the values of democracy, as Kassner points out, 
then the process should be constrained or its outcome overridden (Kassner, 2006:494).  
 
In sum, a plausible criterion for the legitimacy and effectiveness of democracy may need 
to point out how, irrespective of good outcomes, democracy may be ontologically, 
among other things, inclusive, just and fair, et cetera. This background and 
understanding of how to determine democratic legitimacy and effectiveness, offers the 
basis for understanding African democracy. Consequently, the study now pays attention 
to the nature and practice of democracy in the traditional African polity, and its 
subsequent bearing on modern democratic practice in Africa. 
 
1.4 African democracy 
 
In this section, as has already been alluded to above, the study focuses on the existence, 
nature and practice of African democracy in traditional polity and how it can be brought 
to bear on modern democracy. The guiding questions are: i) Does traditional Africa have 
a democracy; and what is its nature? ii) Of what relevance is such a democracy to 
contemporary democratic practice in Africa? To address these concerns, it is argued that 
it is a misconception that democracy must mean a Western-style of governance with 
individuals making decisions and issue-oriented interest groups lobbying for specific 
outcomes. Such a misconception overlooks the specificity of a people’s cultural and 
social orientation. I suppose this may lead to a disregard of the way Africans 
traditionally or even democratically organised their lives. To this end, what matters most 
is to establish the nature of democracy that operated in traditional Africa.  
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1.4.1 The traditional African democracy 
 
To begin with, Wiredu addresses himself to the nature of decision making in traditional 
Africa, which he says was by consensus21. He sees consensus as playing a key role not 
only in matters of political governance, but also as being the order of the day in African 
social interactions and deliberations (Wiredu, 1996:182). It is important to point out that 
Wiredu’s conception of democracy by consensus is greatly influenced by the desire and 
search for an alternative political paradigm to the majoritarian – or multiparty – 
democracy, which among other things, he sees as characterised by competitive power 
struggles rendering it too adversarial, aggressive and divisive; and resultantly, harmful 
to the post-colonial African polities (Wiredu, 1996:187).  
 
It is against the foregoing consideration that Wiredu makes a compelling case for a 
“radical” and “thorough-going” consensus mode of democracy. He argues that in 
traditional Africa consensus was axiomatic for joint action – the pursuit of which “was 
a deliberate effort to go beyond decision by the majority opinion” (Wiredu, 1996:186). 
Majority opinion, he argues, is a mere aggregation of numbers making it easier to 
achieve and less preferred to consensus. To stress this point, Wiredu gives an example 
of the Ashanti community that he argues pursued consensus as a preferred option to 
majority opinion because it offered the least resistance in a given matter of decision-
making. He writes: 
 
To them, majority opinion is not in itself a good enough basis 
for decision making, for it deprives the minority of the right to 
have their will reflected in the given decision. Or, to put it in 
terms of the concept of representation, it deprives the minority 
of the right of representation in the decision in question. 
(Wiredu, 1996:186).  
 
 
                                                 
21 The notion of democracy by consensus as conceived by Kwasi Wiredu is a primal attempt of reaching 
out to Africa’s traditional past for an alternative democratic paradigm to the majoritarian type of modern 
times. It has generated a lot of debate and even criticisms from many scholars and African philosophers 
– notably, Emmanuel Eze Chukwudi, Joe Teffo, Edward Wamala, and Bernard Matolino among others. 
Nevertheless, it is not within the scope of this study to respond to such criticisms labelled against 
consensual democracy. 
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It is to be pointed out that what makes consensus to be a preferred democratic political 
option for Africa to the majoritarian type is that it – consensus – operated in such a 
manner that it did not place any one group of persons consistently in the position of a 
minority as is common with the majoritarian democracies of modern times22. While 
consensus does not guarantee a total agreement, the most important thing to note is that 
the interlocutors at a discussion may reach an agreement on what ought to be done 
without forsaking their opinion about what is true.  
 
In Wiredu’s own words: 
 
...consensus usually presupposes an original position of 
diversity. Because issues did not always polarize opinion on 
lines of strict contradictoriness, dialogue can function, by 
means, for example, of the soothing of edges, to produce 
compromises that are agreeable to all or, at least, not obnoxious 
to any. Furthermore, where there is the will to consensus, 
dialogue can lead to a willing suspension of disagreement, 
making possible agreed actions without necessarily agreed 
notions (1996:183).   
  
 
It is in this connection that democracy by consensus ensured that the interest of either 
group was catered for – be they in the minority or otherwise. This is basically because 
consensual democracy guaranteed a substantive representation that went over and above 
mere formal representation23. In consequence, it ensured that each person was 
represented not only in council but also in counsel in any matter to his interest or those 
of their groups (Wiredu, 1996:186).  In sum, I suppose that what makes consensus an 
important element in democratic practice is its concern not with the good of oneself, but 
rather the good of the whole – the common good. 
 
                                                 
22 Majoritarian democracy as a “tyranny of numbers” in most modern democracies operate in such a way 
that larger communities in a multi-ethnic society come together in a coalition to win an election. By so 
doing, they render smaller ethnic communities to be in perpetual political limbo. 
23 For a detailed analysis of the two kinds of representations see Wiredu (1996:186).  
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In his book African Indigenous Political ideology: Africa’s cultural Interpretation of 
Democracy, David Maillu argues that traditional Africa had a democracy whose roots 
were embedded in the communal life of the people – it was a kind of democracy which 
made it possible for everyone to enjoy life and be concerned with everyone else’s 
wellbeing (Maillu, 1997:239). It is to be pointed out that what Maillu holds as the true 
nature of African democracy is sensitivity and responsibility, which characterise 
concern for other people’s wellbeing.  
 
According to Maillu, in the traditional African polity, democracy was realised in loving 
one’s neighbour as oneself. As such, it was a democracy which provided the poor people 
with an opportunity to be heard and to be given the help they deserved (Maillu, 
1997:239).  
 
In view of the foregoing, it is argued that African traditional democracy was so imbued 
with the way of life of the Africans that it was defined by their very traditional social 
structure as Naomi Mitchison writes:  
 
There are no loose ends in tribal society. Everyone is held in a 
network of relationships.... It makes for closeness, for social 
classes staying as they are, for carefully exclusive systems of 
aid and occupation. The orphan and the aged will have some 
place in it. The sick will not be entirely neglected. Everybody 
may be undernourished, but few will starve (Mitchison, 
1970:60).  
 
 
In his article titled “Africa and the prospects of deliberative democracy”, Emmanuel 
Ifeanyi Ani sees African traditional democracy as that which is hinged on the culture of 
deliberation of the Africans. He argues for a deliberative24 type of democracy as 
                                                 
24 Deliberative democracy can be equated with consensual democracy. The process of achieving both 
lies in the recognition of other members’ “deliberative capacity”. That is, in deliberation or consensus 
building, human beings owe one another the reasons for their proposals (see Ani 2013:211, Wiredu 
1996:182-190).  
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characteristic of the traditional African polity (Ani, 2013:207).  For Ani, the modern 
state in Africa lacks the art of deliberation since, unfortunately so, it is defined by an 
inherited colonial type of aggregative democracy. He writes:  
 
The emergence of the modern state structure, which can often 
encompass a multiplicity of traditional societies, is a 
development that has extended the social arena beyond the 
boundaries of the immediate traditional community into a 
multiethnic society. This sociospatial extension was not 
accompanied by an equal extension of deliberative institutions, 
since the modern state inherited the aggregative democracy of 
colonial masters (Ani, 2013:207) 
 
 
Ani underscores the importance of deliberation in the practice of democracy in 
traditional African polity. He argues that it was a mechanism for sustaining inclusivity 
in primordial African societies. However, its lack thereof in modern democracies has 
led to “the aggregative pitting of societies, ethnicities, political ideologies, and even 
religious worldviews against each other” (Ani, 2013:207). It is in view of the foregoing 
that it can be argued that there is an urgent need for deliberation to ameliorate the current 
democratic practice in Africa. Again Ani underscores this urgency by pointing out that 
“Without a deliberative culture, aggregative democracy stands the danger of translating 
into a self-defeating technocracy” (2013:2008). This necessitates a look into how 
African democracy was practiced.  
 
1.4.2 The practice of African democracy  
 
This section delves into the practice of democracy in traditional African polity. Building 
on Ani’s concept of deliberation, I seek to make particular reference to the practice of 
consensual democracy; and argue that the practice of African democracy primarily 
requires the act of deliberation. That is, it is deliberation that legitimises the practice of 
democracy in any polity. This is because, as Ani rightly points out, deliberation is 
pegged on the understanding that each member of the society must recognise others’ 
deliberative capacity and that we owe one another reasons for our proposals (Ani, 
2013:213).  
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In addressing the practice of African democracy, Wiredu focuses on the question of how 
consensual democracy worked by referring to the Ashanti traditional political system. 
He notes that every clan was the basic political unit of the Ashanti system. He writes:  
 
Every such unit has a head, and every such head is 
automatically a member of the council, which is the governing 
body of the town or village. The qualifications for lineage 
headship are seniority in age, wisdom, a sense of civic 
responsibility and logical persuasiveness (Wiredu, 1996:184).  
 
 
This is why Wiredu places the responsibility of lineage headship in the hands of a chief. 
Nowhere in traditional Africa was a chief a young, inexperienced and unwise individual. 
On the contrary, the chief was a senior member of the community whose wisdom 
revolved around concern for the common good of his kinsmen and women. In the 
discharge of his functions, the chief presided over the council not as a superior member 
or final arbiter, but as a symbol and expression of consensus reached by the councillors. 
In relation to his councillors, the chief was simply the primus inter pares, the first among 
equals, who facilitated consensus building on matters of communal interest before the 
council. As Wiredu notes, the chief’s personal word was not law (Wiredu, 1996:185).  
 
According to Wiredu consensus operated at all levels of government; its workability 
made possible by it being a premeditated option. That is, the ultimate focus of consensus 
is the common good based on the belief that the interest of all members of a society is 
the same, although their immediate perceptions of those interests may be different. 
Resultantly, the attainment of communal good is based on dialogue made possible by 
the innate ability of human beings to cut through their differences to their “rock bottom 
of identity interests” (Wiredu, 1996:185).  
 
The Ashanti valued rational discussion since logical persuasiveness was a prerequisite 
to holding office. In Wiredu’s view this is what primarily made consensus attractive to 
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democracy. Besides, it encompassed both formal and substantive representation. It was 
not a party system of government based on a mere sway of the majority. Rather it was 
a government of participation in power and not appropriation of and competition in 
power by the majority. All in all, consensus is cooperation not confrontation – a radical 
decision to go beyond the majority opinion to represent the minority in the final outcome 
(Wiredu, 1996:186-187). Wiredu’s argument is practical in the sense that the practice 
of Western democracy has increased competition for power without at the same time 
increasing inclusiveness. It is this lack of inclusivity that, in my view, undermines 
Western democracy. In line with these arguments, it is crucial to look at how consensus 
can be brought to bear on modern democratic practice in Africa.  
 
1.4.3 Relevance of African democracy  
 
Having looked at how African democracy worked, it is important to look at its bearing 
on modern democratic practice in Africa. Proponents25 of African democracy argue that 
the challenges of modern democracy in Africa – majoritarian or aggregative – relate to 
the form of decision-making which, based on mere aggregation of numbers, ends up 
creating cleavages in every sphere of political life.  Ani particularly notes that:  
 
 
Preoccupation with multiparty aggregative democracy in 
Africa has produced superficial forms of political/electoral 
choice making by subjects that deepen pre-existing ethnic and 
primordial cleavages (2013:207) 
 
This challenge is further compounded by the fact that aggregative democracy regards 
voting26 as the basic standard for decision-making, instead of its usual function of being 
a last resort in cases of intractability (Ani, 2013:208). Wiredu sees voting in modern 
African polity as a foreign political import – the hinge upon which majoritarian 
                                                 
25 Mostly Kwasi Wiredu and Emmanuel Ifeanyi Ani. 
26 Ani recognises the existence of intractability in every sphere of life making voting a basic human 
solution to it (see Ani, 2013:208).  Wiredu does not share this view and sees voting as a unfortunate 
foreign political imposition (see Wiredu 1996:184)  
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democracy turns – leading to a government of “consent” without consensus (Wiredu, 
1996:183-184). In view of this, I argue that it is not gainsaying that modern democracies 
so characterised by heterogeneity, need to incorporate the art of deliberation for the 
realisation of national integration. Besides, deliberation plays a key role in this, since 
firstly, it is a process in which the members of a political community participate in 
public discussion and critical examination of communally binding public policies and 
not the pursuit of some individual interests.  
 
Secondly, following logically from the first point above, the process of deliberation 
through which these policies are reached is not just a model of political bargaining, but 
a commitment to the common good. The very nature of deliberation demands that the 
interests of no particular member of the polity have a priori precedence over those of 
any other (Valdez, 2001:30). This explains why Wiredu argues that consensus, as a 
procedure of political decision, requires persuasion of each representative not only of 
the optimality of each decision, but also of the practical necessity (1996:89).  
 
In respect to the political rhetoric of modern democracies where politicians campaign 
promising heaven without the potentiality of delivering the sky, it is important that 
consensus is brought to bear. This is because consensual democracy as is the case with 
deliberative democracy is based on rationality and it aims at truth. As Matolino notes:  
 
...the dialogue is aimed at rendering bare the opposing views, 
understanding their content and aims; and most crucially the 
dialogue would be directed at building bridges between 
disparate opinions (Matolino, 2009:40).  
 
My reading of Matolino is that he is basically alluding to the force of argument in 
consensus building as having the most weight as opposed to mere political rhetoric and 
empty persuasions of politicians. The context of understanding may be interpreted to 
mean that consensus is not manipulative and coercive, and is not an emotive appeal for 
fostering sectarian or jingoistic interests of politicians in modern times. Rather, it is a 
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willingness to modify their proposals on the basis of the most complete and compelling 
information available. 
 
The process of consensus building provides consensual democracy with a foundation of 
political legitimacy. Since consent is at the centre of democratic decision making, 
consensus remains the vehicle through which the populace can justify self-imposed laws 
and policies that are communally binding (Valadez, 2001:32). Consensual democracy 
refines the process of autonomous self-governance by placing conditions on the 
deliberative process, which ensures that the outcomes of deliberation do not merely 
aggregate existing desires but reflect a higher degree of collective knowledge and 
mutual responsibility. The political legitimacy of consensual outcomes is based not 
merely on the will of the majority, but on the results of collective reasoned reflection, 
which respects the moral and practical concerns of all the populace.  
 
In sum, consensus is a conditio sine qua non for the realisation of cohesion in modern 
democracies in order to ward off the challenge of mere aggregation of numbers – of the 
majority over the minority – which, in Wiredu’s own conception is the quintessence of 
uncooperativeness, an epiphenomenon of colonialism, and antithetical to the spirit of 
communalism (Wiredu, 2010:1060-1).   
 
The understanding of African democracy, its various features, and how it operated in 
the traditional polity begs a consideration of the challenges that democracy faces today. 
An outline of such challenges may provide a common launching pad upon which 
African traditional political values may be brought to bear on contemporary democratic 
practice in Africa.  
 
1.5 Challenges to democracy in Africa: an outline 
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In this section, the study presents a critical overview of the democratic challenges in 
Africa. It is noted that we have reached a point in history where democracy faces serious 
threats not only in the developing world – Africa – but also in the developed ones where 
it has been established for centuries (Pardo and Schwartz, 2007:15). That is to say, there 
are new and powerful developments the world over, which not only jeopardise but also 
significantly determine how democracies perform. Such developments – terrorism, 
globalisation, worldwide economic depression  - are, as Jose´ Pardo and Pedro Schwartz 
point out, just among a few threats to the practice of democracy in the world today 
(Pardo and Schwartz, 2007:15). Nevertheless, as Abdulahi Osman observes, a great 
majority of diagnosis of what ails Africa, and particularly Africa’s democratic challenge 
in contemporary times, rightly points to “political institutions and their failure to sustain 
governance that is supposed to spark social and economic development” (Osman, 
2008:127).  
 
That there is discontent of postcolonial democracy in Africa is, therefore, not in doubt. 
While the practices of popular authority, elections and public discussion – in the form 
of media briefing – are entrenched in the exercise of power, modern democratic practice 
in Africa is far from producing models of governance that the populace can freely 
accept. It can be argued that the democratic practice has simply failed to produce the 
kind of social order of the African traditional political modus vivendi. The concept of 
political equality, for instance, is fiercely contested in most circumstances. As a result, 
the politics of the belly27 – where a selfish attitude is best captured in the phrase “it is 
our time to eat”28 – reproduces inequality through structures of racism, ethnicity and 
patriarchy that the African society does not exemplify to an unconscionable degree 
(Mehta, 2003:38). In this case, inequality becomes an existential burden that inflicts 
psychic costs by diminishing a sense of self. That is, when inequality imposes the 
profoundest burdens – by denying individuals the minimum regard due to them - it 
leaves an indelible mark and sense of political discontent (Mehta, 2003:38-9). This leads 
to a perpetual desire for true democracy, which in essence, is a perpetual desire to have 
                                                 
27 For more information on “politics of the belly” see (Patrick Chabal, 2009).   
28 This attitude is expressive of neo-patrimonialism politics where an individual rules by dint of personal 
prestige and power granting favours to his relatives and political cronies without following “the rules of 
the game”. See (Bratton &Van de Walle, 1997:61ff).  
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one’s moral worth29 recognised in a democratic setting. In view of the foregoing, it can 
be pointed out that inequality in democracy leads to lack of legitimacy and internal 
cohesion of most post-colonial polities in Africa.  
 
The lack of democratic legitimacy has also created another challenge for democracy in 
Africa; that is, the underlying assumption that democratic practice ipso facto leads to 
economic development. Nevertheless, a look at the living and social conditions of 
African peoples reveals a deteriorating trend. This raises a fundamental question about 
the meaning of democratic practice in Africa. It renders the democracy-development 
continuum invalid. There are many autocratic countries in Africa perpetuating poverty 
and oppression. In fact, according to Pratap, this points to a greater challenge of the 
persistent gap between the outcomes that people expect from the government, on the 
one hand, and the government’s capacity to attend to their wellbeing on the other 
(Pratap, 2003:35). In this regard, there is also the gap between increased demand of 
accountability and reflective effectiveness.  
 
According to Osaghae, another challenge associated with the practice of Western 
democracy in Africa relates to the fact that Western democracy thrives dangerously on 
the exclusivist politics of winner-takes-all. He asserts that this requires a reassessment 
of democratic practice (Osaghae, 1999:17-18). Evidently in a multi-ethnic democracy, 
there is a need for values of tolerance and consultation as well as principles of power-
sharing, decentralisation, political inclusivity, et cetera, which are in short supply in 
modern democracy in Africa. 
 
All in all, it can be advanced that there is, generally, the faltering of democratisation in 
Africa with delegitimizing and other attenuating effects on the establishment of true 
                                                 
29 It is to be noted that one’s moral worth in Africa is to be understood in its communal matrix. The 
individual is in constant dialogical and relational inclusivity with the community. As such the individual 
is a participant in the lives of others. See Augustine Nwoye’s, “Remapping the Fabric of African Self: A 
Synoptic Theory” (2006:128-9).   
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democratic regimes occasioned by failure to grant equality of access to state-controlled 
resources to the various groups (Osaghae, 1999:15). 
  
1.6 Conclusion 
 
This chapter set out, first and foremost, to provide a concise overall view of what 
democracy entails. It specifically unravelled the meaning of “democracy”, and pointed 
out that the concept attracts many a definition. As such, it is not possible to cover each 
and every aspect of democracy. In Dahl’s own description of the multiplicity of 
democracy’s meanings “the term democracy is like an ancient kitchen midden packed 
with assorted leftovers from twenty-five hundred years of continuous usage” (Dahl, 
1982:5). Thus, the chapter has attempted to indicate and clarify some of the key points 
concerning the nature of the concept of democracy and its relationship to the political 
systems with which is associated. This attempt is worthwhile not because democracy is 
important, but rather that considerations of the concept of democracy and its relationship 
with political reality, is fraught with difficulty and confusion.  
 
 
As such, when properly conceived – of course as an ideal – democracy must satisfy 
certain criteria, which ensure collective participation, availability of choice, or 
diminished inequality. Democratic principles can be expressed in a variety of 
institutional forms, including those that embody cultural preferences derived from 
African traditions. That is, true democracy can be realised through mutuality, or 
achievement of consensus, or solidarity.  
 
 
Against the foregoing, it was underscored that in Africa – as should also be the case 
with other societies – democracy is unlikely to work, or to endure, unless it is compatible 
with the fundamental beliefs of the people. In consequence, the legitimacy of democracy 
derives from the principle of popular sovereignty. That is, ordinary citizens are equally 
endowed with the right and ability to govern themselves. In disregard of this fact, 
democracy is bound to face challenges of deep uneasiness by the populace about its 
actual workings – illegitimacy – signaling an apparent ambiguous future. 
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Furthermore, democratic legitimacy in Africa can only be achieved when the people 
fully participate in its creation through a deliberative process of consensus building that 
allows for their fundamental values to be revealed. Resultantly, there is a need to jettison 
the mistaken assumption that Western typologies of democracy transplanted in Africa 
during the colonial period, carry with them the seed of liberation for Africa’s socio-
political maladies. It is on this account that the study takes an in-depth critical and 
analytical assessment of the failure of democracy in contemporary Africa in the 
succeeding chapter.  
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CHAPTER TWO 
 
 
 
FAILURE OF DEMOCRACY IN AFRICA 
 
 
 
 
As long as the locus of accountability is externally located and 
democratization is approached by the elites simply as an opportunity for 
power competition, so long will the establishment of the democratic 
regimes remain a mirage in Africa. 
 
[Eghosa Osaghae, Democratization in Sub-Saharan Africa: 
Faltering Prospects, New Hopes, 1999] 
 
 
2.1 Introduction  
 
 
This chapter presents a philosophical account of the failure of democracy in Africa. It 
is argued that variants of colonial democracies as they operated in the West and how 
they were transplanted in Africa are responsible for the failure of democracy in Africa 
today. Since Western democracy is basically at variance with African cultural political 
values, it is argued here that the main problems that are associated with democratic 
practice in Africa – illegitimacy and ineffectiveness – are a result of the European 
disregard of the African traditional political values. These problems have exacerbated 
rather than reduced the disjuncture between the political elites and the state on the one 
hand, and society and ordinary people – the masses – on the other in modern 
democracies in Africa.  It is on this understanding that the following section gives an 
analysis of the colonial antecedent of the challenges of democracy in Africa today.  
 
 
 
 
  
2.2 The Colonial antecedent  
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The emergence of European democracy, as Charles Tilly points out, resulted from 
moments in the revolutions of the 1840s when new regimes temporarily installed both 
representative legislatures and general male suffrage. That is, the essence of European 
democracy is best defined and explained by their experience with adult suffrage and 
elections. Tilly further points out that within this historical context of the installation of 
European democracy, authoritarian regimes also emerged sapping the legislative power 
without necessarily eliminating its election component (Tilly, 2004:214).   
 
However, the European democratisation outside Europe, as scholars point out, was 
carried out through colonisation, conquest, confrontation and revolution, thereby 
promoting both democracy and tyranny (Albernethy, 2000:55-60). In consequence, the 
introduction of European democracy in Africa was, as Monica Flores argues: 
 
…framed within a history of European violent colonization 
over most parts of the planet, traditionally interpreted by 
enlightened Europeans as a historical mission to [politically] 
civilise the world (Flores, 2005:5).  
 
This perspective explains why by the midpoint of the nineteenth century, the European 
political elite had accepted the civilising logic of imperialism as propagated by the 
intellectual class. European empires were justified on the basis of good government and 
the transmission through education of civilising values. Resultantly, as Nana Poku and 
Anna Mdee correctly point out, Africa would only exist in the European mind as the 
barbaric other – creating an avenue of politics of dominance to be pursued against 
people of difference (Poku and Mdee, 2011:12).  
 
The emerging problem of democratic practice in Africa, therefore, as Eghosa Osaghae 
observes, is informed by such history and experience, which supports the colonial 
mission by the universal claim that only European or Western democracy can yield 
better political governance (Osaghae, 1999:10). It is advanced here that Western 
democracy is dangerously hinged on the assumption of racial superiority on which the 
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whole edifice of colonial administration depended. This has led to different political-
cum-social stratifications of modern society as a way of occupying and articulating 
power and status. 
 
The colonial exercise of power – directly or indirectly – also led to daunting democratic 
problems in Africa. The direct rule involved the replacement of African traditional 
authority with the rule by white administration whose officers were sent from the 
metropole (Poku and Mdee, 2011:13). This, arguably, led to the breakdown of African 
traditional power structures. Conversely, where indirect rule30 was prominent, a local 
oligarchy was subsumed and made reliant upon the metropole. This had two effects; 
firstly, for the colonial regime, it was cheaper to administer and had the effect of boxing 
African people into ethnic or ‘tribal’ units31. Secondly, the local oligarchy became an 
autocratic organ of imposition of colonial power. Through corporation with traditional 
leadership, particularly in the rural areas, the colonial regimes were able to withhold 
modernising influences applied in the colonies from other parts of the country, sowing 
the seed for political mistrust and inter-group rivalry (Poku and Mdee, 2011:18).   
 
All in all, authority was invariably located in remote European-style new urban places 
for economic expediency. That is to say, the colonial administration removed itself from 
those regions and peoples, which at least formally, were not deemed economically 
viable (Poku and Mdee, 2011:18). This, arguably, is what has led to disregard of certain 
constituencies not considered viable either in terms of votes or in terms of economic 
gain in modern democracies in Africa. It can be held against the foregoing that nothing 
else can better account for the unbridled disregard and neglect– as far as development 
is concerned – of certain regions in Africa’s contemporary democratic practice. 
 
                                                 
30 Indirect rule was mainly found in the rural areas, which places the Europeans considered unsuitable 
for farming and settlement. Such places were regarded as lacking in substantial resources such as 
minerals, thus they were hardest to permeate by the colonial administrative machine due to the paucity 
of resources. See (Poku and Mdee, 2011:17). 
31 On this ground it is held among scholars that ethnicity was a great colonial invention that involved 
ascribing monolithic identities for colonialists’ own interest (Ranger, 1996; Vail, 1993). 
  
50  
  
Kwame Gyekye also sees functionality problems of democracy in contemporary Africa 
as having their roots in colonial epistemic orientation. He argues that “political 
institutions that were bequeathed to the African people by colonial rulers…modeled on 
those colonial rulers, did not function properly” (Gyekye, 1997:115). In line with 
Gyekye’s argument, Kwandiwe Kondlo and Chinenyengozi Ejiougu underscore the fact 
that colonial mentality is to blame for the failure of democratic governance in the post-
colonial contemporary Africa. They observe that the arbitrary manner in which 
European powers carved up the continent into colonial states produced enduring 
negative implications on democratic practice as such. They write: 
 
The deliberate disregard  by the European colonisers for those 
African nationalities whose normatively democratic 
institutions they found incompatible with the colonial project 
they erected throughout the continent...helped to create 
negative consequences for governance in post-colonial 
contemporary Africa (Kondlo and Ejiogu, 2011:xix). 
  
 
Against the foregoing, it is important to look at the nature of Western democracies, and 
how they operated or do operate in Africa in the twenty-first century. My focus is liberal 
democracy as the commonly practiced type of democracy in Africa together with its 
associated aftermath, directed democracy.  
 
 
2.2.1 The consequence of liberal democracy  
 
 
To begin with, there is liberal democracy wherein the powers of government are limited 
by laws and citizens enjoy freedom of association to compete for office in free elections 
at regular intervals. John Stuart Mill is regarded as the father of modern liberal 
democratic theory.  He conceived liberal democracy to be of a representative type. Such 
a democracy, he observed, should give people the most important liberties: freedom of 
conscience, thought and feeling, holding and expressing opinions, pursuing one’s life 
plans and combining with others for any (non-ulterior) motive.  He particularly argued, 
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as far as democracy is concerned, that direct citizen participation in the affairs of 
government should be encouraged so as to engender confidence in them about their 
ability to govern themselves and of developing intellectual talents and communal, moral 
values. Nonetheless, given the nature of large societies, he thought that the ideal 
typology of a perfect government would be representative democracy (Mill, 1991a 
[1861]:256). All in all, major characterisation of liberal democracy entails both 
participation and equality. These elements constitute what Mill himself regards as the 
‘pure idea of democracy’. That is ‘government of the whole people, by the whole people, 
equally represented’, which requires proportional representation so as not to deny the 
minority the right to governmental representation (Mill, 1991a [1861]:302-3). 
 
In Africa, the experience with liberal democracy was more pronounced in the so-called 
“third wave of democratisation”32 of the 1990s. This wave, arguably, contributed to 
some notable changes on the continent. In 1994, for example, it marked the end of 
apartheid and inauguration of majority rule in South Africa; and as Victor Adetulla 
observes, it led to the expansion of political space in a number of one-party states – 
leading to the end of personal rule of some “leaders” notably, Mobutu Sese Seko in then 
Zaire, Hastings Kamuzu Banda in Malawi, Kenneth Kaunda in Zambia (Adetulla, 
2011:15) and Daniel arap Moi in Kenya. Liberal democracy helped to put an end to 
authoritarian and dictatorial regimes; and today the continent lives in and celebrates the 
era of multi-party elections.  
 
In spite of these apparent positive developments, I argue that the practice of liberal 
democracy in contemporary Africa has produced more political contradictions than 
solutions. For instance, the success of multi-racial elections in post-apartheid South 
Africa, as elsewhere on the continent, has not guaranteed the incorporation of all social 
groups into the democratic system. The phenomenon of multiparty elections in Africa 
often leads to a sense of political disaffection that ordinarily manifests itself in 
                                                 
32 Susanna D. Wing in her book, Constructing democracy in Africa: Mali in Transition, underscores that 
the “third wave of democracy” in Africa actually began in 1989; and despite the many changes including 
adopting new constitutions, only a handful of states in Africa have laid groundwork for “more 
democratic” polities (Wing, 2008:1).  
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violence.33 As a result, there is an apparent tendency of leaning toward power-sharing 
arrangements after “stolen” or “sham” elections. This, as Adetulla rightly observes, 
leads to deep questioning of the commitment of Africa’s new found democracies to 
constitutionalism and rule of law – perceived key tenets of liberal democracy (Adetulla, 
2011:15). My thinking is that this is a pointer to the fact that democracy requires more 
than periodic holding of elections.  
 
The equation of multi-party elections with democracy has led to very dubious outcomes 
in contemporary Africa. Claude Ake argues that liberal democracy is not in the least 
emancipatory especially in African conditions since it offers the people rights they 
cannot exercise, voting that never amounts to choosing, freedom that is patently 
spurious, and political equality that distinguishes highly unequal power relations (Ake, 
1996:6). It can be advanced following Ake’s argument that the existence of multiple 
parties and the conduct of periodic elections in Africa is neither a sufficient precondition 
nor a reliable indicator of democracy. The conduct of periodic elections, in the final 
analysis, boils down to a “leader” being declared the winner of elections by an 
institution34 instead of being chosen, that is, upholding the choice of the people. In most 
cases the phenomena of post-election violence that abound on the continent arise from 
such realities.  
 
The concern of liberal democracy primarily with elections – how elections determine 
who will be in a position to exercise state power – is indifferent to the character of the 
                                                 
33 Multi-party elections in Africa have not led to democracy that the people desire. For instance, despite 
the Nigerian successful ‘second transition’ following 2003 elections, the case of 2007 agitation for 
democracy dividends, paints a rather gloomy picture. Kenya’s disputed elections in 2007 which triggered 
violence resulting in many deaths after the then incumbent, President Mwai Kibaki allegedly ‘stole’ the 
elections; the Zimbabwean 2008 violence triggered by election flaws and human rights abuses – leading 
to a power sharing deal between President Robert Mugabe and the opposition Movement for Democratic 
Change (MDC) – all these point to a continent in deficiency of democracy and, at best, still agitating for 
“democracy dividends” (Lewis and Alemika, 2005:vi). 
34 Mostly there are electoral bodies, for example, Independent Electoral and Boundaries Commission 
(IEBC) in Kenya; whose final announcement of election results is not only official but also final 
regardless of whether such declaration goes counter to the people’s choice as is usually the case. The 
problems associated with such institutions are anybody’s guess. In most cases such electoral bodies are 
compromised by incumbent leadership right from the way they are constituted; as a result the peoples’ 
choice in an election is sacrificed on the altar of political expediency and interest of the incumbent.  
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state in Africa. It has produced a social context that has continued to work against the 
emergence of true democracy – further immersing the state in social contradictions – 
that render it unable to effectively be responsive to the needs of the populace. In a 
situation where the leadership of a state is given to the ‘popular’ as opposed to the 
‘competent’, the interest of the majority is most likely to undermine the common good; 
and this leads to lack of justice and accountability on the part of the ruler to the 
governed. This eventually leads to a total lack of democracy per se, which manifests 
itself in the form of a directed dictatorship-type of democracy.  
 
 
2.2.2 The consequence of directed democracy 
 
A second type of democracy in contemporary Africa – a sequel of liberal democracy, 
so to speak – is the one that accepts the principle that rulers should be accountable to 
the governed, but is dispensed, all the same, with the political method of multiparty 
electoral competition. This type of democracy, which, I choose to call directed 
democracy35, is a form of directed dictatorship. It is government by “guardians” of 
public wealth who normally insist upon political uniformity. It is to be noted that 
political uniformity, by its very nature, leads to an obvious problem of too little 
democracy within political parties. Jose´ Casas Pardo and Pedro Schwartz attest to this 
very problem, which they see as apparently responsible for the placement of 
incompetent people in positions of leadership.  
 
 
They write: 
 
To begin with, their members include only a small fraction of 
the population. In addition, the means of becoming a leader of 
a political party (and therefore, a potential ruler) is generally 
rather undemocratic: maneuvering, being subservient to the 
                                                 
35 The term directed democracy is adapted from Richard L. Sklar in his article “Democracy in Africa” 
(Sklar 1983:12-13).  
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people above, creating power groups within the party, being 
photogenic and so on. Generally speaking, elected leaders are 
not necessarily the most able ones (Pardo and Schwartz, 
2007:17).  
 
 
It is to be noted, therefore, that this model of democracy can be equated to the 
aggregative model in which individuals in the polity have varying preferences about 
what they want government to do. Besides, they know too that other individuals also 
have their own preferences – competing interests – which may or may not match theirs.  
Thus, the sole goal of democracy is reduced to deciding what leaders, rules and policies 
will, at best, correspond to the most widely and strongly held preferences (Young, 
2007:19). Arguably, this amounts to the populace behaving strategically by re-orienting 
their tactics to their perceptions of the activities of competing preferences. 
 
The emerging problem associated with such behaviour is simple; the outcome of both 
elections and legislative decisions reflects the mere aggregation of the “strongest” or the 
most widely held preferences among the populace. This definitely puts in great conflict 
the question of democracy and justice. About this phenomenon, Young rightly 
postulates that: 
 
While some preferences may be motivated by self-interest, 
others by altruistic care for others, and still others by a sense of 
fair play, the aggregative model offers no means of 
distinguishing among such motives. There are no criteria for 
distinguishing the quality of preferences by their content, origin 
or motive. [...] this model values some [preferences] more than 
others only extrinsically according to how many or few hold 
them or how strongly (Young, 2007:20).  
 
 
 
Against this backdrop, democracy in contemporary Africa only passes as a mechanism 
for identifying and aggregating the preferences of the populace in order to learn which 
of those preferences are held in the greatest number or with the greatest intensity. This 
leads to a situation whereby the citizens adhere to their own preferences without the 
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possibility of interacting with those of opposing views. Besides, it yields to a common 
political phenomenon in contemporary Africa, namely, the influence of opinion polls 
by politicians. Politicians – as opposed to statesmen – rule by dint of preferences of the 
public irrespective of whether the outcomes of such preferences would  be reasonable 
and good for the community or not (Pardo and Schwartz, 2007:18). This sacrifices 
deliberation on the altar of jingoistic interests of a group with no possibility of political 
coordination and cooperation, which are central to true democracy (Young, 2007:20).  
 
John Dryzek sees another problem associated with this aggregative model of democracy 
as carrying a thin and individualistic form of rationality. He argues that the model is 
sceptical about the possibility of normative and evaluative objectivity. It denies that 
people can make claims on others about what is good or just, or can defend such claims 
objectively without appealing to the subjective preferences or interests of themselves 
(Dryzek, 1990:125).   
 
In consequence, aggregative democracy offers no motivational basis for accepting as 
legitimate the outcomes of a democratic process. The outcome normally reflects the 
most widely held preferences, and so there is no reason for those who do not share those 
preferences – the minority segment of the population – to abide by them. Such segment 
of people is left without a choice; in most cases they may simply be compelled to submit, 
given the obvious reason that they fall within the matrix of the minority segment of the 
population. This further accounts for yet another problem of modern democracies, 
namely, the abounding low and relatively small public participation in decisions on the 
issues that concern them, and which are, therefore, unfortunately left to be decided by 
the “government” or politicians. 
 
In sum, since the de facto liberal democracy and its directed-dictatorship sequel were 
bequeathed to Africa by colonial rulers, they lacked cultural roots upon which to stably 
stand thereby posing fundamental challenges and the subsequent failure of democracy 
in contemporary Africa. Such challenges invite critical analysis. In the section that 
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follows the study takes a critical and analytical look at the failures of democratic practice 
in contemporary Africa. 
 
 
2.3 Failures of Democracy in Africa 
 
 
In considering the failures of democracy in contemporary Africa, this study focuses 
mostly on the liberal form of democracy. This is because liberal democracy is the 
hallmark of the post-cold war global wave of democracy to consolidate hegemonic order 
(Osaghae, 1999:20). Nevertheless, as I have pointed out in the preceding section, liberal 
democracy faces a fundamental problem, which relates to the disjuncture between the 
state and society – between the political class and ordinary people. This disjuncture 
manifests itself in various forms – alienation, disempowerment and low sense of 
ownership of the state by the masses – pertinent to explaining the failures of democracy 
in contemporary Africa.   
 
 
2.3.1 Incongruity with African political landscape 
 
 
First, there is the problem of incongruity of European type of democracy with African 
values and political landscape. It is noted that European liberal democracy is not solidly 
established in Africa; and as such, it is threatened with strife and chaos arising from the 
social, cultural and political divides of the African society (Pardo and Schwartz, 
2007:1). Liberal democracy is a product of the development of the capitalistic state 
whose central organising element is the autonomous individual who is the repository of 
human rights. This is at variance with the group structure of socio-economic and 
political organisation as well as rights in Africa.36 Ake argues that the level and top-
sided nature of development in most African states do not permit of private enterprise 
taking over and commanding heights of national economies in the name of 
democratisation (Ake, 1996; 2006:17). In the same vein, African leaders of the older 
                                                 
36 Chole and Ibrahim (1995) delve much into the nature of the socio-economic variance of liberal 
democracy with African socio-economic and political organisations.  
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generation – the pre “third wave” – rejected democracy in its multi-party orientation 
because it polarizes multi-ethnic countries and reduces the capacity to keep the fragile 
nation-state intact. Former President of Kenya, Daniel arap Moi, is on record 
questioning the validity of multiparty democracy in Africa. He on many occasions 
retorted, Demokrasia! Democrasia ni kitu gani? Mwaafrika hajui demokrasia. Hiyo 
kitu itakuja kugawanya watu wetu katika makabila mbalimbali (Democracy! What kind 
of thing is democracy? Africans do not know democracy. That thing [democracy] will 
come to divide our people along ethnic lines)37.  
  
Against the foregoing, it is argued that such kinds of questioning are, actually, calls for 
social and welfare democracy congruent with African social structures. In essence, 
democracy must claim some sense of cultural relevance. However, in attempts to claim 
such relevance, as Richard Sklar argues, all but a few of them were rudely swept away 
by military coups, political usurpations and constitutional changes shortly after 
independence (Sklar, 1983:12). This could be due to the fact the hopes and aspirations 
of the populace – political freedom and the realisation of true democracy – were not 
achieved. Those who emerged as liberators from the colonial yoke soon turned out to 
be conspirators serving the needs of foreign controllers.  
 
Another major failure associated with liberal democracy’s incongruence with African 
values is its effects on the new generations. Africa’s new generations are condemned to 
grow up in an atmosphere of weaker civic values and virtues associated with Western 
societies; this definitely has a negative bearing on democracy and its future in Africa. 
The practice of democracy requires active involvement in and practice of values that 
define human beings in their social context – responsibility, respect and mutual concern 
– and not purely as individuals cut off from social networks. Unfortunately, in 
                                                 
37 In many public fora prior to 4th December, 1991 when the repeal of Section 2A that made Kenya a de 
jure one party State was made, President Moi displayed such an attitude of indifference towards critical 
issues of human rights and democracy. He basically equated the calls for democracy with the political 
rhetoric for multi-party politics; and, thus, disunity and conflict along ethnic lines (see “Wako leads the 
Burial of Section 2A in Society on December 23, 1991:26; see also Winnie Mitullah, Moris Odhiambo 
and Osogo Ambani. Kenya’s Democratisation: Gains or Losses? Appraising the Post KANU State of 
Affairs, 2005:1).   
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contemporary Africa, such values appear to have been sacrificed on the altar of the 
Western way of life. Pardo and Schwartz allude to this fact when they write:  
 
Values such as responsibility, work and effort, duty, solidarity, 
thriftiness, family, abiding by the law, respect for the elderly 
and for other people and their property, and even for their 
parents, and good manners are not totally accepted and even 
less practiced (Pardo and Schwartz, 2007:24).  
 
In view of the foregoing, it can be argued that there is an apparent focus on the self and 
individual gain rather than on the communal good reminiscent of Western cogito, which 
imperils the whole practice of democracy in an African context. In consequence, there 
is more concern with consumption and hedonism than with work, which puts the 
performance of democracy in great jeopardy since leadership positions are, in most 
cases, seen as a means of expropriating state resources rather than service and 
responsibility towards fellow men and women – citizens. 
 
If granted, then such mentality, concerns, values and attitudes associated with the 
current generation of leaders pose a real danger to democracy in contemporary Africa 
since arguably, as Gyekye points out, they constitute a type of political attitude that has 
opened the floodgates of bribery, corruption, carelessness about state property; and 
other un-ethical acts deleterious to the development and welfare of the state as such 
(Gyekye, 1997:136). This, as I argue, is in contradistinction to the African traditional 
communal life and spirit of mutual co-existence, which I suppose is hinged on the 
understanding that any injury done to the state – or community as a whole - directly 
affects the individual and vice versa as captured by John Mbiti in the expression, “I am 
because we are and since we are, therefore I am” (Mbiti, 1978:16; 1970:141). 
 
According to Samwel Makinda, the problem of liberal democracy in contemporary 
Africa can rightly be attributed to the inappropriateness of Western ideas and practices, 
the inexperience of leaders in running multi-party systems, and the general political, 
economic and social conditions of Africa (Makinda, 1996:567). This inappropriateness, 
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Makinda further observes, is occasioned by the mentality of “winner-takes-all”, which 
stems from the fact that those who control the machinery of government and 
administration have unlimited access to state resources (1996:567). It is noted that this 
is a pointer to the colonial state of affairs where the exercise of power was a matter of 
political and economic expediency, solely serving the interest of the metropole. This 
has led to an apparent lack of understanding the essence of multi-party democracy in 
contemporary Africa, which has yielded to the failure of disaggregating democracy from 
its specific Western practices. 
In consequence, despite its apparent vigour, the practice of liberal democracy in Africa 
is debilitated by the effects of economic anarchy and social distemper with only a small 
minority of the population conspicuously wealthy and privileged while the vast majority 
seethes in discontent (Sklar, 1983:13). Those who adhere to the national conscience 
deplore the plunder and waste of Africa’s wealth by corruption of those at the helm of 
political power.  
 
 2.3.2 Opportunism and corporatist tendencies  
 
There is yet another failure of democracy in contemporary Africa, which Eghosa 
Osaghae calls ‘divergent and contested operationalisation of democratization’ by a 
largely opportunistic political class in Africa (Osaghae, 1999:21). This failure is attested 
to by the high number of badly divided oppositions, mostly along ethnic lines. In many 
an instance, the so called “new leaders”38 including leaders of pro-democracy groups, 
are either former ministers or displaced members of ruling parties. This means that – for 
the political elite – democracy is a naked power game, which affords the displaced 
politician another opportunity to secure new access to and misappropriation of national 
resources (Osaghae, 1999:21). The eventual result is the circulation of political elites 
defined by multiparty elections marred with violence and suspicion; power sharing deals 
not the rule of law; and lack of accountability on the part of the political leaders. This 
                                                 
38 In most cases those who emerge as new leaders to replace authoritarian regimes were major players in 
previous governments, a fact that explains why most African countries have become “democratic” 
without being free (Osaghae, 1969:22). This is what Jaramogi Oginga Odinga, the father of multiparty 
politics in modern day Kenya referred to in his famous publication, Not Yet Uhuru (1969). Uhuru is a 
Swahili word meaning freedom.  
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scenario serves as a benchmark for weak political opposition, whereby, once the 
opposition leaders have found reasonable accommodation within government, they let 
go of their serious push for true democracy.  
 
This approach to democracy leads to corporatist tendencies, which in turn explains why, 
in most cases, leaders opt to sacrifice the common good on the altar of political 
expediency. In consequence, as Osaghae points out, the lower and middle-class citizens 
whose democratic currents normally fuel a more performance-cum-welfarist oriented 
and accountability demanding democracy, and who ordinarily demand for “democracy 
of empowerment” leading to ‘uplifment’ of the ordinary people, find themselves 
hijacked by the political elite. In most cases, their well-meaning notions of democracy 
become submerged by power politics of the political elite and the globalisation process, 
which takes the elite interest as the mainstay of democracy (Osaghae, 1999:22).  
 
This exhibits, at interplay, colonial tendencies of dependency. The elites are seen as the 
bridgehead of integration into the world’s capitalistic system. There is a praetorian 
argument which discourages “mass democracy” on account of the ‘excessive’ social and 
welfare demands of the middle and lower class. Furthermore, there appear deeper 
sources of neo-colonial paradigms of the World Bank and IMF, which exclude from the 
process the very people for whom they are designed and supposed to benefit (Osaghae, 
1999:22).  
 
 
2.3.3 Modernisation-ripeness thesis 
 
Modernisation-ripeness thesis is basically concerned with poverty, economic 
underdevelopment, low levels of industrialisation, urbanisation, national cohesion, 
underdevelopment of civic political culture, and the absence of other “social requisites” 
of democracy. Edward Keller argues that as regards this thesis, democracy may not 
work in some African countries – or is bound to fail all the same – due to low socio-
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economic and political development, which he observes, are not conducive to 
democracy (Keller, 1995:228).  
 
While it is true that Africa may be faced with acute poverty problems and low economic 
development more than in Europe or any other part of the world, these factors may only 
determine the success of liberal democracy and not necessarily that of democracy per 
se. On this argument, the modernisation-ripeness thesis does not hold. Further, in 
contradistinction to the thesis, as Osaghae argues, economic development and other 
social requisites do not in themselves guarantee democratic consolidation (Osaghae, 
1999:17). This linkage, therefore, of democracy with economic development falls flat. 
Schmitter and Karl also point out that the linkage simply cannot hold. They write:  
 
While the long-term compatibility between democracy and 
capitalism does not seem to be in doubt, despite their 
continuous tension, it is not clear whether the promotion of 
such liberal economic goals as the right of individuals to own 
property and retain profits, the closing function of marvels, the 
private settlement of disputes, the freedom to produce without 
government regulation or the privatization of state-owned 
enterprises necessarily furthers the consolidation of democracy 
(Schmitter and Karl, 1996:60).   
 
 
In this regard, there is another danger inherent in the modernisation-ripeness thesis, 
which relates to the fact that the so-called “social requisites” of democracy are confused 
to be necessary products of sound political democracy. To presume the inevitability of 
failure of democracy in Africa along these lines is tantamount to saying that Africa is 
not ripe and perhaps would not be ripe for democracy for ages to come. This, as has 
been pointed out, may only be true of liberal democracy, which is presumed to require 
a reasonable degree of capitalistic development but not democracy sui generis. The 
insistence on the social requisites of democracy has led to democracy’s dismal 
performance on the continent. In a multi-ethnic society like Africa, what is at stake is 
not necessarily the “social requisites” of democracy, but rather “political requisites”. 
There is the underdevelopment of “political requisites” defined by lack of values of 
tolerance and consultation; as well as political safeguards to protect the interest of 
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minorities and other marginalised and disadvantaged groups. This situation calls for 
effective multi-ethnic democracy and not “social requisites” per se, lest Africa plunges 
to the depths of sectional politics. 
 
2.3.4 Sectional politics   
 
In contemporary Africa, there is rampant ethnic mobilisation instead of issue-based 
politics. Unfortunately, most countries in Africa – Eritrea, Nigeria, Ghana, Kenya, 
Zimbabwe, Ivory Coast, et cetera – have not found an expedient alternative to ethnic 
mobilisation in their attempt to sectional parties (Osaghae, 1999:16). This has led to bad 
political behaviour both by the ruling party and the opposition. In most cases some 
African leaders are not willing to abide by the “rules of the game” and there is the failure 
of the opposition to realise that they can play a meaningful role while not in power. The 
existence of multi-ethnic groups is used to serve the interest of politicians.  
 
It is argued that while the existence of several ethnic groups does not ipso facto 
constitute a problem, some politicians have sought to capitalise on their fears and 
ignorance. In this case, liberal democracy has tended to exacerbate rather than reduce 
ethnic tensions just to further the career of some politicians (Makinda, 1996:570). This 
explains why, in most cases, opposition parties in Africa emerge strongly as an 
alternative political force and possible replacement to authoritarianism only to split up 
when nearing elections – perpetuating the rule of the incumbent. In Kenya, for instance, 
the Forum for Restoration of Democracy – FORD - had become the main opposition 
under Jaramogi Oginga Odinga in 1990.  In 1992, just about election time, FORD split 
with Kenneth Matiba leading a predominantly Kikuyu faction of FORD-Asili and 
Jaramogi leading FORD-Kenya, a faction predominantly Luo. This phenomenon 
repeated itself in 1997 when FORD Kenya split after a long leadership tussle between 
Kijana Wamalwa and Raila Odinga following the death of Jaramogi in 1994. Michael 
Kijana Wamalwa retained FORD-Kenya with a predominantly Luhya support; while 
Raila Odinga, the son of Jaramogi, walked away and formed the National Development 
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Party-NDP enjoying the Luo ethnic-based support. Such scenarios are common across 
the continent. 
  
In view of the foregoing, it can be concluded that the failure of liberal democracy in 
contemporary Africa relates in significant ways to ethnic-cum-sectional politics. Such 
politics thrives dangerously on the critical lack of effective grassroots mobilisation and 
organisation necessary for articulating the wishes of ordinary people as regards the type 
of government they desire.  
 
 
2.3.5 Authoritarianism 
 
Another failure of democracy in Africa is attributed to the phenomenon of authoritarian 
terrain of politics. Authoritarianism manifests itself in the persistent undemocratic 
values and behaviours of African leaders relating to the “hybrid regimes” – political 
regimes in which the transition entailed blending of democratic institutions with 
important legacies from a recent authoritarian past. Aristide Zolberg traces the origin of 
such authoritarian behaviour and concludes that contemporary African societies are 
syncretic arrangements of two sets of values, norms and structures, the new and the 
residual with the latter itself usually subdivided into distinct subsets (Zolberg, 1968:71). 
African leaders opted for foreign values and continued with colonial legacies while 
adopting state structures such as repressive legislations, use of armed forces and police 
– including security agencies – and institutional practices which assert the primacy of 
presidents over parliament and judiciary, and preserve the subordination of civil society 
to state authority (Osaghae, 1999:18) 
 
These undemocratic values and behaviour of the leaders persist in contemporary Africa 
as a perpetuation of authoritarian politics since, as Osaghae again observes, there are 
instances where African governments are forced to “grudgingly” agree to adopt 
democratic values; and even those who do so voluntarily, only do so to satisfy donor 
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conditionality and legitimize their hold on power (Osaghae, 1999:18).  This has 
definitely led to the failure of the establishment of true democracy, which is responsive 
to the needs of the populace.  
 
Arguably, true democracy can hardly be built under such conditional circumstances. In 
fact true democracy cannot be built in situations where the political leaders, 
governments and their international benefactors who give priority to power-politics, 
economic growth and stability over democracy, also claim the prerogative of deciding 
the form of democracy for the ordinary people.  Thus, insofar as democracy is 
characterised by African states succumbing to pressure of Western reforms, will liberal 
democracy in Africa remain a sham democracy. 
 
In view of the foregoing it can be argued that the demand by the World Bank and IMF 
on smaller bureaucracies for reduced government expenditure, removal of food 
subsidies, though they have a possibility of more wealth in the long run, is a misplaced 
demand and a minimalist approach to the establishment of true democracy for that 
matter, which only causes pain for the African populace (Makinda, 1996:568). In view 
of this, an argument can, therefore, be advanced that the majority of people in Africa 
are more interested in finding how a system of government can help them to cope with 
daily hardships of life rather than ensuring that the government is accountable to a donor 
community or institution.  
 
Nonetheless, while this study acknowledges that economic stability is a necessary 
condition for liberal democracy to thrive, it is of very little concern for the ordinary 
citizens. What the ordinary citizens require most is that leaders should remove existing 
class and regional disparities by extending social and economic benefits to previously 
disadvantaged groups. This is a sure way of reinforcing democratic legitimacy and 
authority in modern Africa.  
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2.3.6 Weakness of representatives  
 
Another reason that accounts for the failure of democracy in Africa today is the 
weakness of representatives’ oversight and judicial institutions. It is argued that these 
institutions are not strong enough to pressurise the government to serve the common 
good. John Holm and Patrick Molutsi, while citing the case of Botswana, argue that the 
efficacy of civil society to hold government to account has continued to be limited by 
developmental and apolitical orientation of most of its constituents which restrict its 
influence to advisory activities (Holm and Molutsi, 1996:44).  
 
This problem is further compounded by the reluctance of governments to permit free-
willing and politically efficacious civil society. Many urban-based middle class citizens 
and labour unions are more concerned with engaging the state to exact privileges and 
material benefits for their members rather than more durable equity in dealing with 
competing interests (Holm and Molutsi, 1996:56). As a result, there is the tendency of 
a more powerful civil society getting eaten up by the political elite. With the swallowing 
up of perceived strong representatives, the practice of democracy goes un-checked, and 
there emerges a myriad of challenges ranging from abuse of power to barefaced 
disregard of people’s rights – discrimination – informed by the attitude of winner-takes-
all (Holm and Molutsi, 1996:56). 
 
 
2.3.7 Globalisation 
 
Democracy in Africa also faces the problem of globalisation. The stress on globalism 
of democratisation puts Africa in a perpetual dependent position. This means that Africa 
is not only on the receiving end as far as democratic political paradigm is concerned, 
but also that democratisation provides – within the continent – an opportunity to 
establish new linkages of control. This is because, in Osaghae’s own words, 
“globalisation of democracy is an American-led Western project to consolidate 
  
66  
  
hegemonic order of post-cold war era” (Osaghae, 1999:20).  In this regard, the failure 
of democracy can be attributed to globalisation shifting its focus from Africa and 
Africans to the “benevolent” international community that determines whether or not 
the process of democratisation is successful (Osaghae, 1999:20). 
 
The resultant problem is a resounding one. In most cases the international community 
sees “democratic success” where ordinary citizens can hardly see any meaningful 
changes – difference – in their lives. What this means is that the practice of liberal 
democracy in Africa today is more concerned with satisfying donor conditionality than 
meeting the needs of the ordinary people. This problem is further compounded by the 
fact that pro-democracy movements and opposition parties mostly receive funds from 
international donors, and are interested in bringing their countries to “international 
standard” without much meaningful democratic development in the state.  
 
 
It can then be advanced that concern with global conditions has weakened the basis of 
accountability to citizens thereby deepening the disjuncture between the state and the 
ordinary citizens. Of this reality Osaghae conclusively writes:  
 
 
As it were, accountability to the World Bank/IMF and other 
international community masters meant less responsibility 
toward internal constituents as government abandoned 
obligations to citizens in the production of social goods, and the 
global gatekeepers of democracy saw nothing wrong in the 
supposedly democratic regimes enforcing unpopular and life-
threatening economic reforms on which the people were not 
consulted and which they voted against in several anti-
government riots and demonstrations (Osaghae, 1999:21). 
  
 
It is evident, therefore, that Africa is not only being controlled but is also influenced by 
foreign institutions; and external influence has indeed become power itself. This 
signifies a major problem of Africa’s inability to control its own affairs. Kofi Buenor 
Hadjor points out that:  
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No other part of the world is more dependent on external forces 
than Africa. The decisions that influence her are not made in 
Accra, Nairobi or Addis Ababa. They are made in London, 
Paris, Washington or Moscow (Hadjor, 1987:5).  
 
With this mode of operation, African governments are more reliant on the backing they 
receive from abroad than focusing on the needs of the people. and the support they can 
get from them. Consequently, operative democratic institutions that were designed to 
regulate Africa’s subjection in the colonial era continue to ensure its subservience in the 
global political order (Hadjor, 1987:6).  
 
It should be noted that it is not the global perception that makes democracy a political 
system but rather the “interaction” between the leading and the led. Those at the helm 
of political power must personify the need and dreams of the masses, their yearning for 
freedom, dignity and better life. This is what may lead to genuine political authority in 
modern day Africa. Nevertheless, it is the lack of genuine political authority – 
legitimacy – that continues to highlight the estrangement of African political elite from 
their societies. 
   
2.3.8 Neo-patrimonial rule 
 
Lastly, we address the failure of democracy in contemporary Africa as a consequence 
of neo-patrimonial politics. It is held that neo-patrimonialism is the institutional 
hallmark of postcolonial African politics (Bratton and Van de Walle, 1997:61). This 
concept derives from Max Weber’s notion of patrimonial authority, which relates to 
“the exercise of power in small-scale, face-to-face types of traditional communities” 
(Hyden, 2000:18).  In the context of the modern state, however, neo-patrimonialism 
refers to a situation where rulers have access to enormous resources that a state can 
mobilise; and ensures political stability by selectively allocating favours and material 
benefits that are not regularised in state budget to loyal followers (Hyden, 2000:19).  In 
fact, in a patrimonial political system, an individual rules by dint of personal prestige 
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and power; and ordinary people are treated as extensions of the “big man’s” household, 
with no rights and privileges other than those bestowed on them by the ruler (Bratton 
and Van de Walle, 1997:61). As a result, the fundamental characteristic of neo-
patrimonial rule is that it is the very opposite of democracy as it is characterised by the 
absence of transparency and public accountability. Its very nature is that it is kept private 
and secret.  
 
In contemporary Africa, neo-patrimonialism manifests itself in ‘imperial presidency’ 
where a presidential system is used to enhance the power of the head of state – 
presidentialism. Presidentialism implies that there is a concentration of political power 
in the hands of one individual who resists all but the most trivial decision-making tasks 
(Bratton and Van de Walle, 1997:63). In such a circumstance, the formal rules of the 
system are flouted as authority is personalised. Consequently, what exists is the dyadic 
relation between the “strong man” and his political acolytes, who, as Bratton and Van 
de Walle observe, comprise pyramids and factional networks.  They further observe that 
this is what made rulers like Kenneth Kaunda in Zambia, Sekou Toure´ in Guinea and 
Felix Houphouet-Boigny in Cote d’Ivoire leave a deep personal imprint on national 
politics – moulding their countries political rules and rhetoric, thus making  for their 
‘over-stay’ in power (Bratton and Van de Walle, 1997:63-4). This makes the practice of 
democracy unpredictable. 
 
Hyden argues that the most damaging aspect of the tendency to “privatise” politics and 
treat it as a “closed shop” in this manner renders it virtually impossible to punish 
someone who has been an insider but who, for some reason, proves to be a political 
liability. He further points out that in most cases such persons are rewarded with 
lucrative and prestigious appointments such as an ambassadorial placement in order not 
to “divulge” information that is deemed harmful to the ruling clique (Hyden, 2000:21). 
The consequence of such a practice is clear: there is a perpetuation of corruption due to 
the fact that lack of accountability is appreciated rather than condemned. This is what 
leads to the economic decline of the state, which characterises most polities in 
contemporary Africa.   
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Other than non-accountability to the public, another feature of neo-patrimonialism is 
patriarchy. In such a system, women have no guaranteed avenue for advancement in 
political leadership; and the few who manage to, do so at the discretion of men, 
particularly the “strong man”. Arguably, democracy fails in this connection to make full 
use of women’s human resources (Hyden, 2000:22).  If Africa is to move forward and 
if democracy is to bear any mark of relevance in people’s lives in contemporary times, 
then the role of women cannot be ignored.  
 
Another salient feature that has led to the failure of democracy in modern Africa as far 
as neo-patrimonialism is concerned is the fact that in most cases political appointments 
are not based on merit. There is a deliberate effort to make appointments not on the basis 
of one’s learned skills – technical know-how – but rather on the basis of relations – 
technical know-who. More often than not meritocracy is sacrificed on the altar of 
ethnicity. As a result, the leader is expected to favour certain groups of people and 
preferably his own who, because of the apparent relation they share with him – the 
“strong man” – hold onto the attitude that “it is their time to eat”.  
 
This phenomenon leads to two glaring negative consequences in democratic practice in 
modern Africa; the first is the wasting of human resources who can use their talent and 
professional prowess to help build the state. This is because it is most unlikely that the 
qualified persons will ever get the job. In most cases it can be advanced that jobs are 
given not on the basis of academic qualification – technical competence – but rather on 
the basis of birth qualification – how one is related to the “strong man”. Secondly, it 
tends to generate conflicts between primary social organisations where the principle 
basis for membership is ethnicity, clan, or race39. With this in mind, it is advanced that 
neo-patrimonialism presents a crude way of practicing politics – the zero-sum approach 
                                                 
39 Instances in which identity is deliberately politicised to serve the interest of those in power abound in 
Africa. Some notable examples include Siyad Barre’s nefarious manipulation of clan relations in 
Somalia; Daniel Moi’s use of ethnic violence to strengthen the fortunes of his party – KANU – elections 
in Kenya; and Nigeria’s 1993 refusal of election results as having placed a man from a “wrong” ethnic 
group in power (Hyden, 2000:23).   
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– in which there is no scope for compromise. In consequence, it remains detrimental to 
reasoned deliberation and policy-making necessary for the practice of true democracy 
as such (Hyden, 2000:23).   
 
 
 
2.4 A final critique of liberal democracy 
 
The spread of liberal democracy marked a major political development of the 20th 
century. Nevertheless, as I have pointed out, the emergence of liberal democracy relates 
to a particular culture – European culture. Ake specifically points out that liberal 
democracy is ‘a product of a socially atomised society where production and exchange 
are already commoditised; a society which is essentially a market. It is a product of a 
society in which interests are so particularized that the very notion of common interest 
becomes problematic hence the imperative of democracy’ (Ake, 1993:243-244). This 
phenomenon makes absurd liberal democracy’s claim to universality. To overlook the 
cultural specificity of a people in transferring democracy simply jeopardises its 
legitimacy and effectiveness. This is what has made democracy to perform so dismally 
in Africa in the 21st century.  Adetulla vividly captures this reality. He argues:  
 
The purveyors of liberal democracy ignore the differences in 
the process of historical development and change in different 
regions of the world. Also, the preference for a state-centric 
legal-bureaucratic basis of authority that is tailored after the 
experience of Western societies does not hold actual or 
potential benefits for non-western countries (Adetulla, 
2011:17).  
 
 
Liberal democracy, though it fundamentally relates to the theory of liberalism, can be 
argued to have yielded to a great variety of ‘liberal democracies’ based on how best to 
preserve civil liberties or structure representative democracy. For example, regarding 
representation, some theorists would favour parliamentary or presidential, some others 
will favour proportional representation or others still will opt for a free hand for elected 
officials (Cunningham, 2002:29). As such, the adoption of liberal democracy as the 
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dominant ideology of political order is solely to allow liberalism to determine the nature 
of the state. In view of this, B. Parekh holds that liberal democracy focuses mainly on 
who exercises state power and how he/she acquires authority. Consequently, he 
concludes that the concern of liberal democracy is whether a regime is “authoritarian” 
or “representative” (Parekh, 1993:165).  
 
In line with the foregoing, I argue that the practice of liberal democracy in modern 
Africa lacks authentic participation of the populace since it focuses mainly on the 
typology of government in place – and not on the people themselves. In this sense 
democracy in Africa only passes as “a form of political regime in which citizens choose, 
in competitive elections, the occupants of the political offices of the state” (Bratton and 
Van de Walle, 1997:13). Accordingly, Africa’s transition to democracy can only be 
gauged in the context of competitive election “as long as that election is freely and fairly 
conducted within a matrix of civil liberties, and that all contestants accept the validity 
of the election results” (Bratton and Van de Walle, 1997:13).  
 
This presents three challenges to consolidation of democracy in Africa; firstly, the 
contestants may not be “true” democrats in the sense that they may not necessarily be 
interested in the wellbeing of the people as such. Secondly, the approach does not 
presuppose the existence of a political culture of democracy among either the citizens 
or the political contestants themselves. Lastly, the quality of elections generally remains 
suspect, and cannot be taken as a sufficient condition for democratisation; in most 
African states it is a source of conflict as experiences in Nigeria, Ivory Coast, Kenya, 
Togo and Zimbabwe have shown (Adetulla, 2011:18).   
 
To limit democracy to elections – electoral democracy – is to refuse to wake up to the 
reality that democracy sui generis must affirm and not deny the legitimate moral claim 
of the people themselves. It is to refuse to take note of the important fact that in Africa 
“democracy is a way of constituting political relations such that the exercise of state 
power receives popular authorization” (Mehta, 2003:35). In consequence, the most 
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challenging and complex task in establishing true democracy is embedded in the 
realisation that the romance of democracy, the aspirations it generates and the passions 
it inspires, cannot be limited to electing governments (Mehta, 2003:35-6). 
 
Liberal democracy with its main focus on elections, has failed to produce a viable and 
meaningful democracy in contemporary Africa. Instead, it has led to fraudulent 
leadership and erosion of democratic effectiveness and legitimacy by sheer rhetoric, and 
a total disregard of the principles of popular sovereignty. The fact remains that the 
fundamental postulates of political legitimacy are being constrained by underdeveloped 
and fragile public institutions, and by neo-patrimonial leaders determined to disregard 
popular demands. In sum, against the analysis of the failures of democracy, it can be 
logically inferred that liberal democracy only passes in Africa as an electoral type of 
democracy with a lack of requisite political legitimacy and corresponding effectiveness.   
 
2.5 Conclusion 
 
This chapter was designed to outline the failures of democracy in contemporary Africa. 
In the course of analysis, it was underscored that Africa is a culturally diverse society. 
The way democracy confronts this diversity will lead not only to the establishment of a 
viable and meaningful democracy, but also to a more profound and comprehensive 
understanding of what such basic notions as political equality, autonomy and justice 
mean in such a culturally diverse setting. As a result, it is necessary to see how 
democracy applies to the cultural groups – community – and not only to individuals. In 
essence, for democracy to find a lasting root in Africa, it requires, as a matter of urgency, 
a multicultural approach. Failure to take cultural diversity into consideration – and 
assuming a culturally homogeneous body of politic – may lead not only to inadequate 
ways of solving the problems of democracy in Africa, but also to an unfortunate total 
absence of democracy in the long run.  
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Efforts by external governments, institutions and agencies to direct socio-economic and 
political changes in Africa, must not deny the people of Africa the right to determine 
their own future, otherwise democratic legitimacy, once again, will be greatly and 
profoundly affected.  
 
Since there is not a tradition of Western-type democracy in Africa, it will take time to 
establish institutions in which it thrives; Western democracy remains a system that does 
not correspond to the African political landscape. Nevertheless, there should be a 
contextualised form of democracy most suitable for the African situation. This explains 
why Ake likens democracy to development when he notes that it is “not something that 
one people does for another. People must do it for themselves or it does not happen” 
(Ake, 1996:69).  
 
The validity of Ake’s assertion cannot be denied. Democracy requires to be 
contextualised in order to be viable. Such a democracy must recognise that African 
traditional polity was defined by democratic principles of popular participation, consent 
and accountability. That is, rather than see African cultural and social formations as 
obstacles to democracy, as the colonialists and some “white” scholars do, they should 
justify the search for appropriate democratic forms that would enable those values to 
find expression in modern Africa. It is on this understanding that the study looks at 
African culture and democracy in the next chapter.  
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CHAPTER THREE 
 
 
 
AFRICAN CULTURE AND DEMOCRACY 
 
 
 
Like development, democratization is not something that one people does 
for another. People must do it for themselves or it does not happen. 
 
[Claude Ake, Rethinking Democracy, 1996] 
 
 
 
3.1 Introduction 
 
The existence of true democracy in post-independence Africa is a debatable 
phenomenon. This is partly because in the post-independence era, the state in Africa has 
held too tightly to its colonial antecedent to the detriment of the establishment and 
development of a viable and meaningful democracy with which Africans can identify. 
As a result, the practice of democracy has been impaired in many ways; and, arguably 
so, the political institutions that were bequeathed to the African people by the colonial 
rulers have failed to function properly in post-colonial Africa. This failure manifests 
itself in many ways – as we have seen in the previous chapter – including the 
unavoidable consequences of political confusion, uncertainty, and frustration that still 
abound in contemporary Africa. There is obvious political instability and the abysmally 
poor governmental performance in most African states is indicative of a lack of 
consonance and congruence between Western democracy and the African way of life as 
well as traditional political practice.  
 
In order to establish viable political structures for contemporary Africa, there is a need 
for recourse to African values in the traditional system of government. This is a plausible 
endeavour toward making democracy in Africa both meaningful and viable because 
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“traditional system of government did have some democratic features that a new 
political system can profit by” (Gyekye, 1997:116). In other words, there is an urgent 
need for traditional African cultural values to be brought to bear on the practice of 
democracy in order to yield better governance for Africa in contemporary times.  
 
In this chapter, I seek to appraise the fact that the social order of any African community 
is communal (Gyekye, 1995:154), and argue that communalism as such is a doctrine of 
human nature, which is indispensable for any socio-political organisation. As such, for 
democracy to be truly established in post-independence Africa, it ought to embody 
certain philosophical perspectives about African social organisation – 
communitarianism (Gyekye, 1995:154). 
 
In view of the foregoing, based on the Akan social thought as presented by Gyekye, this 
chapter seeks to unravel those democratic features of African indigenous government 
as embedded in communalism; and that are in line with the ethos of democracy, which 
can be brought to bear meaningfully on modern democratic practice in Africa. It further 
provides an analytical account of political institutions and how they operated in the 
African traditional set up. Philosophical underpinnings of these institutions attempted 
to address the concern of whether or not the indigenous political system exhibited 
democratic features.  
 
3.2 The concept of culture and African social existence  
  
The Longman Dictionary of Contemporary English provides a basic definition of 
culture as “customs, beliefs, art, music, and all other products of human thought made 
by a particular group of people at a particular time”. This definition, in my reading, 
suggests two fundamental features about culture: first, is the fact that culture is human. 
The second, following logically from the first, relates to the fact that culture expresses 
uniqueness and creativity, and as such it distinguishes human beings from other beings.   
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Henry Odera Oruka attempts a definition of culture and underscores that:  
 
 
Culture is man’s contribution to the nature of environment. It is 
a general way of life of a people, which among other things 
demonstrates their celebrated achievements in thought, morals 
and material production (Oruka, 2002:58).  
 
This view is shared by Ngugi Wa Thiong’o. Though Wa Thiong’o sees culture in a 
similar manner, he conceives it in a broader sense and defines it as “a way of life 
fashioned by a people in their collective endeavour to live and come to terms with their 
total environment” (Wa Thiong’o, 1972:4).  
 
Both views allude to the fact that the concept of culture is a prerequisite for 
understanding a people’s history and how they have maintained themselves in existence. 
Following these conceptions, Odera Oruka observes that the content of culture can be 
summarised in a threefold manner, which incorporates a people’s body of knowledge, 
beliefs and values, behaviours, goals, social institutions, tools, techniques as well as 
material constructions (Oruka, 2002:58). 
  
The contents of culture that Oruka outlines above can be rephrased and further 
expounded for purposes of clarity. In this context, my reading of Oruka reveals that 
what he refers to as ‘a people’s body of knowledge’ can be rightly and properly termed 
as the ‘cultural knowledge’ of a people. In this sense, culture is what informs actions 
that people undertake in a given social and cultural context. It is the “reason”40 people 
hold for performing or not performing particular action(s). Arguably, against the 
understanding of ‘cultural knowledge’, culture exists as tacit knowledge. That is, 
knowledge commonly acknowledged, understood, and practiced without necessarily 
being committed to writing or explicit expression. It constitutes a thought system – a set 
                                                 
40 The reason people hold for the things they do may not be as systematic and logically convincing for 
an outsider. But it is what convincingly holds members of a given society together to act in a particular 
manner.  
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of norms, standards, notions and beliefs – which forms the basis of an automotive mode 
of operation, reflected through belief system, customs, practices, art and music affecting 
a people's pattern of behaviour and attitude.  
 
In view of the above consideration, it is plausible to advance the argument that if people 
know what democracy entails with regard to their social and cultural orientation then 
they will identify with it and be committed to it at least in some way. This is because 
the beliefs, values, behaviour, goals and social institutions are what, in my opinion, 
properly constitute and determine a people’s “cultural behaviour”. If this position is 
admissible, then I am persuaded to advance that it is both the “cultural knowledge” and 
“cultural behaviour” that connote the way a group of people actually undertake actions 
within its societal confines. In essence, both features outline how and why people 
behave and relate to the social and political institutions of their society. In consequence 
thereof, it is both cultural knowledge and behaviour that explains how and why a 
particular group of people will participate in a democracy.  
 
Lastly, Oruka makes references to tools, techniques and material constructions, which I 
take to together constitute a phenomenon called “cultural artifacts”. Cultural artifacts 
are the things people make and use in the expression of their culture. Understood in this 
manner, a people’s cultural knowledge, behaviour and artifacts constitute an adequate, 
holistic cultural expression, which must come to terms with all aspects of their social 
existence and praxis (Gbadegesin, 1991:174). This is to say that culture emerges from 
the socio-economic and political conditions of a society. It is on this ground that I am 
persuaded to think and argue that culture serves as a basis of democratic practice. 
 
Wiredu, in the article titled “The Moral Foundations of African Culture”, shifts the 
debate from the meaning of culture to what literally informs it – morality.  Wiredu does 
this in a bid to establish the practicality of culture. He argues that morality is universal 
and essential to all human culture. As a result, any human society without a modicum 
of morality is bound to collapse. In this context, he sees morality simply as the 
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observance of rules necessary for the harmonious adjustment of interests of the 
individual to those of others in the society (Wiredu, 2002:287). It can be argued that it 
is in this very sense that Wiredu’s conception of culture echoes the concept of “cultural 
behaviour” of Odera Oruka.  
 
Conceived thus, culture has the potential to meaningfully bear politically on democratic 
practice in contemporary Africa. To my mind, what logically follows from Wiredu’s 
perspective is that the harmonious adjustment of interests of the individual to those of 
others connotes reciprocity required in democratic governance. That is, it creates a 
situation where leaders use their leadership positions in ensuring the welfare of the state, 
and the citizens attune their socio-cultural, economic and political behaviour in line with 
the laid out rules to make this possible. In consequence, culture can enhance 
democracy’s legitimacy and effectiveness for it is the people’s holistic way of life. It is 
against this backdrop that I argue further that if democracy lacks legitimacy and 
effectiveness in contemporary Africa – as it actually does to a larger extent – it is 
because it has not allowed African cultural values to inform its practice. That is, 
democratic practice in Africa has not embraced African morality, which is 
quintessentially a social need for the viability of democracy as such.  
 
In line with the above reasoning, it can plausibly be advanced that morality is a conditio 
sine qua non for culture. This is essentially so because morality affects the socio-
political life of a people since it relates to the sense of duty that individuals ought to 
have toward each other and the state within a communal context. Thus, as Wiredu 
argues:   
Morality in this sense does not just involve the de facto 
conformity to the requirements of the harmony of interests, but 
also conformity to those requirements which is inspired by an 
imaginative and sympathetic identification with the interest of 
others even at the cost of a possible abridgement of one’s own 
interest (Wiredu, 2002:287).  
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My reading of Wiredu is that the moral basis of political culture should be derived from 
a metaphysical foundation of a people’s way of life. The requirements of morality as a 
basis for a people’s way of life which are central to making democratic practice in 
modern Africa meaningful and viable for morality does not just involve the de facto 
conformity to the requirements and harmony of individual interests but it yields to 
capture and conforms to the harmony of communal interest as well.  
 
In sum, it is culture that helps individuals to develop their capacities for mutual respect 
and compromise; and deepen their understanding of the common good (Valadez, 
2001:5). This, to my mind, explains why democratic practice in contemporary Africa 
should be pegged on the moral foundation of African culture of communalism, without 
which, as I argue and present in the section that follows, it would remain an odyssey – 
a long tiresome journey whose end in view may still lie in an epistemological oblivion. 
 
It is in view of the foregoing that Oruka further sees as a formidable aspect of culture, 
the great thoughtful minds it has produced as well as those aspects of human life that 
such minds have helped to shed light onto. He notes that in any given culture, celebrated 
achievements in thought consist of ideas of its sages, scientists, artists, poets, prophets, 
philosophers, statesmen, and moralists, et cetera (Oruka, 2002:59). This constitutes 
what he technically calls the intellectual41 lights of culture. This means, therefore, that 
it is impossible to think of culture without at the same time thinking about the people – 
men and women – who have made a contribution in shaping it. In this case it would be 
absurd to think of African political culture without thinking of contributions of such 
political figures as Nkrumah, Nyerere, Senghor, et cetera who are regarded to have 
given African political culture its direction through their various conceptions of African 
way of life.  
 
                                                 
41 It is intellectual because no serious attack or defense of a culture is possible if it does not account for 
those ideas of thoughtful minds without whose ideas no culture would be possible (Oruka, 2002: 59).   
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In view of the foregoing, it can be pointed out that cultural achievement in thought is 
central to shaping the direction of democratic practice. Even so, other than achievement 
in thought, culture helps in the creation of moral institutions and systems. That is, in its 
moral perspective, culture should be understood in a wider context to incorporate the 
socio-political and religious conventions. In this sense, “the values of culture 
ceremoniously bind people together through institutionalised form of life” (Oruka, 
2002:59).  As a result communitarianism – as a way of life – expresses an African 
traditional cultural consciousness, which places emphasis on the activity and success of 
the wider society (Gyekye, 1995:155) necessary for politically viable and meaningful 
democratic structures in modern Africa. With this in mind the study takes a critical look 
into the concept of communitarianism in order to establish the cultural bases of African 
traditional political practice.  
 
3.3 Communitarianism and traditional African political practice  
 
Wiredu observes that the first wave of rulers of post-independence African states was 
basically faced by the fundamental question of “What form of government, or more 
generally, social organisation was best suited to the requirements of (a) the social and 
economic development that had become stunted under colonialism; and (b) the 
restoration of the cultural identity that colonialism had eroded” (Wiredu, 1996:145). It 
is this fundamental question that led leaders like Kwame Nkrumah of Ghana, Leopold 
Senghor of Senegal, Sekou Toure of Guinea, Julius Nyerere of Tanzania, and Kenneth 
Kaunda of Zambia, to develop both political and developmental blueprints based on the 
“conceptions of community, polity and the general good” (Wiredu, 1996:145). It is 
within these historical circumstances that I am persuaded to think that African Socialism 
emerged as a basis for political action. It is, therefore, against this backdrop that this 
study focuses on communalism as a primordial mode of existence that did inform 
political practice in traditional Africa; and from which political values can be drawn for 
meaningful democratic practice in contemporary Africa.  
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Gyekye argues that the social order of any African community is communal. He sees 
the correct description of the African social order as depicting both features of 
communality and individuality – amphibious (Gyekye, 1995:154). Accordingly, he says 
that it is a doctrine of social organisation emanating from the Akan concept of 
humanism, which is embedded in the fact of “ensuring the welfare and interest of each 
member of the society” (Gyekye, 1995:155).  In essence, according to him, such welfare 
and interest of every member of the society cannot be attained outside a communal 
system primarily because communalism focuses primarily on the  activity and success 
of the wider society without, of course, looking down upon the activity and success of 
the individual. Arguably, it is on this basis that communitarianism as a doctrine of 
human nature and relationship can be said to embody certain political elements and 
democratic practice in traditional Africa. Gyekye captures this reality when he writes 
that, “it is perhaps indisputable that social institutions embody philosophical perspective 
about human nature and social relationships” (1995:154).  
 
My reading of Gyekye is that the very nature of communalism, which explicates its 
political demeanor in traditional African society, is hinged on the fact of each member 
acknowledging the existence of common values, obligations and understanding; and 
embodying feelings of loyalty, commitment, willingness and desire to advance its 
interests. That is, individual members of the society ought to fully participate in the life 
of the community by demonstrating concern for the well-being of others and doing what 
in effect advances the common good (Gyekye, 1996:36). It is on this basis that Gyekye 
conceives society as natural to man and as a necessary condition for human existence. 
He quotes the Akan proverb that captures this reality thus: “When a man descends from 
heaven, he descends into a human society” (onipa firi sorobesi a, obesi onipa kurom) 
(Gyekye, 1995:155). He sees human sociality as preordained by the Supreme Being. 
That is, human beings are originally born into a human society (onipa kurom) with an 
already predefined social nature rendering solitariness a kind of impossible existence 
since individual capacities, as he notes, are not sufficient to meet the basic human 
requirements. As such he aptly argues that “the individual inevitably requires the succor 
and the relationships of others in order to realize or satisfy the basic needs” (Gyekye, 
1995:155).  
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Accordingly, Masolo asserts that “Communitarianism represents the view that the 
attainment of human needs is best served in union with others” (Masolo, 2010:145). In 
other words, communitarianism presupposes the critical fact that it does not of necessity 
negate individualism; but rather, its essence lies in the recognition of the limited 
character of the possibilities of the individual, which whittle away self sufficiency of 
the individual as such. Thus, in spite of an individual’s giftedness and abilities, there is 
an embedded insufficiency to achieve one’s welfare through a solitary effort.  
 
It is in view of the foregoing that Gyekye further points out that, in the Akan social 
thought, communitarianism is indicative of the value of collective action, mutuality, and 
interdependence as necessary conditions for the realisation of both individual welfare 
as well as the successful achievement of most difficult undertakings. The individual 
should, therefore, work for the good of all, which includes his or her own good. He says 
this is the essential nature of communalism - the insistence that the good of all 
determines the good of each – in the Akan social thought as captured in the following 
set of proverbs: 
 
One finger cannot lift up a thing. 
If one man scrapes the bark of a tree for medicine, the pieces 
fall down. 
The left arm washes the right arm and the right arm washes the 
left arm. (Gyekye, 1995:156).   
 
As such, it is important to point out that communalism entails the fact that life can only 
be more successful and meaningful when it is lived in the context of identifying with 
and depending on the group. In consequence, communitarianism is depictive of an ideal 
social order, which calls for full participation of all members of the society. Arguably, 
therefore, such participation is characterised by social and ethical values necessary for 
democratic governance such as social well-being, solidarity, interdependence, 
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cooperation, and reciprocal obligation, all of which are conducive to the equitable 
distribution of resources and benefit of the society (Gyekye, 1995:157).   
 
It is on the basis of the foregoing that Masolo links theoretical underpinnings of African 
communitarianism to emancipatory politics of independence from European 
colonialism. He says it is an ethic of everyday life and social order, which is a mode of 
interdependent life, a moral good and not a mere passive and mechanistic cosmic 
arrangement, which in essence entails better ways of human living than any other mode 
(Masolo, 2010:246). He underlines that the expression of such a mode of existence is 
found in many local idioms of African communities. He captures one such idiom that is 
used to enthuse someone to help a needy neighbour from the Luo community of Kenya, 
thus:  
 
It is humans who sacrifice for each other (literally “it is among 
humans that one may decide to go hungry for a night so another 
person can eat”) –dhano ema nindo-niga wadgi kech (Masolo, 
2010:246).  
   
Nevertheless, Masolo is quick to point out that there could be other idioms which appear 
to contradict the communitarian principle, such as “dhier ma kowaduu ok moni nindo” 
(a person’s eye does not miss sleep because his or her neighbour is poor) (Masolo, 
2010:246), which does not literally imply that one feels the pangs of hunger; but, rather 
that the awareness that someone actually is in such a distress can only be rescued by 
one who is better placed. In fact, as he rightly argues, such awareness constitutes a 
critical entry point to the consideration of the fact that “a world where everyone is left 
out to their own fate, cannot be a world of happy people, at least not everyone all the 
time” (Masolo, 2010:246). As such, an ideal social order can only be realised with the 
recognition that human beings depend on each other for their own benefit and for the 
benefit of the society at large.  
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To my mind, in line with the foregoing discussion, it can be advanced that, in the 
African context, communitarianism entails special responsibility and indiscriminate 
concern for each other. This is critical to political and democratic practice in post-
independence Africa in the sense that it creates awareness of fair play in social 
interaction among members of the society. Arguably, therefore, in a well-controlled 
ambience of communality, the public good is not only secure but also tends to diffuse 
quintessentially to each and every cog of the social system in a more or less 
proportionate measure (Nyasani, 2010: 246).  
 
 
In sum, communitarianism directs and commands the actions of individuals in the 
society restraining them from interfering with the destiny of each other as preordained 
by the Divine Order, and, as such, respecting the beacons of each individual’s existence 
(Nyasani, 2010:246). It is on the foregoing account that the following section delves 
into unraveling the democratic character of traditional African system – mode of life 
and political institutions.  
 
  
 
3. 4 Democratic character of traditional African system 
 
It has been argued that traditional African society was characterised by a democratic 
way of life epitomised by such features as the will of the people, freedom of expression 
of opinion, and the limited power of the highest political leader, the chief (Gyekye, 
1997:116). However, the most fundamental feature of the traditional African democratic 
practice was that government was by the will of the people whose opinion was sought 
on every matter. People’s opinion was sought on all socio-economic and political 
activities. Arguably, every matter that involved decision-making was put to the poll and 
came out stamped with the seal of authority of the people’s will. And so, political rule 
was by the people’s consent.42  
                                                 
42 Even though the Chief presided over the exercise of political authority within the society, such 
authority derived from the people themselves. Both the ruler, Chief and the governed, the people were 
held together by a reciprocal and contractual bond; and the Chief possessed only delegated authority 
(Gyekye, 1997:117).  
  
85  
  
 
All in all, while some scholars may advance that political practice in traditional African 
society was by no means democratic43, I maintain that traditional African political 
practice had democratic elements in both theory and practice, which elements could be 
brought to bear on contemporary political practice (Gyekye, 1997:120). I choose to 
discuss such practices under the institution of chieftaincy as well as the communal mode 
of African life for they seem to cut across many traditional African societies; and extant 
literature has delved so much into them.  
 
 
3.4.1 Chieftaincy 
 
In traditional African society, chieftaincy was an outstanding political institution. Its 
democratic character and value lay in features such as the status of the chief, the nature 
of authority, and the relationship between the chief and the people. Gyekye points out 
that chieftainship as a political institution is widely practiced in traditional African 
communities (Gyekye, 1997:121). According to Nelson Mandela, chieftaincy wielded 
such power and influence that it was the very centre around which life revolved 
(Mandela, 1994:19). For the purpose of this study, I limit myself to Gyekye’s Akan 
example of chieftaincy in order to analyse the aspects already outlined above. In so 
doing, I submit that it should not be misconstrued to mean that the pattern of governance 
was exactly the same in every community’s chieftaincy one came across. Rather, it is 
the view that there were significant similarities among them across African communities 
to warrant it being termed an African phenomenon. I submit too, that, while it may be a 
rare phenomenon to be ruled by chiefs in contemporary society, the manner of political 
operation of the chief in the traditional set-up can still be used as an archetype to inform 
political leadership in present day Africa.  
                                                 
 
43 I have in mind those cultural universalists who hold the view that democracy – while having its roots 
in Western civilization, forms the central aspect of a universal, normative framework that eschews time, 
space and context – is a trans-cultural phenomenon; and as such allude to the fact that African culture is 
intrinsically hostile to democracy (Donelly, 1989; Howard, 1986; Lipuma & Koelble, 2009; Chabal & 
Daloz, 1999). 
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Among the Akan people, for instance, every town or village is made up of several clans. 
Each town or village constitutes a political unit. A chief governs the political unit; he is 
normally chosen from a royal lineage. That is to say, a chief is chosen from within one 
of the clans regarded to have founded the village. It is important to note that the royalty 
status of the family is not only to be recognised, but also accepted, by the people 
themselves. He outlines that each clan consists of many lineages and each lineage 
comprises of many individuals linked by blood relationships. A great number of towns 
and villages form a paramountcy state (oman), headed by a paramount chief (Gyekye, 
1997:121).   
 
There is a chief and a council of elders for each village or town. While each elder heads 
a clan within the village, it is the chief who presides at the council meetings. 
Nevertheless, each lineage or town – in the conduct of their affairs – acts autonomously 
without any interference from either the chief or the paramount chief. This is indicative 
of decentralised power and political system, about which the modern “democratic” state 
in Africa is still so incredulous; and yet, which Gyekye affirms, is an outstanding feature 
of the traditional Akan political culture (1997:121).  
 
It is important to note that while the chief was elected or chosen from the royal lineage, 
he was chosen by the head of the lineage “in consultation with the members of that 
lineage” (Gyekye, 1997:121). It is the element of consultation that guaranteed his 
acceptance as well as legitimacy of his authority to rule. The paramount chief was 
chosen in the same manner. The critical idea here is that neither the chief nor the 
paramount chief was imposed on the people he was meant to govern or lead. This is in 
contradistinction to the practice of modern democracies where a leader – election winner 
– is declared irrespective of election irregularities or disputes rendering such a leader to 
be regarded as an imposed one by those who see themselves as clearly short changed.  
 
  
87  
  
Gyekye informs us that it is only when the chief has been accepted that rituals and 
ceremonies relating to power and authority are conducted. This is an indication that 
power and political authority come from the people; thus, the chief takes a public oath 
on the occasion of his formal investiture of power before his councilors and the 
populace. This investiture of power takes the form of injunctions, which are read 
publicly before the chief as a way of defining the matrix of political authority and the 
kind of relationship between himself, the ruler and the people as the governed (Gyekye, 
1997:122).  
 
Some examples of the injunctions that are declared to the chief through his spokesman 
– the okyeame – and which he acknowledged run as follows:  
 
We do not wish that he should curse us. 
We do not wish that he should be greedy. 
We do not wish that he should be disobedient [or, refuse to take 
advice]. 
We do not wish he should treat us unfairly. 
We do not wish that he should act on his own initiative [lit.: 
“out of his own head,” that is, acting without reference to the 
views or wishes of the people.] 
We do not wish that it should ever be that he should say to us, 
“I have no time, I have no time” (Gyekye, 1997:122).   
 
Gyekye narrates that the injunctions are pronouncements of the people’s wish to the 
chief on how he ought to govern them. Essentially these declarations mean that the 
people play a key role in determining their own social and political purpose, telos. By 
the words, “we do not wish that” as the introductory antiphon for each injunction, 
Gyekye points out that:  
 
The declarations are, in one way, an unambiguous assertion of 
the people’s right to participate in running the affairs of their 
community or state, in governing themselves; they are, in 
another way, an indication of the confidence the people have in 
insisting on the exercise of a political power that will reflect 
their wishes (Gyekye, 1997:122).  
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My reading of this is that the pronouncements help to establish a personal bond – of 
dealing with each other in a humane manner – between the chief and the people. They 
help to instantiate a relationship of reciprocity and mutuality thereby leading to 
actualisation of equality and justice that democratic practice requires. They are an 
expression of the people’s awareness and consciousness not only about how they ought 
to be governed, but they also bring out a sense of their worth as people – recognition of 
their identity.  
 
This is what makes the socio-political relationship in the traditional polity more unifying 
since the consequences were spelt out to the chief – the ruler – from the word go. This 
phenomenon runs contrary to the practice of Western democracy where an oath of office 
is merely read by an Attorney – in most cases a Chief Justice – to the “leader” designate 
holding Bible or Quran in his hand. Obviously this points to a lack of personal 
communion with the people. In many a case, the leader does not feel the sense of 
obligation to the populace as is the case among the Akan and most traditional African 
polities as such. It can, arguably, be advanced that it is this fact of the leader not feeling 
nor appearing to have a sense of obligation to the populace that complicates the notion 
of the dignity of the human person, equitable distribution of resources, consultation, and 
acting in concurrence and advice of councilors as was the case in the traditional African 
political set up; in which case, it can be advanced that the lack of sense of obligation 
between the ruler and the populace critically diminishes the voice of the people in 
governance putting both the effectiveness and legitimacy of democracy in contemporary 
Africa in great doubt. Basically the pronouncements constitute a political contract 
between the chief and the people, and, as such, render the chief to particularly be a 
steward of people’s political power (Gyekye, 1997:122).  
 
This mode of political operation was replicated in the chief’s council as carried out by 
various clan heads. The councilors as the people’s representatives had to confer with the 
people on any matter to be deliberated upon at the council level. They acted on the 
advice and with the concurrence of the members of their clan just as the chief himself 
was under the obligation to act after consulting and obtaining the consent of his 
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councilors (Gyekye, 1997:123). The councilors lived a life of representative persona. 
They created a free and frank atmosphere for the expression of people’s opinions, which 
enhanced a free discussion of matters affecting the state. This involved listening to 
arguments – in the case of disagreements – until a consensus was achieved with a 
reconciliation of opposing views (Gyekye, 197:123).  As Gyekye rightly points out, this 
is what brings to the fore the traditional African communitarian ethos that places a great 
value on solidarity, which in turn engenders the pursuit of consensus. That is to say, 
every decision adopted by the chief as the highest political authority commanded 
unanimity as it had been discussed and agreed upon at all other lower levels of assembly. 
In other words, in the traditional African polity, it is consensus for the sake of attaining 
the common good that preceded and commanded both political and democratic 
practices. To a larger extent, this was informed by the spirit of communalism.  
 
 
3.4.2 Communalism 
 
In this section, I particularly delve into the question of the democratic character of 
communal values in the traditional African polity. This serves as a launching pad of 
how such values may be brought to bear on the contemporary democratic practice in 
Africa. To begin with, it is fitting to revisit and clarify the concepts of community and 
communalism. A community is a group of persons who are linked by interpersonal 
bonds – not necessarily biological bonds – and who share common values, interests and 
goals (Gyekye, 1996:35-6). A community shares an overall way of life. That is to say, 
in a community, each member acknowledges the existence of community that is 
expressed through the desire to advance and realise the common good (Gyekye, 
1996:36).  
 
Resultantly, therefore, communalism refers to the theory that community is the focus of 
the activities of the individual members of the society. This does not mean, however, 
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that the individual lacks an autonomous existence44. Rather, it means that the focus of 
success, whether of the individual or the group, should be the wider society. This should 
not be to the detriment of the individual but to the wellbeing of every individual. My 
point of argument here is that human beings are by nature social, and social relationships 
are essential for every human person since there is not a self-sufficient individual 
capable of adequate functioning in a social context. Gyekye emphasises this very point 
by pointing out that “Social life is natural to the human being because every human 
being is born into an existing society” (Gyekye, 1996:36). 
 
In view of the above, it is to be noted that African society places a lot of emphasis on 
the community values of human existence. The communal structure of the African 
society creates a sense of community, which defines social relationships among 
members of the society (Gyekye, 1996:35). As an enduring feature of the African social 
life, the theory of communalism, arguably, holds that we humans share enough with 
others around us. That is, a purely individualistic or jingoistic approach to, or a pattern 
of life, ceases to be so as long as other people are brought into the picture. 
Communalism, therefore, is in line with the democratic ethos in the sense that it restricts 
the liberty of leaders to not act without considering the good of all; and, on the part of 
the populace, it enhances mutuality and sense of dependence. This is what Julius 
Nyerere called Ujamaa or familyhood in Tanzania. As a founding father of the 
Tanzanian polity he was moved by the great need for unity of the Tanzanians, which he 
hinged on two main goals – staving off the capitalistic propensity for creating extreme 
wealth inequality as well as achieving economic self sufficiency.   
 
While Nyerere’s two goals were laudable, Ujamaa rested on simplistic idyllic vision. 
The communal farming in villages depressed in a few years and food production fell. 
Tanzania became more reliant on food and economic aid than ever before. To my mind, 
the failure of Ujamaa could be attributed to the fact that it was an experiment of one 
man upon entire country. It lacked the crucial appreciation of political realities taking 
                                                 
44 The question of autonomy of existence or simply, “personhood” has been extensively dealt with by 
Bernard Matolino in his very recent monograph Personhood in African Philosophy (2014).  
  
91  
  
place elsewhere, which could better inform its practice; and most importantly the 
involvement of the populace to own it from the onset. This arguably is a deliberative 
aspect that can be advanced to have been lacking in the implementation of Ujamaa in 
Tanzania. I am, therefore, persuaded to think that as a form of African communalism, 
Ujamaaa would have performed better had it appreciated other operative democratic 
trends of the moment elsewhere.45 
 
Against this understanding of communalism, it can be advanced that a well-intentioned 
democratic government could, by drawing on the wisdom and experience of others, 
arrive at a reasonable set of beliefs about its citizens’ good – the common good, which 
defines the community’s way of life rather than adjusting itself to the patterns of 
individual and jingoistic interests of the political class (Kymlicka, 1990:206).  
 
In the foregoing respect, it can be argued further that communal values essentially, 
therefore, are those values that express the appreciation of the worth and importance of 
the community, and those values that underpin and guide the type of social relations, 
attitudes, and behaviour that ought to exist between individuals in a community with a 
sense of the common good (Gyekye, 1996:35). It is in this sense that communalism 
renders political relevance to democratic practice in Africa’s post-independence era  
through the values of sharing, mutual aid, caring for others, interdependence, solidarity, 
reciprocity in obligation, as well as social harmony. In consequence, communalism may 
be conceived as a stimulant of public interest. To my mind, it assumes the characteristic 
of equitable treatment of members in a society, and, as such, tames the instinct of greed 
and plunder by obliging each individual to think and act with an attitude of concern for 
the other and the common good. 
  
                                                 
45 I am persuaded to advance this argument because Nyerere himself though enthusiastic about Ujamaa 
and being against vast accumulation of wealth and fortune did institute a one party-state of democracy 
under the guise that multi-party democracy was a luxury that African states couldn’t afford. Yet, for 
increased participation of the populace, this fact does not seem to hold to-date. There is the apparent 
feeling that democracy in Tanzania (and elsewhere) can thrive with appreciation of other values 
elsewhere which do not contradict the democracy sui generis. 
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According to Masolo, adherents of communitarianism ascribe to the view that: 
 
The status of the political and moral community have rights that are 
not just independent from those of individual but are also more 
important in some crucial ways that warrant the freedoms of the 
individual for the goodness of the collective whole (Masolo, 
2010:222).  
 
My interpretation of Masolo is that individual political rights must take cognizance of 
human dignity. This is to say that the manner of acting in a communal context – or rather 
political context – must be restricted by considering the good of others beyond one’s 
own good and interest. As such, what is regarded by the populace as the good of the 
whole – the greatest good, summum bonum - is tied in some important ways to the 
cultural practices they share with others within the community (Kymlicka, 1990:203). 
In essence then, communitarianism is the way a person feels and thinks in union with 
all other people around him or her (Senghor, 1964:94). This explains why Gyekye, in 
likening communitarianism to the Akan concept of humanism, argues that it ensures the 
accomplishment of the welfare and the interests of each member of society, which can 
hardly be realised outside a communal system (Gyekye, 1987:155).  
 
In view of all these perspectives on communitarianism, I argue that communitarianism 
promotes a traditional liberal attitude and freedoms that enable people to judge what is 
valuable in life by exploring the different aspects of their shared cultural heritage. In 
fact, as Masolo points out, communalism represents: 
 
…the sum of all ethical values, all shared experiences and responses, 
the consciousness of belonging together through history, reinforced 
by religious and cultural homogeneity (Masolo, 2010:223).  
 
In consequence, it leads to an ethical state where subjective freedom is valued against 
its contribution to the prescriptions to the common good; that is, to a kind of communal 
democracy, which can only sustain itself through a process of communication and 
dialogue leading to consensus on values and cultural norms (Masolo, 2010:224).  In 
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sum, it can be advanced that communalism determines the volume and moral output in 
the society since it impacts on the rules of upright social conduct by inviting active 
public – or political – participation in all matters that affect the populace. 
 
   
3.5 Cultural impediment to democracy in traditional Africa 
 
 
In spite of the fact that African traditional cultural practices had democratic elements as 
discussed in the foregoing section, some scholars allude to the fact that undemocratic 
cultural practices abound in traditional African society. As a result, they see governance 
in contemporary Africa as intrinsically hostile to ingredients of democracy owing to 
African traditional cultural influence. In fact, it is often held that the absence of 
democracy in Africa can be blamed on long-standing political traditions (Bratton and 
Van de Walle, 1997:37).  It is against this background that LiPuma and Koelble, who 
can rightly be referred to as Africanist radicals, argue that: 
 
Traditional leadership, while by no means anti-democratic, is not a    
guarantee of African democracy. On the contrary, under current 
conditions it is likely to entrench autocracy, patrimony and 
despotism… (LiPuma and Koelble, 2009:220).   
 
It is noteworthy that LiPuma and Koelble single out autocracy, patrimony and despotism 
as some of the undemocratic practices that traditional governance bestowed or can 
bestow on “democracy”.  
 
Patrimony particularly is regarded as one of the traditional African practices that is 
regarded as hostile to the democratic practice in Africa. It refers to a political system 
where an individual rules by dint of personal prestige and power; and ordinary citizens 
are treated as extensions of the “big man’s” household, with no rights or privileges other 
than those bestowed by the ruler (Bratton and Van de Valle, 1998:64). As a political 
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system, it is perceived to be so strong in traditional Africa and it is held to mainly centre 
on personalisation of power.  
 
In a similar manner Chabal and Daloz see African political leadership as that which is 
informed more often than not by personal rule, and while citing certain occurrences in 
African states like the genocide in Rwanda and the political disintegration of Zaire as 
instances informed by deep-seated cultural practices, they hold the view that African 
traditional culture is intrinsically hostile to the practice of democracy. They specifically 
write: 
 
We cannot, for example decide a priori that certain forms of African 
politics (i.e., the genocide in Rwanda, the disintegration in Zaire...) 
are temporary aberrations which are not representatives of existing 
trends on the continent (Chabal and Daloz, 1999: xviii). 
 
 
As a result of this, they further hold the view that colonialism failed to overcome ‘the 
strongly instrumental and personal characteristics of traditional African administration’. 
Accordingly, therefore, they are of the opinion that African paternalistic culture is to 
blame for the crisis of democracy in postcolonial Africa (Chabal and Daloz, 1999:xviii).   
 
In line with the foregoing perspective, Ndlovu-Gatshen associates lack of accountability 
in contemporary African politics with traditional African cultural practice of patrimony. 
He argues that some postcolonial African leaders have justified their non-accountable 
styles of leadership and blatant violation of human rights in terms of African tradition. 
He cites an occurrence in Benin where Mathieu Kereku, who was a Marxist dictator, 
was asked to step down after a long period of presidency and responded by asking 
whether other than seeing tombs of kings, the people had seen a retired king in Africa 
(Ndlovu-Gatshen, 2008:376). The implication of this is, in Africa kings do not retire, 
they only die in power. This is what amounts to patrimony where the individual rules 
by dint of personal prestige.  
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My interpretation of these views is twofold. Firstly, these views are tantamount to 
saying that democracy fails in Africa because African culture does not support it. 
Secondly, they tend to point to the fact that traditional African culture should be 
regarded as flagrantly opposed to democracy and democratic values. If my interpretation 
is correct, then these positions should be taken as logically defeating and indefensible. 
The failure of an individual person at the helm of political leadership does not invalidate 
the viability of an institution. While it is largely true, as in the case of Mathieu Kereku 
of Benin, that there could be an abuse of power in Africa’s traditional polity, 
contemporary liberal democratic practice has not been spared from such ills either. It 
would be wrong to equate the failure of an individual to the failure of an institution as 
such. Such views further commit the fallacy of non sequitur by insinuating that because 
some components of traditional African culture are perceived to be opposed to the 
practice of “democracy”, so democracy fails in Africa. This is tantamount to saying that 
if some African traditional cultural practices are perceived to be in line with 
“democracy”, then there would not be democratic challenges in contemporary Africa as 
such. Such argument would be logically unwarranted.  
 
In fact, I choose to argue that such positions are untenable and cannot hold. They simply 
do not follow since the challenges that democracy faces in Africa are structural and they 
are well known. They include such realities as poverty, illiteracy, disease, corruption, 
environmental degradation, civil war, ethnic disputes, et cetera, which are indelibly 
interlinked with the African colonial experience (Crepaz, 2008:9-10). Thus, it is the 
colonial forms of social organisation and globalisation – and not African culture per se 
– that are to blame for democracy’s failure on the African continent.  African culture, 
as I have laboured to show, is politically democratic by any standard of analysis. In fact, 
African culture should be properly seen as a way out of democracy’s problems. As 
Hountondji observes, “...it will bring an end to shame, [...] and to take fatherland 
seriously” (Hountondji, 2002:115). In Hountondji’s view, it is the way Western 
democracy is practiced that threatens the cultural identity of a people. Nevertheless, 
African culture is not flagrantly opposed to the ethos of democracy. 
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3.6 Conclusion 
 
 
I have pointed out that, in Africa, the absence of democracy was often blamed – by some 
scholars – on long-standing political traditions of the African peoples. Naomi Chazan, 
for instance, attributes lack of democracy in Africa to such weaknesses of the connection 
between state and society, which have a critical bearing on the meaning and influence 
of democratic norms on the continent (Chazan, 1993:68). What this implies is that 
African traditional cultural norms are, by their very nature, taken to impact negatively 
on the principles of a democratic political system. In my understanding, this is what 
contextualises the “politics of the belly”46, which is so rampant in African states; and, 
which is regarded to be so embedded in the well-established customs, values and 
informal relationships among Africans. That is to say, ‘politics of the belly’ leads to a 
situation where “private consumption of public resources undermines and enfeebles 
state institutions” (Bratton and Van de Walle, 1997:38).   
 
 
Nevertheless, as I argue, the pre-colonial African state was democratic in nature, being 
largely characterised by participatory and inclusive politics. Thus, the African form of 
traditional political organisation was that of a stronger participatory and inclusive 
democracy than the “imported” Western form of liberal democracy practiced in post-
independence Africa. If this is granted, then it should form the logical ground on which 
to reject the Western forms democracy as the sole political type for contemporary Africa 
in favour of another type, which appreciates African forms of political organisation 
based on the indigenous traditions of the African peoples.  
 
 
On the foregoing understanding, it is acceptable to see why some scholars hold the view 
that the existence and persistence of democracy in certain states in Africa are best 
                                                 
46 This concept is a compelling one by Jean-François Bayart in which he sees the democratic behaviour 
by Africans as occasioned by the material poverty of the continent. Consequently, in such scarcity of 
resources politics becomes a life-and-death struggle over private access to the limited state resource; and 
I dare say, state power is used as a means of expropriating such resources. See (Bayart, 1993; Bratton 
and Van de Walle, 1997).  
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explained by their being pegged on African traditional practices and way of life. For 
instance, the survival of democracy in Botswana can be best explained by turning to the 
pre-colonial Tswana public assembly, the kgotla, as a traditional institutional archetype 
upon which modern democratic arrangements could be modelled and legitimised.47 It is 
in view of this that I am persuaded to conclude that it is the colonial state that instituted 
an anti-democratic ethos that continues to pervade the politics of post-independence 
Africa.  
 
 
Crawford Young rightly points out that the external origins and the coercive practices 
of the colonial state constituted a powerful legacy into the postcolonial period. 
Resultantly, the post-independence state in Africa inherited colonial structures as well 
as its quotidian routines (Young, 1994:283). This phenomenon necessitates a revolt 
against the Western political culture and the demand for African traditional modes of 
governance, which will ensure that the democratic practice reflects and actually 
represents a concrete embodiment of authority traditions, and eventually helps to 
reinforce those traditions.  
 
 
In the chapter that follows, I take this debate further and examine the manner in which 
either Western democracy or African traditional democracy can offer a viable 
democratic theory for contemporary Africa. That is, I undertake a critical and analytical 
look at how democratic practice in Africa could be animated along some of the 
traditional institutional frameworks discussed above.  
  
                                                 
47 This view is highlighted by Michael Crowder in the article “Botswana and the survival of liberal 
democracy in Botswana” in Decolonization and African Independence: The transfers of power 1960-
1980, ed. Prosser Gifford and William Roger Louis (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1988). 
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CHAPTER FOUR 
 
 
 
ANIMATING DEMOCRACY: TOWARDS AN INTEGRATED 
CONSENSUAL THEORY  
 
 
 
 
The people for whom the form of government is intended must be willing 
to accept it; or at least not so unwilling as to oppose an insurmountable 
obstacle to its establishment. They must be willing and able to do what is 
necessary to keep it standing.  
 
[John Stuart Mill, On Representative Government, 1861] 
 
 
 
 
4.1 Introduction 
 
   
In the previous chapter, the study appraised communalism as an indispensable social 
order for the practice of democracy. I pointed out that for democracy to be truly and 
meaningfully established in post-independence Africa it ought to embody  philosophical 
perspectives that underpin African communalism that are in line with the ethos of 
democracy sui generis.    
 
In this chapter I seek to look at the possibility of an alternative African concept of 
democracy. I propose to call this alternative concept of democracy an integrated 
consensual theory.  My contention, in this respect, is that it is a conceptual error to think 
of a theory of democracy for contemporary Africa in a purely foreign manner, and that 
there is a need to have a cultural context of democracy. In fact, I will endeavour to show 
that the cultural context dictates the meaning of democracy in that a culturally bound 
meaning would not only be easily understood by the citizenry, but also easily acceptable 
as describing more accurately a people’s way of life. Consequently, it is necessary to 
  
99  
  
utilise indigenous democratic heritage and values that are embedded in the history and 
cultural vitality of the African people (Teffo, 2004:443).  
 
Such an approach, I seek to further argue; will provide a viable and meaningful theory 
of democracy founded on the concept of equality and freedom between the rulers and 
the populace. Arguably, therefore, Africans understand what freedom and democracy 
mean in their cultural contexts and do not need alien ideologies to define these terms for 
them – they understand that democracy ideally means equal participation (Moshi and 
Osman, 2008:213). That is to say, an alternative African theory of democracy should be 
one whose vital force is freedom as well as accountability of rulers to the governed.  
 
Nevertheless, the realisation of true democracy with such definitive principles remains 
a mirage in contemporary Africa. It cannot be denied, as I have previously pointed out 
in this study, that the state in post-independence Africa faces a lot of challenges. 
Arguably, therefore, one reason that can be advanced to partly account for such a 
plethora of challenges is that the African state in the post-independence era has held too 
tightly to its colonial antecedents leading to a situation where Western democracy is 
regarded as the sole democratic paradigm. This, as Wingo points out, has led to a 
situation where governance structures are superimposed with foreign political principles 
and procedures (Wingo, 2000:450).  
 
In view of the foregoing, it is justifiable to argue that what is at stake is to critically re-
evaluate the Western conception of democracy, and the need for the West to refrain 
from imposing ideologies on people of cultures different from their own. On this 
understanding, this chapter further seeks to point out that what is at stake is the eclectic 
appraisal of Africa’s indigenous democratic values and practices coupled with the ideals 
from other cultural traditions in order to provide a viable alternative African theory of 
democracy (Fayemi, 2009:101).  
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In order to realise this, I will first unravel the concept of democratic theory and then 
undertake a conceptual analysis of both universalism and traditionalism. I will then give 
a critical analysis of the eclectic approach as a plausible option toward the establishment 
of a viable and meaningful alternative democratic theory for contemporary Africa.  
 
4.2 A discourse on the theory of democracy 
 
A theory of democracy, Holden argues, is a body of thought that provides and analyses 
a conception of democracy together with an explanation and justification of the 
existence – or possible existence – of democracy (Holden, 1974:66). It is important to 
note that it is the analysed conception that may be termed as a model of democracy as 
such.  In this sense, a theory of democracy denotes the actual workings as well as actual 
political systems that are called democratic. In post-independence Africa the extant 
democratic concept has been that of liberal democracy, which as I earlier pointed out, 
has both consent and majority rule at the heart of its theoretical expression. 
Nevertheless, as a concept and form of government, democracy should entail a system 
that allows the populace freedom to decide their desires (Moshi and Osman, 2005:213). 
That is, democracy has become a universal phrase used to describe the current political 
trends especially in third world countries (Adejumobi, 2002:3). Notwithstanding that, 
it is doubtful whether the concept of liberal democracy appropriately captures what the 
needs and aspirations of the populace are in contemporary Africa. 
 
In view of the foregoing, it is important to note that the form of democracy that a polity 
grows should be as a result of complex interactions between geographic, cultural, 
historical and intellectual experience (Crepaz, 2008:8) As such, given Africa’s 
divergent history, the emergence of democracy on the continent need not necessarily 
unfold in the same fashion as it did in the developed societies in the West. 
Democratisation, should as it were, be rightly conceived as a continuous process 
through which democracy evolves. As Adejumobi rightly points out, it involves the 
creation and expansion of the political space for various actors to interact, negotiate, 
compete, and seek self-realisation, within some set of permissible rules (Adejumobi, 
2000: 29). All in all, while democratisation is neither an instantaneous occurrence nor 
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a uni-linear process, as Osaghae argues (1999:7), the end product of its various 
dimensions, approaches and distinctions is to establish a meaningful and viable 
democratic order.  
 
 
Nonetheless, the concept of democracy as outlined above has been largely appropriated 
as a synonym of liberal democracy, yet it is not the only form of democracy possible, 
nor does it approximate the concept of democracy in its classical sense.  In its classical 
sense, as Ake rightly argues, democracy is uncharacteristically simple and precise (Ake, 
2000:7). It is about popular expression of power by the people as opposed to liberal 
democracy, which is a political system in which there is the choice of political leaders 
by the people through competitive elections, a guarantee of civil and political rights, 
the rule of law, and public accountability (Diamond, 1996, 1997: Bratton and Van de 
Walle, 1997).   
 
 
To my mind, the essence of democracy in line with the foregoing is popular power. 
That is, true and meaningful democracy should rightly be understood as a system of 
governance that seeks the realisation of human potentialities through active 
participation in the actualisation of the rulership process. If this is granted, then Ake’s 
argument is correct and defensible that true democracy, on the one hand, enables and 
empowers while on the other hand, liberal democracy prevents and protects (Ake, 
2000:14). In sum, the quiddity of democracy can be said to be trivialised by equating 
liberal democracy with democracy per se.  
 
 
However, equating liberal democracy with democracy sui generis is a logical extension 
of the nature of the historical developments in Western societies, in which, as 
Adejumobi points out, property and market society were created and accentuated by the 
dynamics of industrial as well as technological revolution (Adejumobi, 2002:4). This 
phenomenon, as he further argues, explains why, in liberal democracy, issues of private 
property and accumulation are emphasised and are well protected in Western liberal 
democracies, while those of equality and rights come later (Adejumobi, 2002:5). In 
consequence, the synergy between liberal democracy and traditional African 
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democracy should play out in the current search for an alternative democratic theory – 
true democracy – that is responsive to the needs and aspirations of the Africans in the 
post-independence period. There is an urgent need, therefore, to establish the 
ramifications and functional elements of a liberal democratic project and its linkages 
with a plausible African democratic mode.  
 
 
4.3 Universalism and liberal democracy in Africa 
 
Universalism is a process that ensures an increasing homogenisation of all human 
societies, regardless of their cultural origin and embeddedness (Fukuyama, 1992:xiv).  
Thus, with respect to the practice of democracy, as Fayemi points out, the Universalist 
position presents liberal democracy as the model of “democratic” government that 
should not only be practiced anywhere and everywhere, but also as the most desirable 
form for universal – or global – embrace (Fayemi, 2009:107).  
 
One of the proponents of the concept of Universalism is Francis Fukuyama. He argues 
for a Universalist position for liberal democracy by stating that a liberal state is 
universally victorious. Fukuyama came to this conclusion following the collapse of 
Communism and the subsequent “victorious” emergence of the United States of 
America from the Cold War. In Fukuyama’s epistemic orientation, liberalism is a 
universal phenomenon, and industrial development that characterises it must follow a 
capitalistic universal pattern set by the West. It is on this understanding that Fukuyama 
further argues that: 
 
 …all countries undergoing economic modernization must 
increasingly resemble one another; they must unify on the basis of 
a centralised state, urbanize, replace traditional forms of social 
organization (like tribe, sect and family) with economically 
rational ones based on function and efficiency, and provide for 
universal education [democracy] of their citizens (Fukuyama, 
1992:xv).  
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It can be concluded, following Fukuyama’s view, that Western liberal democracy is to 
be perceived as a universal concept,; and, as such, the only viable system, which should 
replace any other perceived contesting and even competing “democratic” and economic 
alternatives.  
 
Universalism, thus, presents Western liberal democracy with a capitalistic economic 
orientation as the one and only form of human government that any state, including 
African states, must adopt in order to be considered democratic. That is to say, as 
Fayemi argues, the Universalist thinking is that liberal democracy is the final form of 
human government; and that it has proved to be the most viable, desirable and 
imperative for addressing the challenges of development in third-world nations 
(Fayemi, 2009:107-108). Of course, such a view cannot hold in contemporary society. 
This is arguably because, considering Wiredu’s distinction between cultural universals 
and particulars, it is important to point out as he does that “More often than not, the 
alleged universals have been home-grown particulars” (Wiredu, 1996:2).  
 
In view of the foregoing consideration, it can rightly be advanced that liberal democracy 
cannot solely be the political panacea for whatever socio-economic and political 
challenges confront any – African – state on two major accounts. First, such a stance 
deprives the world’s diverse nations of the right to construct their own type of 
democracy, which corresponds to their social and cultural milieu. To do so would earn 
universalism a bad name (Wiredu, 1996:2). Nonetheless, as Fayemi rightly argues, the 
diverse nations of the world have every right, by the fact of their existence, to construct 
their own conceptions of democracy in line with their religious, economic and social 
needs (Fayemi, 2009:108).   
 
Secondly, and following logically from the first, I am persuaded to think that a people’s 
way of life – cultural values and traditions – necessarily impact upon the way 
institutional values and systems are constructed and sustained. To think otherwise, is to 
think that certain cultures are inherently hostile to democracy par excellence, which 
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would be fallacious since to be democratic is to embrace certain values that enhance 
human dignity and freedom. To my mind, such values ought to have cultural expression.  
 
In  line with the above considerations, it is in order to examine some of the values 
associated with liberal democracy that make the proponents of the Universalist thesis 
think that liberal democracy is superior to and victorious over any other system of 
government the world over. It is on this understanding that I take a critical look into the 
concept of liberal democracy and its practice with the contention that there is nothing 
principally amiss in a people or individuals trying to convey tidings of universals or of 
particulars to other peoples (Wiredu: 1996:2).   
 
4.3 1 The concept of liberal democracy 
 
 
Political liberalism refers to the rule of law, separation of powers, and the guarantee of 
the rights of individuals and groups to live their life and pursue happiness as they deem 
worthy (Wingo, 2004:451).What this means is the fact that democracy as a form of 
government, in the Western political system, was taken seriously if and only if it 
connected to the framework of political liberalism. As Wingo postulates, political 
liberalism and democracy in the United States of America are regarded as an organic 
whole to the extent that  the two are not seen as being distilled from different traditions 
and history, and, as such, reference to democracy is in actual sense a reference to both 
ideas (Wingo, 2004:452).  
 
In view of the foregoing, it is agreed that liberal democracy is a political system, which 
allows citizens to engage in free political competition, periodic multiparty elections, and 
have respect for individual freedom of thought, expression and assembly. More 
succinctly, it is a political system in which there is the choice of political leaders by the 
people through competitive elections, a guarantee of extensive civil and political rights, 
the rule of law and public accountability (Diamond, 1996,   1997, Bratton and Walle, 
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1997). It reflects, as Moshi and Osman point out, an Anglo-American cultural bias, 
which reduces democracy to elections, multiparty system and universal suffrage such 
that any deviation is to be regarded as an anomaly (Moshi and Osman, 2008:3).  
 
Against this backdrop and conception, Robert Dahl advances three conditions for a well-
functioning liberal democracy as: a) extensive competition by political candidates and 
their groups or parties; b) political participation that provides the choice for the 
electorate to select candidates in free and fair elections; and c) civil as well as political 
liberties that enable the citizens to express themselves without fear of punishment (Dahl, 
1971:221).  
 
It can be argued that given a situation where all the conditions as postulated by Dahl are 
met, liberal democracy creates a majoritarian rule. It is this aspect of liberal democracy 
that necessitates an investigation and critical analysis of its practice.    
 
 
4.3.2 The practice of liberal democracy  
  
 
As I have indicated above, liberal democracy is practiced primarily within the matrix of 
multiparty politics, periodic elections and universal adult suffrage. That is, there must 
be periodic elections in which individuals compete either independently or as affiliates 
of political parties for the variously contested political offices. Many scholars have, 
however, argued that this system of government has failed in many parts of Africa; and 
as such, it should be replaced by an African type of democracy (Ebo, 1990; Wiredu, 
1996, 1997; Teffo, 2004; Moshi and Osman, 2008).  They argue that Western 
democracy – or liberal democracy for that matter – insists on multiparty politics causing 
political parties to aggregate along class interests to the detriment of African indigenous 
cultural values of community. Conceived in such a manner, liberal democracy is seen 
as the source of communal ethnic conflicts, elite abuse of power, majoritarian tyranny 
and corruption (Moshi and Osman, 2008:3).  
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Some scholars still argue strongly that even though liberal democracy shares some 
affinities with the concept of democracy such as political equality, inalienable human 
rights, right to political participation, accountability to the governed and the rule of law, 
they are, nevertheless, markedly different (Adejumobi, 2002:4). In the same vein, Ake 
sees liberal democracy as flagrantly opposed to the African way of life and practice of 
democracy. He observes that liberal democracy is contrary to African communalism 
and consensus building, which render sovereignty to the people in a true political and 
democratic practice. He argues thus: 
 
Instead of collectivity, liberal democracy focuses on the individual 
whose claims are ultimately placed above those of the collectivity. 
It replaces government by the people with government by the 
consent of the people. Instead of the sovereignty of the people, it 
offers sovereignty of the law. In the final analysis, liberal 
democracy repudiates popular power (Ake, 2000:10).    
 
 
Ultimately, therefore, liberal democracy is perceived as a political system that 
unfortunately thrives on the principle of “tyranny of numbers” leading to a perennial 
exclusion of the “minorities” from the inner workings of the state thereby causing them 
to face an insecure future (Rothchild, 2000:11).  
 
As such, it can be argued that the manner in which Universalism presents liberal 
democracy, though it has some universal features, does not seem to appreciate the fact 
that local cultures and traditional values certainly impact upon the way democratic 
values and systems are built and supported (Fayemi, 2009:109). The neglect of the 
contribution of local cultures to the way democracy ought to be practiced in Africa can 
arguably be said to be a major contributor to the failure of liberal democracy in post-
independence Africa.  
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Sophine Jane advances her argument along similar lines; while liberal democracy has 
the potential of guaranteeing development in post-independence Africa, its apparent 
failure can be explained by the haste of most African states in consolidating their 
democracies without gradually achieving the developmental pace of the West (Jane, 
2002:19).  My reading of Jane is that for democracy to be viably and meaningfully 
established; and bear positively on a people’s hopes and aspirations, there ought to be 
certain favourable conditions in line with the people’s social development. In fact, Jane 
points out that liberal democracy in the West has in its favour economic prosperity and 
equality enhanced by the phenomenon of industrialisation, which conditions do not 
prevail in Africa. To this effect, she further points out that democracy in Africa is still 
in its infancy stages yet it is very eager to ape the developmental pace of the West (Jane, 
2002:19). In consequence, liberal democracy, to my mind, should not be a global 
political-cum-governmental prescription without due regard to the particular cultural 
values that can support it.  
 
In view of the foregoing, an evolution of a meaningful and viable theory of democracy 
should take cognisance of the fact that true democratic governance ought to instantiate 
and promote universal human values of dignity and freedom (Fayemi, 2009:109).  In 
essence, if it does not pay attention to such values, then neither universalism nor its 
political sequel – liberal democracy – can be said to yield a legitimate democratic theory 
for contemporary Africa. This consideration is what invites an analysis of traditionalism 
and democracy in Africa.  
 
 
 
 
4.4 Traditionalism and democracy in Africa 
 
As I have pointed out above, the search for an African theory of democracy cannot yield 
pragmatic results if all it considers is the Universalist approach without taking into 
consideration African indigenous political practices and values. That is, a viable and 
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meaningful theory of democracy for modern Africa should appreciate the fact that a 
people’s cultural values and practices are not hostile to the values of democracy per se. 
True democracy must be flexible enough allow a people’s local values and systems to 
inform and support its practice. Otherwise, in the absence of such flexibility – periodic 
reform and renewal – as Seymour Lipset rightly argues, democracy simply becomes 
rigid, corrupt and unresponsive to the needs of the people as such (Lipset, 2000:10). 
Against the foregoing, an analysis of the Traditionalist approach toward the realisation 
of a meaningful and viable democratic theory for contemporary Africa is, therefore, 
called for.   
 
To begin with, Traditionalism48 is a school of thought which holds that if democracy 
has to work in Africa and solve the many political challenges that Africa faces at all, 
then recourse must be taken to African culture itself. That is to say, that the manner in 
which traditional Africa used to govern itself should be the way to conduct political 
affairs in contemporary African polity. The Traditionalist school of thought frowns at 
the way Western democracy is currently gaining ground in contemporary Africa, yet it 
can neither be sustained nor solve the bulk of crises that beset the continent (Fayemi, 
2009:109). The proponents of this approach, notably Kwasi Wiredu, Wamba dia 
Wamba, Marie Eboh and Francis Offor among others, are of the view that Western 
democracy should be jettisoned in lieu of African indigenous democratic culture. These 
scholars argue that Western democracy was imposed on Africa as a “civilised” system 
of government under the pretext that pre-colonial Africa’s political structures were 
autocratic and authoritarian in character. 
 
On the other hand, they maintain that a critical look at the socio-cultural history of pre-
colonial Africa reveals a democratic structure of rich African political and cultural 
heritage enshrined in the manner in which leaders of the community were chosen; the 
principle of checks and balances; and the recognition of and respect for the rights and 
freedoms of others. They contend that African political structure had representational 
                                                 
48 Fayemi uses the term Traditionalism to denote a school of thought in the discourse on the state of 
democracy in Africa that frowns at the manner in which democracy is practiced on the continent in 
modern times (Fayemi, 2009: 109).   
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and participatory features which were ipso facto democratic.49 These views invite a 
critical analysis of the nature and practice of African indigenous democracy in the pre-
colonial era.  
 
4.4.1 Democratic practice in traditional Africa 
 
Before I delve into a specific analysis of the argument of the Particularist scholars – the 
proponents of Traditionalism – I present a brief description of how democratic 
leadership was conducted among the Yoruba people in pre-colonial times. My point of 
argument is, other than being a well-documented example, traditional Yoruba 
democratic leadership is similar to what is found in many other traditional societies 
across Africa. The question to answer here is: To what extent was the Yoruba system of 
government in pre-colonial times democratic? In an attempt to answer this question, I 
address myself to the political practices such as “choice” of leaders, the principle of 
checks and balances, the idea of respect and rights of individuals as well as the features 
of participation and representation. I contend that these were rightfully aspects or 
moments of democracy among the Yoruba people. 
 
To begin with, Akintoye informs us that the pre-colonial Yoruba societies were 
kingdom based. The ruler of the whole Kingdom was called Oba, King. Each Kingdom 
comprised of a central town and several villages. There were subordinate towns and 
villages under a subordinate ruler known as Baale, village head.  Each town was divided 
into four and put under a “quarter chief”. Each quarter was made up of many nuclear 
families with same ancestral descent. Each family compound had a family head called 
Olori ebi (Ankintoye, 2009:1). The crucial point to note here is that each of these 
societal stratifications was interconnected with all the others with respective 
governments. Yunusa Kehinde Salami points out that the choice of who governed at 
these levels was done through a democratic means – age and prominence in the ancestral 
tree (Salami, 2006:69). The family was the nucleus of the Yoruba system of 
                                                 
49 This view is held by, among others, Wiredu (1996), Tangwa (1998) and Salami (2006). 
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government. In the family compound, there was the corporate existence of members – 
each member had property right and duties. Members deliberated on the affairs of the 
family and settled disputes at family compound meetings that were frequently held. It 
is to be noted that it was in such family meetings that democratic features of governance 
were exhibited as every member had full rights to express his/her views and opinions 
(Akintoye, 2009:3). It was the responsibility of the family head to ensure that not only 
was every member’s opinion heard, but also that each of them was encouraged to freely 
express it. In consequence, participation was each member’s duty. Any member who 
habitually failed to honour such duty risked being considered abhorrent in the family 
compound (Akintoye, 2009:3). Thus, participation was a critical democratic 
phenomenon most notably at the choice of a king.  
  
Among the Yoruba, the choice of a king was ipso facto a demonstration of democracy 
in that it defined the democratic nature of the political system. This was held to be 
arguably so because, at the death of a king, ascendency to the throne did not 
automatically pass to the deceased king’s sons. Akintoye says that candidates would 
emerge from other royal families including all the male members of the royal family 
group. The fact of the matter here is that all candidates to the Obaship – sons and even 
grandsons of former kings – were all eligible for selection as Oba and treated as equal 
candidates. The power to carry out the selection of Oba on behalf of the people was 
vested in the standing committees of chiefs, known as the Council of Kingmakers. It 
was this Council with consultation with the Oracle, Ifa that guided and authenticated 
the selection process (Akintoye, 2009:3).   
 
In the foregoing respect, the Council was all-powerful but its decision was not arbitrary 
since there were laid down principles and norms that strictly guided the final decision 
on who became the king. Such guidelines included firstly, personality and historical 
background of the candidate as well as his moral disposition. Secondly, there was the 
expression of the public opinion on the prince. In consequence, to succeed in this 
process, a candidate’s choice had to be supported by the majority of the Council of 
Kingmakers upon overwhelming merits in the historical, personality and the moral 
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yardsticks used in the process of this determination. After meeting these mundane 
requirements, the support of Ifa was sought; and once it was received, the ritual of 
ascending to the throne would then begin. It is within this context, coupled with Ifa’s 
approval, that the King occupied the highest seat of the Kingdom.  
 
In his book The sociology of the Yoruba, N. A. Fadipe alludes to the fact that even 
though the king sat on the highest seat of the kingdom, his exercise of power was only 
within the matrix of the first among equals, primus inter pares. In this sense, the king 
was the “first” among, but equal with, his councillors. His function as the head of the 
council was to oversee the general health of the society, which entailed internal security, 
issues of peace and war as well as the administration of justice (Fadipe, 1970:206). 
 
In conclusion, the nature and practice of the Yoruba indigenous government – as was 
the case with other African communities – was such that political arrangement provided 
for checks and balances. This was further explicated in the fact that if a king behaved in 
such a manner that he tried to establish his own personal power beyond the limits of the 
limited monarchy system, or if he became tyrannical, greedy, et cetera, some chiefs 
would talk to him; and if he failed to amend his ways, the matter would be taken to the 
special council of spiritual elders, namely the Ogboni, at which Council he would be 
seriously warned. Following failure to heed the Ogboni, quarter chiefs alerted the family 
heads to inform their compound meetings of the final action that would be taken against 
the king – being presented with an empty calabash or parrot’s eggs as a sign that the 
king had to, and compulsorily so, evacuate the office (Fayemi, 2009:112). This process 
of checks and balances, in my reading, was indicative of the fact that the king was a 
mere custodian of the people’s power. The Yoruba indigenous government, it can be 
held, was a people-centred democracy.  
 
In respect to the foregoing exposition, it is plausible to advance that the system was 
based on the rule of law – constitutionalism. Salami argues that this system was 
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democratic to the extent that rules were strictly followed (Salami, 2006:74). There was 
also the participation of the different levels and cadres of the society (Salami, 2006:75).  
 
 
4.4.2 The Traditionalist argument and African democracy 
 
 
In the discourse on viable and meaningful democratic theory for contemporary Africa, 
proponents of the Traditionalist thesis, in principle, argue against the Universalist 
standpoint and liberal democracy. There is an apparent “negative” feeling among 
scholars in this camp that what passes as democracy for Africa today is nothing but 
Western “democratic” prescriptions50. It is held that there is an unfortunate imposition 
of Western political values, which are not suitable for the African situation. For Wamba, 
democracy should be seen in Africa as a process of emancipation, self-determination 
and the meeting of the needs of the African people. He writes: 
 
 
...democratization has to be considered as a process to win, defend 
and protect the rights of the people and the individual against the 
one-sidedness–including the right of self organization for 
autonomy and not necessarily right of participation in the state 
process (Wamba, 1990:127).   
 
Marie Eboh, in her article titled “Is Western Democracy the answer to the African 
Problem?” argues that Western democracy is not an authentic expression of an African 
political culture. She sees democracy as culturally relative; and that the solution to 
Africa’s contemporary governance challenges must not be sought for in the Western 
type of democracy, but rather, in every effort that seeks to address the socio-economic 
and political realities of contemporary Africa, which may, in the long run, lead to an 
African style of democracy. Without giving democracy an African flair as Eboh seems 
to suggest, there are bound to be perpetual governance challenges in Africa. She, 
                                                 
50 Wamba dia Wamba (1990) particularly argues that since the inception of democracy in Africa, Africa 
is subjected to a situation where it has to consume what the West articulates as “democracy”.  
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therefore, concludes that there is a need for an African democracy, which addresses the 
specific issues that face the African continent (Eboh, 1990:167).   
 
Both views of Wamba and Eboh are expressive of the simple fact that Western 
democracy is unsuitable for Africa and that an African culture-centric type of 
democracy should be allowed to emerge in order to replace it. While it is admissible 
that democracy should address itself to the socio-economic and political conundrums of 
contemporary Africa; and that it should answer to the questions that the people for which 
it is meant are asking, it should, however, be remembered that there are certain 
fundamental values of democracy sui generis, which cut across any cultural divide. I 
contend that such values ought to be regarded as fundamental fabric for constructing 
true and viable democracy for any society, their historical emergence notwithstanding.   
 
Such fundamental values of democracy, to my mind, constitute what I prefer to call the 
grounds for accepting democracy as a political system of government in which the 
people rule. Nevertheless, it should be pointed out that the grounds upon which 
democracy may be favoured as a political system can be either “moral” or “non-moral”. 
That is to say, democracy may enable people to pursue their own interest – non-moral 
purpose; or to secure liberty, justice, et cetera – moral consequence. Nonetheless, 
democracy may well be favoured for its own intrinsic value, as a good-in-itself; in which 
case it may be regarded as a system of governance which involves treating people with 
respect and dignity proper to them as human beings granted them by nature.  
  
 
Some scholars have argued that the ground for democracy is of moral concern.  David 
Beetham, for instance, asserts that the purpose of democracy should be the enjoyment 
of equality of the right to take part in decision-making (Beetham, 1983:55). My reading 
of Beetham is that there is no way democracy as a political system can be divorced from 
morality. If this is granted, then it is plausible to advance the argument that if democracy 
and morality are kept separate, they render conflict inevitable since the interpretation of 
‘rule by the people’ which fits the requirement, for example, of liberty and justice, may 
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clash with that of enabling people to pursue their interests. If this happens, then it would 
be necessary to adjudicate between the purposes themselves. However, it would be 
simplistic to suppose that an acceptable form of democracy would rest on one such 
purpose to the exclusion of all others. In consequence, the grounds for democracy 
should be properly hinged on the fact that individual human beings are dignified persons 
with rights – intrinsic property.  Some obvious examples of such intrinsic values or 
property of democracy include liberty or freedom, equality, justice, the rule of law, and 
subsequently, the common good. I will briefly discuss each of these grounds of 
democracy and argue that the common good constitutes the highest intrinsic value since 
all other grounds lead to its attainment.   
 
 
a)  Freedom 
To my mind, a well-constructed political system should serve the purpose, telos, for 
which human beings exist, namely happiness. Arguably, liberty or freedom is a 
necessary element of happiness, and consequently of democracy. This is because 
freedom requires that people exercise their own individual judgment in the practice of 
democracy. Pope John Paul II, in his Encyclical Centisimus Annus, argues that freedom 
must define the citizen in a democratic setting as an “autonomous subject of moral 
decision” (John Paul II, 1991:29).  
 
In the same vein, J. S. Mill, an eminent advocate of individual freedom, argues that 
freedom is the absence of external constraints on the individual. Mill further argues that 
the individual should be free from the state since “a person who is deprived of freedom 
and of the possibility of earning a living through his own initiative, comes to depend on 
the social machine and those who control it” (Mill, 1983:349). According to Mill, 
therefore, if a person is deprived of freedom, then it is difficult for him to recognize his 
dignity as a person, and this hinders progress towards the building up of an authentic 
democratic government. 
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My reading of Mill is that an authentic democratic government cannot be realised 
without reference to an individual’s exercise of free choice. That is, the realisation of 
true democratic order critically depends on the exercise of an individual’s unique and 
exclusive responsibility bestowed on him or her by nature. Arguably in this sense, 
therefore, freedom of the individual is important in two ways; firstly, it promotes the 
individual’s dignity as a person; and secondly, because progress in any matter depends 
on contribution from persons who can think for themselves, true democracy can only be 
brought about by individuals who are free and are able to think for themselves as such.  
 
Still, while free development of the individual is important for the realisation of true 
democracy, in contemporary time and the age of industrialization such as ours, there is 
a fear that a monolithic society would ensue and such a society would infringe upon 
individual rights. In consequence, there is a need to define the nature and limits of 
society’s power over the individual. It is to be noted that conflicts between the interests 
of the individual and those of the society are bound to occur, yet they must be resolved 
in the best way possible. The only circumstance in which the individual can be restrained 
is when he or she acts in a manner which is harmful to the society. The restraint, 
nevertheless, should be understood as an effort towards the preservation of the society.  
 
In sum, freedom produces a higher type of individual with the requisite ability to tolerate 
and establish mutuality with others necessary for the establishment of a meaningful and 
viable democratic polity. If granted, then, freedom by its very nature presupposes justice 
in a democratic polity.  
  
 b) Justice 
 
A system of government cannot be fully or meaningfully democratic and rooted among 
the people, unless it is also grounded on the concept of justice in order to actualize 
happiness of the citizenry (SECAM, 1988:4). Terence Irwin presents a Platonic 
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argument to the effect that justice is conditio sine qua non for the establishment of an 
ideal state, in that it is only when the state is ruled by the virtuous that justice can be 
realized. He narrates Plato’s analogy of the soul and the state and rightly points out that 
justice in the state is the condition in which the rational, the emotional and the appetitive 
parts of the soul all do their work (Irwin, 1977:204). This analogy outlines Plato’s 
conception of the state as composed of the philosophers as the rulers of a polity; the 
auxiliaries as the administrators; and the labourers as the producers with corresponding 
virtues of wisdom, courage and temperance. 
 
It is in view of the foregoing, as Gunnar Skirbekk and Nils Gilje rightly point out, Plato 
conceives justice as a virtue, which is connected with the community, that is, the 
citizenry of the state. In other words, justice is the harmony among the three virtues of 
wisdom, courage and temperance.  Consequently, the ideal polity is not only thought of 
from the perspective of theoretical moral demands, but also as one with reciprocal 
satisfaction of needs. Thus, the wise think, the courageous defend and the temperate 
produce (Skirbekk and Gilje, 2001:57).   
 
Accordingly, therefore, I am persuaded to advance the view that justice is 
complementarity. It not only entails doing that which one is disposed to do, but also that 
which he or she is equipped to do. In consequence, what is required of people in a 
democracy, as Fredrick Copleston argues, is for people to complement one another so 
that everyone actively participates in supplying the natural needs. In fact, as he further 
postulates, a democratic polity should not only further the economic needs of man, since 
man is not simply an ‘economic man’, but also his happiness; to develop them in the 
good life in accordance with the principles of justice (Copleston, 1946:226).  
 
In the foregoing respect, it can be argued that justice contributes to the wholeness of 
being in a democracy. Its essence consists in the agreement between the leaders and the 
governed with their respective roles. In Africa, justice should be conceived as a social 
cooperation for the common good. Individualism or egoism, where an individual 
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perceives himself or herself as the centre and purpose of all activity motivated by self-
gain, adulterates the very concept of justice in an African set-up where existence is 
defined in a perichoretical modus vivendi, mode of life, as captured by the Mbitian 
expression, “I am because We are and since We are, therefore, I am” (Mbiti, 1969:16).    
 
In essence, it can be argued that in an African perichoresis, the “We” is reminiscent of 
Plato’s idea that the society is not something external to a self-sufficient individual, but 
that the person is always part of the community. In other words, the individual is not a 
demarcated entity cut off from the rest of the community members but essentially there 
exists a dialectical interpenetration and connection between I–the individual and We–
the community, in which neither I nor We can claim full primacy (Nwoye, 2006:129).  
 
In sum, in a true, viable and meaningful democracy, as in Plato’s ideal state, everybody 
should do what he or she is most capable of. This should be the basis for the harmonious 
interplay between the rulers and the governed, and among the populace themselves and 
their professional functions as characteristic of a just state. It is this consideration that 
sets the ground for equality as a ground for democracy.  
 
 
 
c) Equality 
 
Equality means that ‘adequate opportunities’51 are laid bare to all in a polity. That is, all 
those opportunities, which are considered to be essential and without which life is all 
but a frustration, should be given to individuals within the state. To ground democracy 
on equality is to allow each person to have complete freedom in all those matters that 
                                                 
51 I choose to underline that there is a distinction between “adequate opportunities” and “equal 
opportunities”. The former does not mean the latter. Equality is a problem in proportion. It is because of 
this that we talk of adequate opportunities, since every individual must have those things without which 
life is meaningless. All human beings eat, drink and obtain shelter. It is to be noted, even in ordinary 
existence, that we cannot have equality of wages as there is not equality in capacity of work. 
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concern him/her for the realisation of his/her destiny and the common good. This is the 
basic equality of all persons, which stems from the fact that all men (persons?) are 
endowed with a rational soul – that is, they have the same nature and same telos as far 
as democratic governance is concerned. This is reminiscent of Kant’s categorical 
imperative in which case the populace and the political elite must work out of duty. This 
implies that power should not allow leaders to use others as a mere means to some end. 
Good democratic practice demands a co-joint effort of both the leaders and the populace. 
Nevertheless, I am not oblivious to the fact that not all are alike as regards physical 
capacity and intellectual prowess. There are certainly rightful differences between 
people. I, therefore, argue for equality of dignity about which John Locke as an ardent 
defender rightfully writes: 
 
A state of equality, wherein all power and jurisdiction is reciprocal, no 
one having more than another; there being nothing more evident than 
that creatures of the same species and rank, promiscuously born by all 
the same advantage of nature, and the ease of the same faculties should 
also be equal one amongst another without subordination or 
subjunction, unless the Lord and Master of them all should by any 
manifest declaration of His will set one above another, and confer on 
him by an evident and clear appointment an undoubted right to 
dominion and sovereignty (Locke, 1963:169). 
 
In view of the above, it is the equality of men (humanity? persons?) by nature that makes 
it a foundation of true democracy. That is, equality makes democracy to be at the service 
of human dignity and destiny by ensuring that all individuals be treated alike in political 
decision-making – all must be included and enfranchised.  
 
In consequence of the foregoing argument, a democratic polity must strive for 
“democratic equality”52. This means that every individual is equal before the law and 
should enjoy the same status in the sphere of private law.  
 
                                                 
52 Democratic equality operates in the context of every individual being treated with equal dignity 
regardless on one’s status in the society. 
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d) The Constitution – Rule of Law  
In common parlance, a meaningful and viable democratic system of government should 
be based on the ‘rule of law’, that is, rules and regulations that are laid down by the 
Legislature, implemented by the Executive and adjusted by the Judiciary. The 
grounding of democracy on the Constitution, therefore, is of paramount importance 
because the rule of law assumes that every citizen will assimilate the principles and 
ideals of citizenship as the basis of exercising his or her rights and claiming the same 
from the state.   
 
Fairfield Roy observes that the Constitution must have the ability to make democracy 
influence the actions and thoughts of the populace even if they resist. That is, since in a 
democracy factions between the loser and the victor are almost inevitable, it is the 
Constitution that must break and control the violence of factions (Roy, 1961:16). It is 
against this observation that I am persuaded to argue that the plausibility of grounding 
democracy on the Constitution as the supreme law is validated on two accounts. First, 
since it is the control of the inevitable war of factions in a democracy, it destroys the 
liberty which is essential to its existence; and secondly, it gives to every citizen the same 
opinions, the same passions, and the same interests. In sum, the law simply ensures that 
all citizens are equal before it, and it is a necessary condition for the attainment of the 
common good in a democratic polity.   
 
 
e) The Common Good  
The African social organisation as I have pointed out earlier on in this study is that of 
communalism, which is premised on the fact that the good of all determines the good of 
each individual. That is, the sense of community, properly understood, is what defines 
and constitutes the common good. In other words, the common good should be properly 
understood in the context of the welfare of each individual being dependent on the 
welfare of all as such. 
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Gyekye offers a definition of the common good in his narration of the Akan art motif of 
the “Siamese” crocodile: a crocodile with two heads but one stomach (Gyekye, 
1995:159). He contends that the proverb that is connected with this symbol is indicative 
of the fact that even though the two crocodiles have a common stomach, they always 
struggle over food. While Gyekye acknowledges that there are various lessons that can 
be drawn from this motif, he particularly points out that “the common stomach 
symbolizes the common good” (Gyekye, 1995:160). It is in view of this that he goes on 
and describes the common good as “the good of all individuals embraced within a 
society” (Gyekye, 1995:160). It is important to note that against this description, 
Gyekye clearly points out that the common good is not merely the sum of various 
individual goods, but rather that there are certain needs which are basic to the enjoyment 
and fulfilment of the life of each individual. He identifies such needs to include things 
like shelter, food, health, equality of opportunity and liberty (Gyekye, 1995:160).  
 
It is on the foregoing understanding that I argue that a true, meaningful and viable 
democratic order should be grounded on the idea of the common good since, as it stands, 
it is predicated on a true and essential universal – the good of all; that which is, in 
Gyekye’s description, essentially good for human beings as such (Gyekye, 1995:160). 
To my mind, this is what makes the common good to be the conditio sine qua non for 
the establishment of a true, meaningful and viable democratic order in any society.  
 
Nevertheless, the common good is not conceptually opposed to the individual good of 
any member of the society. It in effect embraces the good of the individual as it does 
embrace, too, the good of the society – other members. As such, if the common good is 
attained, then the individual good is also attained for, as Gyekye postulates, there cannot 
be any conflict between the two since they are actually tied together and indeed overlap 
(Gyekye, 1995:160).  In consequence, the possibility of attainment of the common good 
is closely tied to the idea of communality; it is embedded in the fact of reciprocity among 
human beings, that is, the individual identifying himself or herself with the group.  
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What all this indicates is the fact that the project of establishing a true, viable and 
meaningful democratic order in post-independence Africa should, other than dismissing 
the Universalist approach as being a Western imposition of a system of governance, 
look for the fundamental principles that define democracy as a good-in-itself. In 
consequence, I am persuaded to argue that in the search for an African theory of 
democracy, neither a purely Traditionalist approach nor a purely Universalist scheme 
can irrefutably pass as an alternative political paradigm in the post-independence era.  
 
In my view, a plausible alternative African theory of democracy in contemporary times 
should be gauged against, and incorporate, the fundamental values of democracy as well 
as the African indigenous cultural values. It is this consideration that necessitates an 
analysis of those “democratic” values of the African indigenous political system that 
can be brought to bear on meaningful democratic practice.   
 
 
 
 
4.4 3 Values of African indigenous democracy 
 
To my mind, one of the values of African indigenous democracy, and possibly the 
reason why an African type of democracy is preferred to the Western type, is embedded 
in the fact that it is specific to the culture of the African people. It is a democracy that 
emerged against the communal life set-up of the Africans. This is to say that African 
indigenous type of democracy reflected the ordinariness of the people’s way of life. It 
was a democracy of the people’s lebenswelt. In contradistinction to the Western 
democratic type, which is imposed under the guise of “civilising” the Africans, and 
under the pretext that democracy must be practiced in strict adherence to Western 
conception of it, African indigenous democracy has the flair of the African communal 
mode of life, modus vivendi (Offor, 2006:121). Conversely, what constitutes the failure 
of democracy in Africa is the fact that Western democracy is not congruent with the 
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people’s way of life. Nevertheless, democracy must be allowed to emerge from the 
socio-political and cultural context of a people. What this means, as Abraham argues, is 
that in a communal system of life, political power is essentially derived from the people, 
and the leader only holds it in trust.  In fact, in traditional African political life, the king 
was only a representation of the unity of the people (Abraham, 1962:77).   
 
Following logically from the above consideration, is another fundamental value of 
traditional African democratic order, namely dialogue and consultation in the decision 
making process. K.A. Busia captures this value of African democracy when he writes: 
   
When a Council, each member of which was the representative of 
a lineage, met to discuss matters affecting the whole community, 
it had always to grapple with the problem of representing sectional 
and common interests. In order to do this, the members had to talk 
things over; they had to listen to all different points of view. So 
strong was the value of solidarity that the chief aim of the 
counsellors was to reach unanimity, and they talked till this was 
achieved (Busia, 1967:28).  
 
 
It is on this understanding that, in the article titled “Democracy by Consensus: Some 
Conceptual Considerations”, Wiredu offers an elaborate discussion on what he 
conceives to be the nature and role of parties if a political system is of a consensual type. 
He argues: 
 
All parties to any group deliberation that produces consensus are 
party to the decision reached. This contrasts sharply with 
majoritarian decision-making. Here the decision is the wishes of 
one group or group of groups as opposed to another. In politics 
this usually means the majority party. They are the winners, and 
the others are the losers. The notion of party has occurred three 
times in this paragraph. In its first occurrence it means an 
individual or group of individuals with an interest or concern in a 
given issue or project. In the second it is used adjectivally to mean 
being a participant in a decision, and in the third it is used in the 
well-known political sense in which a party is a group of people, 
basically of like mind, organized with the aim of winning 
governmental power (Wiredu, 2001:238). 
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He uses numerical subscripts to track the differences in the above postulated senses; and 
wonders whether parties would actually have any role to play in a polity where decision 
making is arrived at through consensus. He aptly argues that: 
 
Consensus, as may be gathered from all the above, may be 
characterized (in the absence of an antecedent unanimity) as an 
agreement arrived at by all the members of a group through 
rational dialogue and mutual accommodation. Consensus can be 
obtained in both political and non-political contexts, but let us 
restrict ourselves to political consensus. It is obvious that if 
consensus becomes the decision procedure of a nation’s 
deliberating body, the distinction between government and 
opposition would lose its raison d’étre. If all parties1 are party2 to 
the decision, there is nothing to oppose and there is no need of a 
party3 to do the opposing (Wiredu, 2001:238).  
 
 
Wiredu is even more categorical in pointing out the non-necessity of existence of a 
political party in a democratic polity when he further writes that, “On the other hand, 
there will always be parties1 wanting to be party2 to the decision that affects them” 
(Wiredu, 2001:238). He contends that party1 is to be conceived as an association of those 
citizens interested in the promotion of political ideas and policies rendering it to be the 
only plausible manner of conceiving the concept party in a polity; and in which respect 
a political party, properly understood, is rendered not only undesirable and unnecessary 
but also non-existent. It is in this context that he writes: 
 
Anyone who tries to take liberties with the citizen’s right to form 
or belong to a party1 of his choice is trifling with one of the most 
fundamental of human rights, namely, the right of free expression, 
association being a form of expression. In a consensual 
dispensation then, there will be parties1 but no parties3. The same 
thought may be illuminatingly expressed in other terms. 
Obviously, a set of political conventions or constitutional 
provisions that envisages a consensual system of politics will not 
include a rule that mandates that party3  that is victorious at the 
polls gets into governmental power to the exclusion, normally, of 
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other parties3, since there will be no such parties in that system 
(Wiredu, 2001:238-239).        
 
Wiredu’s consensual prescription admits the existence of parties1 and vehemently 
rejects the existence of parties3 such that his argument of a non-party polity only applies 
to the latter and not the former. To my mind, Wiredu’s position on a non- party polity 
with this admission is rather inadequate. It is simply not clear what Wiredu seems to 
mean by a non-party polity. There is an apparent confusion between the concepts of 
party and opposition. If my reading is correct, then his distinctions of parties1.2.&3 is 
misleading and unwarranted. To admit that parties1 are an association of those citizens 
interested in promoting their preferred political ideas and policies and still proceed to 
dismiss parties3 merely as an opposition in a consensual scheme is to miss the point in 
a big way. It can still be argued that the reason for which parties3 are constituted is also 
to promote their preferred political ideas and policies, which is “opposing”. If this is 
granted, then there is no significant political difference between parties1 and parties3 as 
such.  
 
In the article titled “The nature of opposition in Kwasi Wiredu’s democracy by 
consensus”, Matolino offers a plausible critique to Wiredu’s concept of non-party 
consensual polity53. He outlines a threefold criticism, namely, that the meaning Wiredu 
attributes to the term party cannot pass without challenge since the characterisation of 
parties1 and parties3 are actually political parties – a fact that Wiredu appears to deny 
(Matolino, 2013:145-6). Secondly, Matolino shows the incoherency in Wiredu’s 
depiction of one-party state as a combination of party1, 3 (2013:146). He finally points 
out that Wiredu fails to spell out how consensus is attained during the deliberations that 
lead to parties being party2 to decisions (Matolino, 2013:150). Matolino concludes by 
pointing out that while there are attractions in Wiredu’s consensual democracy, the way 
he depicts the nature and role of political parties is problematic (Matolino, 2013:151).   
                                                 
53 My intention is not to give a full exposition of Matolino’s critique of Wiredu’s notion of a non-party 
consensual scheme for that is not within the scope of this study. Rather, I wish to highlight that the way 
Matolino captures Wiredu’s incoherencies sheds more light into the way parties and their role ought to 
be understood in contemporary democratic practice.  
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To my mind, inasmuch as Wiredu vehemently admits the existence of different views 
and standpoints of interlocutors, the principles that guide “political parties” in the 
practice of liberal democracy and the various camps in Wiredu’s consensus building 
remain practically the same. Besides, each individual in party1 insofar as he or she is 
entitled to his or her views – opinions – in consensus building, constitutes an identity, a 
“political party” in its own right if his or her views are not to be taken for granted.  
 
Arguably, therefore, there are as many political parties in consensus building as there 
are members in the deliberating process. This is what can be equated to multiparty 
politics where each political party has its own political manifesto. Perhaps what is 
different is the fact that liberal democracy has institutionalised the camps into political 
parties. Thus, the process of deliberation, which promotes tolerance, mutuality and 
concern for the other, is not flagrantly opposed to the principle of multi-party politics in 
modern times.  
 
In line with the above consideration, the legitimation of consensual or a purely 
traditional socio-political order as the only panacea for democratic maladies in 
contemporary Africa is highly dubitable and cannot pass. This necessitates an eclectic 
approach to the question of African theory of democracy.  
 
 
4.5 Eclecticism and democracy in Africa 
 
 
As I have so far presented and analysed in this study, both the Universalist and 
Particularist schools of thought in the search for an African theory of democracy 
represent extreme positions. The eclectic approach assumes the position that virtue lies 
in the middle, virtus in medio, and reconciles the extremities of both the universalistic 
and particularistic orientations.  According to the eclectic approach, the search for an 
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African theory of democracy in post-independence Africa should not only adopt 
democratic values and principles of indigenous African culture, but also those 
democratic ideas and values that have developed in other cultures as well (Fayemi, 
2009:118).  Proponents of this school of thought, notably Kwame Gyekye, E.A. Ruch, 
K.C. Anyanwu and Kolawole Owolabi among others, argue that those ideas from other 
cultures that are not opposed to democracy-in-itself may contribute to meaningful and 
sustainable democratic practice in modern Africa.  
 
Accordingly, scholars of the eclectic school of thought argue that the search for a true 
and viable democracy for contemporary Africa should not be a mere return to Africa’s 
traditional past, nor a sheer replication of Western modes of political governance (Ruch 
and Anyanwu, 1981:305). Gyekye, in particular, is of the opinion that for Africa to have 
a meaningful democracy there should be a recourse and commitment to Africa’s 
indigenous democratic ideas and institutions. He argues that some of the democratic 
ideals evident in the traditional African socio-political organisation could be 
incorporated in contemporary democratic practice (Gyekye, 1997:120).   
 
Democratic stability and sustainability in contemporary Africa is a matter of 
methodological concern, which is possible if and only if we establish, as Gyekye further 
argues: 
 
…indigenous ways and means of hammering the autochthonous 
democratic elements as well as elements inherited from alien 
source...into acceptable and viable democratic form in the setting 
of the modern world (Gyekye, 1997:43).   
 
In sum, Gyekye sees the African traditional political values as a panacea to the challenge 
of establishing a viable and meaningful democratic theory for modern Africa. He 
contends that democratic values are not alien to African political cultures; and yet such 
values “have not been allowed to affect and shape the contours of modern African 
politics” (Gyekye, 1997:135).   
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In view of the foregoing argument, K. A. Owolabi maintains that traditional African 
culture has both democratic and undemocratic values. As such, a return to the African 
past for a plausible foundation of democracy in modern Africa should be approached 
with caution. Nevertheless, he observes that a viable and meaningful democracy for 
post-independence Africa could be developed from the amalgam of ideas from both 
traditional African culture as well as that of other societies (Owolabi, 2003:443).  
Consequently, it is erroneous to think that democratic institutions that originated in the 
West cannot be successfully utilised in Africa. He maintains that whatever facilitated 
the workability of those democratic values and institutions in those “foreign” 
worldviews, would take course in Africa as such (Oluwabi, 2003:443).   
 
In line with the above considerations, it is clear that the extreme positions of both the 
Universalist and Particularist cannot yield to a viable and meaningful democratic theory 
for contemporary Africa. In fact, the way traditionalists present consensual democracy, 
for instance, as superior to liberal democracy cannot hold, and can be faulted on two 
accounts. Firstly, such a view puts both systems at war with each other in a manner that 
implies that they are both flagrantly opposed to each other. In my thinking, they are not 
since they are both typologies of democracy of distinct socio-cultural emergence and 
expression.   
 
Secondly, a perception that puts liberal democracy over and above the traditional 
African form and vice versa is tantamount to saying that democratic institutions and 
values that originated in other worldviews cannot successfully be utilised elsewhere 
other than their respective ontology of origin. If this is granted, then an eclectic approach 
is more viable by arguing that whatever facilitated the workability of democratic ideals 
in their “primitive” worldviews can, as a matter of principle, be employed for 
sustainable democratic practice in any society including Africa. In sum, following the 
eclectic approach, this study arrives at an  African theory of democracy known as 
“Integrated Consensual Democracy”, which incorporates values and institutions found 
in both the Western and traditional African democratic practices.  
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4.6 Towards a theory of ‘Integrated Consensual Democracy’  
 
 
One of the most fundamental arguments that this study has so far established is that 
there is a problem of the disjuncture that exists between the rulers and the governed in 
contemporary democratic practice in Africa. As a result of this, democratic governance, 
which is supposed to give preference to the people by making their will explicit and real 
in concrete terms, is greatly jeopardised. Its closeness to the people has not been felt so 
as to qualify as a system in which the government stays closer to the people and the 
people closer to their government (Nyerere, 1998). It is in this regard, therefore, that it 
is right and fitting to bridge this chasm with a view to making democracy more viable 
and meaningful for Africa in modern times. I am persuaded to advance that it is in the 
absence of a viable and meaningful democratic theory for contemporary Africa, as 
Adetulla argues that: 
 
...many potential conflicts have intensified with increased 
destabilising capacity. Poverty and deteriorating living conditions 
have exacerbated identity conflicts along communal, ethnic, 
religious and regional lines (Adetulla, 2011:17).  
 
I, therefore, propose the theory of ‘Integrated Consensual Democracy’ as a possible 
panacea to contemporary Africa’s democratic challenges. I argue that the theory of 
Integrated Consensual Democracy is hinged on the concept of public deliberation, 
which is a process by which members of a political community – guided by the 
commitment to the common good – participate in public discussion and critical 
examination of collectively binding policies.  In the section that follows, I provide an 
analysis of how integrated consensual democracy can be achieved by delving into what 
constitutes its nature.  
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4.6.1 The nature of ‘Integrated Consensual Democracy’ 
 
 
It has been argued that the complex nature of contemporary society may render the 
democratic credentials of traditional Africa incompatible with the demands of modern 
forms of political governance (Fayemi, 2009:119). Nevertheless, the nature of 
Integrated Consensual Democracy, which emanates from eclecticism, provides a 
roadmap on how to incorporate the universalistic and particularistic values and 
institutions into a viable and meaningful democracy in contemporary Africa.  
 
To begin with, I look at the phenomenon of voting. It is to be remembered that advocates 
of traditional form of democracy charge that liberal democracy gives the people who 
are meant to be the focus of any system of government, a “negative role” as far as voting 
is concerned. That is, people are given the role of passively choosing between options 
presented to them. This, they maintain, reduces the fact of voting to a meagre exercise, 
a periodic ritual over which they have no meaningful control.  
 
This position, as I argue, is admissible on the grounds that the choices that citizens get 
involved in have a twofold dimension. They concern personnel on the one hand; and 
policy on the other hand. The problem with liberal democracy as regards voting is, 
therefore, that policy options are broad and general rather than specific and detailed. 
Arguably, this amounts to what can be associated with the idea that elected 
representatives have greater knowledge and more wisdom than the populace. They 
prescribe to the electorate what they think the electorate wants.  
 
Resultantly, in liberal democracy it is perceived that the elected representatives should 
have considerable autonomy in making political decisions while remaining within the 
overall control of the people. To this extent, liberal democracy could be faulted on the 
idea of voting. However, the idea itself cannot be wished away on the simple ground of 
being a foreign import, as Wiredu argues and would want us to believe. To do so is to 
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miss the point and to refuse to see the inevitable and positive side of voting not only in 
a system of government, but also on every matter that invites divergent opinions in 
everyday life.  
 
In Integrated Consensual Democracy, voting has a positive connotation such that the 
people actually initiate policies. The idea of representation is, thus, reworked such that 
representatives are not the know-it-all as proponents of consensual democracy would 
want us to believe; but rather they are “controlled” by their electors and are little more 
than messengers conveying the decision of their constituents. It is in this sense that I am 
persuaded to conclude that the idea of voting can be said to tie up with ordinary 
consensus in that it leads to what is properly speaking termed “delegated representation” 
(Gyekye, 1997, Abraham, 1962).  
 
In essence, the populace does not only initiate policies, but also makes detailed and 
specific decisions about what affects them in the ordinariness of their everyday lives. In 
Integrated Consensual Democracy the populace does more than vote. While in ordinary 
consensus voting may be equated to the populace engaging in the act of thinking and 
discussing policies as well as engaging in activities that either form or replace part of 
the very process of government, for instance, becoming a local council or helping to run 
community services, in integrated consensual democracy the idea of voting is preceded 
by a metaphysical worldview, that is a way of looking at the world and democracy as a 
good-in-itself.  
 
Voting in Integrated Consensual Democracy as can be deduced from Osman Edim 
Temple is, thus, a manifestation of a sincere commitment to democracy sui generis and 
not some selected items for political expediency (Osman, 2012:139).  It is in this context 
that I maintain that the idea of representation is taken more seriously in the scheme of 
Integrated Consensual Democracy than in liberal democracy or ordinary consensual 
democracy. That is to say, representation is about the people and their socio-economic 
transformation, rather than cultivating and maintaining arcane loyalties to traditional 
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rulers, spiritual guides, godfathers, and kingmakers for the sake of political survival 
(Osman, 2012:134). As such, representation in Integrated Consensual Democracy is 
valued for its direct effects or outcomes, namely, the full development of the individual 
and the strengthening of bonds between the individual and the community. In other 
words, it is representation against which both the effectiveness and legitimacy of the 
system is gauged.  
 
In line with the above reasoning, it can be further advanced that voting in Integrated 
Consensual Democratic type is an expression of awareness of the populace to connect 
with their socio-economic reality; they are educated and as such, able to connect their 
poverty and deprivation to the wrongful conduct of their sons and daughters in 
government (Osman, 2012:134). This is in contradistinction to representation in modern 
practice of liberal democracy in Africa – a situation where the populace expects 
handouts in order to vote and merely responds to proposed policies. It can be advanced 
that in voting with regard to the practice of liberal democracy, as Osman rightly points 
out: 
 
The people are connected to the entire framework not just 
physically but spiritually. It is this spiritual linkage that makes 
them feel satisfied merely from the fact that one of their sons or 
daughters has access to power. Through this spiritual participation, 
when their sons or daughters have “eaten” the national cake, it is 
they who have eaten it. The masses don’t expect anything except 
handouts during campaigns (Osman, 2012:134) 
 
 
 
It can, therefore, be argued that the concept of representation in liberal democracy is not 
only flagrantly opposed to substantive representation of Wiredu’s consensual 
democracy in which it is preceded by deliberation and active participation of the 
populace in formulating policies that affect their lives, but also that it is a mere 
expression of a need for access by the populace in times of need. Osman further 
contends that: 
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During burials or weddings, they have somebody to turn to for 
financial assistance. It is not accountability they want. It is access 
in time of need. The followers are uneducated and dissatisfied with 
their lot, but they are unable to draw the crucial line linking their 
circumstances with their primordial loyalties (Osman, 2012:134-
5).  
 
Voting in an integrated consensual democracy is, therefore, the kind that is 
accountability-demanding. What it shares with ordinary consensus is the simple fact 
that the populace are not simply reduced and used as a rubberstamp approving what is 
presented to them through voting with neither understanding nor prior deliberation. 
However, it goes a notch higher to even demand accountability on the part of the leaders. 
It is indeed one thing to deliberate and vote a leader into office; and another thing 
altogether to carry on with the deliberation process to demand accountability. This, to 
my mind, is what makes it a fundamental feature of African democracy in contemporary 
times.  
 
Another important feature of integrated consensual democracy that is closely related to 
the idea of voting is multipartyism and periodic elections. Arguably, proponents of 
consensual democracy do not embrace elections and party politics. In fact, going by 
Wiredu’s argument as shown earlier on in this study, there appears to be no need for 
political parties; and their workability is questioned on the basis that democracy by 
consensus in traditional Africa did not have political parties. He argues that in the 
scheme of consensual democracy, all participants were party to the decision making, 
and there was no need to oppose anything (Wiredu, 2001:238). This argument by the 
advocates of consensual democracy cannot pass. In fact, as Matolino rightly points out 
“it is anachronism to deny a place for political parties in a polity on the basis that they 
did not exist in the past” (Matolino, 2012:118). I am of the opinion that a contemporary 
democratic theory for Africa should incorporate multiparty politics and periodic 
elections.  
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To my mind, political parties provide a structure for political participation. They serve 
as a training ground for future political leaders. I suppose that political parties exist to 
primarily transform aggregated social interests into public policy. The relevance of 
political parties in contemporary democratic dispensation cannot be gainsaid since, in 
the words of Njeri Kabereri:  
 
 
A political party is critical in ideological socialisation and training 
of leaders; indeed leaders acquire ideological discipline and 
conviction of values and principles within political parties. It is 
political parties that should keep individual leaders on the rail of 
good leadership (Kabereri, 2011:117).  
 
 
Nevertheless, there are negative perceptions about political parties across Africa. In 
most cases, citizens and development partners tend to ignore political parties 
particularly on the grounds of them being formed along ethnic lines, and not on their 
relevance as far as the common good of the populace is concerned (Kabereri, 2011:117-
8; 2011:124). This phenomenon is coupled with what Wiredu normally terms as sheer 
competition for power whereby the winner takes all power rendering the loser in a 
perpetual political limbo (Wiredu, 2001). In spite of such negative perceptions, which 
are largely true, they should not lead to blanket disregard of political parties in Africa’s 
contemporary democratic practice. I concede that political parties still bear a mark of 
relevance for contemporary democratic practice in Africa.   
 
I contend that the phenomenon of political parties, being organisations that seek to 
influence government policy, hold to the ideology that the good of the community 
should not be sacrificed on the altar of individual interest and political expediency. 
Political parties should sustain democratic values through constant and dynamic 
exchange of ideas about democratic practice as such. That is, political parties should 
share, for the sake of the common good, their manifestos – shared beliefs and attitudes 
as well as assumptions for the wellbeing of the community. In sharing manifestos, I 
propose that political parties should have structured dialogue guided by the principle 
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that all parties have the potentiality to assume power at any given time, and for the ruling 
party specifically that there is a regime in waiting.  
 
As such, in integrated consensual democracy, Wiredu’s party3 actually exists. It is 
brought to the fore and its policy frameworks are consolidated for the pursuance of the 
common good. In this respect, party3 does not in any sense whatsoever lose its identity 
but, rather, constructively checks the effectiveness and legitimacy of the government of 
the day, party1. In sum, the shared manifestos should be implemented since this is the 
only sure way of testing their efficacy and responsiveness to the communal need and 
aspiration.  
 
It is in view of the foregoing that periodic elections become a necessary activity in 
matters of social and political decision making for they guarantee the electorate an 
opportunity to periodically review their choices of political representation. I am 
persuaded to think that it is the phenomenon of periodic elections that keeps the 
representatives alert, to some extent, to deliver according to the needs and aspirations 
of the people as such.  
 
In sum, it would be naive to think that the phenomena of political parties and elections, 
for that matter, can simply be wished away in the practice of democracy in Africa today. 
The gains that multiparty politics has achieved in Africa since the second liberation 
movements of the 1990s in respect to opening the democratic space are so enormous 
compared to a single, only one-party democracy that preceded them. To fail to 
incorporate multipartyism and periodic elections in a democratic theory for Africa today 
is to pitch the two systems of government – liberal and consensual democracy – as 
flagrantly opposed to each other. It should be noted that both systems share some 
fundamental similarities, besides the fact of them both being “democracies”. Even in 
consensual democracy, whenever dissenting views were recorded, they were recorded 
against those consenting; and this was voting by another name.  
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In sum, I am persuaded to argue that voting has been part and parcel of decision making 
in most societies of the world. What Africans did not do was to institutionalise voting 
as liberal democracy did. However, in a world such as ours, there is really nothing wrong 
with voting and its institutionalisation thereof for a meaningful democratic practice. 
Against this background I propose some features of integrated consensual democracy. 
 
 
4.6.2 Workability of integrated consensual democracy 
 
I have so far discussed the nature of integrated consensual democracy and what makes 
it a viable option for contemporary Africa. At the very least, democracy should be a 
process of decision-making, which involves those people who will be affected by the 
decisions (Sindane, 1994:2). In consequence, democracy has to be representative, 
accountable and participatory in order to serve the people’s wellbeing for which, as I 
maintain, it exists. It is on this account that democracy stirs and wakens from the deepest 
slumber whenever the principle of accountability is asserted by members of a 
community or conceded by those who rule (Sklar, 1986:17-29). Thus, in 
contradistinction to the perception that democracy in Africa may eventually die out 
given the many challenges that it faces, it can be easily pointed out that insofar as the 
principles that define democracy as a good-in-itself are seriously taken into account, 
that is, equality, freedom, accountability, the common good et cetera, democracy is 
invincible. 
 
In line with the above, integrated consensual democracy explicates the following 
fundamental features upon which its workability is hinged:54  
 
a)  Information: information means that the populace accesses and 
articulates accurate and relevant data necessary for political decisions. 
                                                 
54 See (James Fishkin 2011).  
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Such data may include information about candidates lining up for 
positions of leadership as well as policy decisions that may affect them 
in the lebenswelt of their existence. This is where both Governmental 
as well as Non-governmental organizations (NGOs) should take the 
critical step in creating awareness to the populace through civic 
education that corresponds to their local needs and those of national 
concern. Such an approach will enrich the people’s deliberative power 
for prioritizing development projects that affect them in their daily 
social existence.   
 
b) Substantive Balance: what this means is that political positions about 
which projects should be prioritised and implemented in the community 
should be based on their supportive evidence. This supportive evidence 
is basically the thorough assessment of the local situation so the any 
project implemented squarely addresses the current, urgent and 
important needs of the people in their local condition of existence. The 
evidence should be by the people, with the people and for the people.  
 
c) Diversity: diversity relates to how African societies are socially and 
culturally constituted. It entails, as far as representation is concerned, 
the fact that all major political positions that are held by the public 
should reflect regional, religious, and gender balances, et cetera. It is in 
this respect that each segment of the populace should be more engaged 
and involved in the decisions that affect them socially, economically as 
well politically. The element of civic education should precede any 
decisions that are taken by the leaders that affect people in the 
ordinariness of their lives. I am persuaded to think that the devolved 
units of government in contemporary Kenya, for instance, should focus 
more on the people themselves prioritizing projects. This in my 
thinking is a plausible bottom-up approach to democratic practice, 
which makes Integrated Consensual Democracy a more plausible 
system to behold.    
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d) Consciousness: in integrated consensual democracy, the populace has 
the opportunity to openly weigh all arguments in the process of political 
deliberation; and, above all, to hold the leaders accountable. This aspect 
builds on public participation, which the Constitution 2010 of Kenya 
so much applauds for true democratic practice. For this to have a 
meaningful bearing on the practice of democracy, the people 
themselves should be allowed to vet their representatives against their 
set priorities; and hold them accountable on the deliverables once they 
set in office.   
 
 
e) Equality: equality means that in a deliberative process, views are 
weighed based on evidence and not on who is advocating a particular 
view. It is the recognition of the deliberative capacity of each member 
pegged fundamentally on the fact that the populace “owe” to each other 
reasons for their respective proposals.  
 
These features, to my mind, legitimise integrated consensual democracy rendering it 
responsive to the needs and aspirations of the citizens. That is, they place the worth of 
the individual and communal good over and above the jingoistic interest of politicians. 
In consequence, integrated consensual democracy qualifies as a plausible alternative 
democratic paradigm for contemporary Africa.  
 
 
4.7 Conclusion 
 
As I have pointed out earlier on in this study, the state in post-independence Africa has 
politically held too tightly to its colonial antecedent. It can be argued, therefore, that it 
is this phenomenon that has jeopardised the realisation of true democracy on the African 
continent in contemporary times. The realisation of true, meaningful and viable 
democracy in post-independence Africa, as I have pointed out in this chapter, is only 
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possible by way of eclecticism – that is, by way of a people validating their heritage, by 
exploring their cultural practices and incorporating those Western political values that 
are in line with the values that underpin democracy sui generis. To my mind, and as I 
have laboured to show, this is an important way of realising a people’s real freedom 
from the yoke of Western “democratic” domination.  
 
African traditional institutions display, incontestably, a process of government that is 
democratic in the sense that complete participation of the people is in-built. It is on this 
understanding that I am persuaded to advance that African traditional institutions 
provided ‘participatory communality’ which rendered political relevance to the practice 
of democracy within a people’s cultural milieu.  
 
Participatory communality relates to a shared communal image whereby those who are 
disadvantaged – the orphans and the widows as well as the less privileged members of 
the society - relate with other members of their community from the perspective of 
“social belongingness”. This is the context in which one needs to understand Amy 
Gutman’s concept of “identity groups” – a way in which individuals identify with others 
thereby affecting how they perceive their own individual interests (Gutman, 2003:2).  
 
In this context, participatory communality offers mutual support and enhances 
inclusivity, which may help in combating injustices for the disadvantaged persons of 
the community. In fact, without inclusivity and mutual identification with each other, 
the practice of democracy would remain greatly undermined in contemporary Africa.  
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CHAPTER FIVE 
 
 
FEASIBILTY OF INTEGRATED CONSENSUAL THEORY: 
CRITICISMS, RESPONSES AND PROSPECTS 
 
 
 
If democracy flourishes and endures in Africa, it will not be because 
outsiders would like to see Africa become democratic, but will occur to 
the extent that African people themselves wish to tread that path. 
 
[Rasheed Sadiq, “Democratization Process and  
 Popular Participation in Africa”, 1995] 
 
 
 
5.1 Introduction 
 
In the previous chapter, I pointed out that there is a possibility for an alternative African 
concept of democracy, namely, integrated consensual theory. I argued that the 
establishment of such a theory is hinged on the fact that it is a conceptual error to think 
of a theory of democracy for contemporary Africa in a purely foreign or Western 
manner. As such, I pointed out that a cultural context of democracy in Africa is 
necessary. In this chapter, I seek to show the feasibility of such a theory by extending 
the argument that, even though the process of institutionalising Western democracy in 
Africa in its liberal context is real and substantive, it faces formidable obstacles. 
Consequently, for the practice of democracy to be meaningfully established – 
sustainable and consolidated in contemporary Africa – there is a need to interrogate its 
nature and establish how far it is in consonance with the political realities of traditional 
Africa.  
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Since I have already argued, too, that the theory of integrated consensual democracy in 
Africa can only be realised by way of validating the heritage of the African people and 
exploring their cultural practices, as well as incorporating those Western political values 
that are in line with the values that characterise democracy as a good-in-itself, I seek to 
critically show how the African way of life – communalism – supports this theory of 
democracy. As such, I will appraise a type of communalism – in-built with complete 
participation of the people – that supports the theory of integrated consensual 
democracy, the nature of party system and subsequently, the norm of political 
accountability. I will endeavour to do all this from the perspective that democracy 
remains a viable system of governance insofar as it is allowed to emerge according to a 
people’s cultural orientation. 
 
 
5.2 On the feasibility of democracy  
 
 
The establishment of a more legitimate and effective democratic system of governance 
in any society, Africa included, can rightly be conceived to be still a ‘work under 
construction’ (Mohammed, 2002:176-7). As such, what is at stake is the whole question 
of the kind of democracy that is relevant for contemporary Africa. To my mind, the 
question about the kind of democracy that is relevant for Africa today rests on the 
assumption that: 
 
Africa requires something more than the crude variety of liberal 
democracy that is being foisted on it, and even more than the 
impoverished liberal democracy that prevails in the 
industrialized countries. Even at its best, liberal democracy is 
inimical to the idea of the people having effective 
decisionmaking power. The essence of liberal democracy is 
precisely the abolition of popular power and the replacement of 
popular sovereignty with the rule of law (Ake, 1996:129-130).   
 
In view of this, it can be argued that the practice of democracy in the traditional African 
polity, and how it can be brought to bear on the modern democratic practice in modern 
Africa, hinges on the important question of the relevance of democracy as a political 
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system of governance. The question that emerges from this concern is whether post-
independence African polity requires democracy in order to respond effectively to her 
socio-economic and political conundrums. This concern is twofold: first, is the concern 
with the implicit question of democracy and not any other system of governance as a 
panacea of Africa’s socio-economic and political maladies in contemporary times. Put 
differently, must democracy be – or why should it be thought to be – the plausible 
political system for Africa in the 21st Century? Second, and following logically from the 
first concern is: what form should democracy take in order for it to be meaningfully 
established in the post-independence era of Africa? What are the possible cultural 
contributions that Africa can make in order for it to be an effective and legitimate system 
responding to people’s needs and aspirations?   
 
To the set of questions arising from the first concern, I choose to offer a theoretical 
justification of democracy.  With respect to the second concern, I choose to focus on 
what I consider to be Africa’s contribution to democratic governance from a cultural 
perspective. Kondlo and Ejiogu strongly argue that Africa has been a victim of 
colonialism with no democratic values to offer but to swallow democracy – hook, line 
and sinker - as prescribed by the West. They assert that what this simply means is that 
“...many African states continue to live with the indelible marks of colonialism into the 
twenty-first century” (Kondlo and Ejiogu, 2011:xxii). To my mind, and in view of this 
argument, the kind of democracy which prevailed in Europe or any other part of the 
world, cannot succeed in Africa without due regard of some aspects of the African 
traditional culture. And so Africa’s contribution to ‘democracy’ in respect to her culture 
cannot be gainsaid. I, therefore, choose in the course of analysis, to intermittently 
respond to the above concerns. 
 
The desirability of democracy for any polity cannot be gainsaid. Arguably, it is agreed 
that democracy remains the most desirable system of governance of all the other systems 
that have been tried from time to time. It is in this respect that Iris Marion Young 
postulates that “We believe that democracy is the best political form for restraining 
rulers from the abuses of power that are their inevitable temptations” (Young, 2000:17). 
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In line with this view, it can be further argued that only in a democratic political system 
can members of a society as a cultural unit, in principle, have the opportunity to 
influence public policy to serve and protect their interests. In sum, as Young rightly 
observes, democratic process – whatever its nature – is the best means for changing 
conditions of injustice, on the one hand; and promoting justice on the other (Young, 
2000:17).  
 
Nevertheless, it is important to consider that even though democracy may be faced by 
enormous threats in Africa today, the values and ideals that are associated with it 
throughout the world will prevail over those threats and challenges. In my opinion, what 
matters is to initiate an African way of embracing democracy – by incorporating 
Africa’s atavistic values – which will ensure, above all, that democracy remains a 
meaningful and viable system of governance in contemporary times.  
 
It is important to note that the values associated with democracy – equality, justice, 
human rights, freedom to make one’s own life choices, the desire and the right to 
participate in decision making on public and private issues, which affect lives, interests 
and communities – are eternal values that human beings worldwide cherish in both mind 
and heart (Pardo and Schwartz, 2007:33). It is in view of this that it can logically be 
argued that in most cases democracy is valued as a good-in-itself not only because it 
provides desirable ends, but also because its gradual acceptance relates to the idea of 
equality and individual liberty.   
 
Equality entails the fact that all are the same in some important respects – that is, we 
share a common humanity. This is a sense of communalism which defines the African 
mode of life, modus vivendi, and which marks Africa’s contribution to the world of 
democracy as such. What is shared must be understood to include citizenship; ability to 
decide what is best for oneself; a capacity for rational thought, et cetera. Thus, when 
individuals are seen as equal, at least socio-politically – and this is central to 
understanding African integrated consensual democracy – no person is deemed to be 
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any better or any worse than any other person (Catt, 1999:7). What this means is that all 
are seen as the same as far as rights and treatment are concerned. This is an African 
communal existential modus that proposes a criterion that illuminates a popular nature 
of democracy, which brings about difference in people’s lives.  
 
Against such argument, those opposed to democracy as a system of governance for 
Africa today may advance that most approaches to democracy in the contemporary 
world have apparently yielded to pseudo-democracy or simply shallow democracy 
without any significant difference to ordinary people. They may further advance that 
inasmuch as there might be radical changes in the constitution – or even expansion of 
political party activity as proponents of both constitutional and procedural approaches 
to democracy would respectively argue - unless these are accompanied by a sense of 
real and meaningful change in the lives of the ordinary people, especially rural dwellers, 
then democracy cannot be said to be meaningfully established among the people and 
responsive to their needs as such.  
 
It may further be advanced that a procedural approach to democracy reduces the true 
meaning of democracy to mere participation in periodic elections. Democracy then 
simply becomes a meaningless election exercise, which leaves the electorate with 
invisible, incomprehensible and irrelevant leaders to their needs. It simply presents the 
electorate with politicians whose interest is in the vote alone – and nothing else. Baker 
captures this reality in a more realistic sense when he writes that: 
 
 
Having candidates who come to the village before election day 
to fish for votes, but who return to the capital once they have 
been elected, this makes as little sense as keeping a spare wheel 
for a car 110 kilometres distance away from the car (Baker, 
2000:186).  
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While the foregoing concerns are largely valid, and I submit that democracy requires 
more than merely a theatre of electoral participation. I am of the opinion that democracy 
requires that the people identify actual processes of popular influence on the state, which 
subsequently make a difference to the way the state acts (Harrison, 2002:82). This is an 
instance of deliberation and consensus – Africa’s offer to modern democratic practice. 
It is an understanding of democratic practice so imbued with the being of Africans that 
it entails going beyond mere periodisation, which characterises most contemporary 
democracies, to identifying the extent of people’s participation in the dynamics of 
democratic leadership. 
 
Nevertheless, since the concern here is about explicating an African understanding of 
and contribution to democracy, it is to be noted that deliberation and consensus account 
for a model of African democracy, which emphasises the ideals of inclusivity55 and 
political equality.  It supports the link between democracy and justice under the ideal 
conditions of inclusive political equality and public reasonableness. That is, African 
integrated consensual democracy that this study proposes would serve as a means of 
discovering and validating the most just policies for the realisation of the communal 
wellbeing. It is a type of democracy that recognises the centrality of equity as embedded 
in communality. It is not a type of democracy that is confined to the ballot box, but that 
which recognises that the people have certain fundamental rights that do not stop at the 
ballot box: the right to basic health, education, security, et cetera. I concede that we may 
need to vote about such matters but the voting itself ought to be preceded by a 
deliberative process of what, when, where and how such fundamental rights are to be 
inserted among them, and the subsequent deliberative procedures meant for holding 
political leaders more responsive to the needs and aspirations of the populace.  
 
                                                 
55 Since in the real world of democratic practice some people and groups have significantly greater ability 
to use democratic processes for their own ends while others are excluded and marginalised, there is a 
need for the widening of democratic inclusion to promote more just outcomes – and African democracy 
in its deliberative context provides important ideals for such inclusive practices.  
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In sum, for democracy to be feasible in contemporary Africa, it ought to be a type of 
democracy “in which people have the real decisionmaking power over and above the 
electoral consent of electoral choice” (Ake, 1996:132). Such a democracy must lay 
emphasis on the communal and individual identities and rights. Its feasibility further 
rests on fact that it must grant to Africans rights to cultural expression as well as political 
and economic participation. That is, it must be a democracy that leads to the recognition 
of nationalities, sub-nationalities, ethnic groups, and communities as social formations 
that express freedom and self-realisation of the Africans (Ake, 1996:132).  
 
 
5.3 On communalism and political participation  
 
I have pointed out above that the feasibility of democracy in Africa requires social 
transformation. Arguably, however, one of the distinct constraints that democracy still 
faces in contemporary Africa is that its practice does not apparently take cognizance of 
any cultural specificity and uniqueness of the African people. This problem can be 
attributed to little or no appreciation of African values and epistemic orientation in the 
practice of democracy, and failure to distinguish between the values and principles of 
democracy from particular historical practices. This is where my proposed theory of 
integrated consensual democracy can be said to differ radically from both ordinary 
consensual democracy and liberal democracy as conceived in Africa. My proposed 
version of democracy appreciates the recreation of democracy sui generis according to 
a people’s way of life. That is, it marries the values of democracy as a good-in-itself to 
the social realities of the African people.  
  
Many African countries are ethnically heterogeneous societies and the nature of political 
arrangement that is feasible must be one that respects cultural diversity and gives 
expression to group identity and self-actualisation. As such, I have argued that for Africa 
to develop a genuine democracy, it must establish a type of democracy that is rooted in 
communalism as a way of life. In Chapter three of this study I defended communalism 
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as an African way of life that serves the welfare of all in the society. That is, in the 
communal social order, a society’s benefits are more likely to be available to all the 
members of the society than in any other social system (Gyekye, 1995:157). This is 
what makes communalism a cardinal point for the establishment of integrated 
consensual democracy. In fact, I contended that communalism presupposes a 
participatory mode of existence as defined by values of social well-being, solidarity, 
interdependence, cooperation and reciprocal wellbeing (Gyekye, 1995:257). The critical 
question that is likely to emerge from this perspective is: what is the correct way of 
understanding communalism as a way of life that can help construct a genuine 
democratic practice in contemporary Africa? Besides, the argument implicit in 
communitarianism that the success and the meaning of an individual’s life is dependent 
on the fact of the individual identifying himself or herself with the group raises the 
problem of how the whole concept of individuality is to be conceived in such a 
democratic dispensation.   
 
Since I relied on the Akan social thought in arguing for the mode of communalism that 
supports my theory of integrated consensual democracy, I would like to point out that 
Gyekye himself was not oblivious to this problem either. In fact he explicitly raises it 
when he writes: 
 
But inherent in the communal enterprise is the problem of 
contribution and distribution. The communal enterprise tends 
to maximize the common good because each individual is 
expected to contribute to it, but obviously, individuals are not 
equal in their capacities and talents – a fact explicitly 
recognized by the Akan thought […]. It follows therefore that 
individual contributions to the common good will be unequal 
(Gyekye, 1995:157).  
 
Gyekye observes that this manner of conceiving the individual in the communal scheme 
also raises another fundamental concern with regard to the distribution of the common 
good as such. He raises the question: “Should inequality in contribution lead to 
inequality in distribution?” (Gyekye, 1995:157).  In other words, the main concern is 
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whether individuality is completely absorbed in the communal scheme, thus whittling 
away individual characteristics in terms of personality, initiative and responsibility.  
 
Matolino raises similar criticisms about the communitarian scheme but with a view to 
establishing the proper place and conception of the individual in the African 
philosophical thought. Properly understood, Matolino’s project is about establishing 
whether African communality obliterates individuality. I shall attempt to respond to this 
concern but I do not wish to give a full analytical exposition of Matolino’s criticisms on 
the communitarian scheme as such. Doing so will be beyond the scope of this study. I 
will only point out the general criticism that Matolino puts forth as regards the place of 
the individual in the society, which I consider to be relevant to this project; and which 
can, in a sense, aid some understanding of political participation of the individual within 
the communal context. Besides, it is important to point out the limited nature of 
Matolino’s criticisms of communitarianism; he does not offer criticisms that reject the 
doctrine of communitarianism in its entirety but only with regard to the question of 
personhood (Matolino, 2014:111). It is in this regard that he faults the doctrine of 
communitarianism in the following manner: 
 
 
Thus it is correct to point out that any communitarian scheme 
views the individual as secondary to the realities of the 
community. Since the community is the primary reality the 
individual has to align her own reality with the primary 
communal reality. Failure to do so means that she has stepped 
out of line and she will be whipped back or worse considered a 
failure at the project of personhood (Matolino, 2014:113).   
 
Matolino’s concern is about what takes precedence over what in the communal scheme. 
From the above quotation he views as a misconception the fact that in the African 
communitarian scheme the reality of the community comes before that of the individual, 
and subsequently shapes the individual reality (Matolino, 2014:114). This could be 
permissible given Matolino’s attention to personhood. However, since my concern in 
this study is about the political participation of the individual within the communal 
scheme, this question may not arise. I shall address myself to the question of political 
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participation; and argue that communalism maximises the interest of all individual 
members of the society.  
 
In the foregoing respect, I wish to refer to Gyekye’s concern on how an individual’s 
contribution and distribution should be managed within the communitarian scheme. It 
should be noted that as far as political participation in the communitarian scheme is 
concerned, each individual’s contribution to the common good is not equal, yet this does 
not mean that there should be inequality in distribution. To my mind, to argue that those 
who have contributed more should be entitled to more than anyone else, is to not only 
distort the concept of complementarity that should permeate communal existential 
modus, but also to adulterate the entire fabric of communalism – the common good.  
 
Gyekye argues that in a communal context, distribution should not be pegged on an 
individual’s contribution. Rather, it should be hinged on the fact that an individual’s 
basic needs are satisfied by the society irrespective of the magnitude of his or her 
personal contribution. He cites the following proverbs to illustrate his point: “The left 
arm washes the right arm and the right arm washes the left arm” and “The fingers of the 
hand are not equal in length” (Gyekye, 1995:158).  Implicit in these proverbs, as Gyekye 
argues, is the fact that people are endowed differently with natural characteristics and 
assets in terms of talents and capacities for which they are not responsible (Gyekye, 
1995:158). In view of this, it is right and fitting to advance that from those who have 
naturally been given more, more should be expected.  In fact, as Gyekye correctly 
argues, just as the power of the left arm may not measure up to the power of the right 
arm, nevertheless, it is able to make some meaningful and significant contribution 
needed by the right arm, as I suppose, and which the right arm cannot provide for itself 
(Gyekye, 1995:158).   
 
In line with this argument, while there cannot be a situation of complete equality as 
explicated by Gyekye in the second proverb above, it can be advanced that as regards 
political participation, the entitlement of the individual – contribution and distribution 
  
149  
  
– to the common good, is plausible following the Akan social thought and humanistic 
orientation. Gyekye ably captures the relevance of each individual’s contribution to and 
participation in the common good when he writes:  
 
 
The Akan position is defensible for, irrespective of an 
individual’s contribution to the common good, it is fair and 
reasonable that everyone’s basic human needs be satisfied by 
the society: From each according to whatever contribution one 
can make to each according to one’s basic needs will run the 
new slogan (Gyekye, 1995:158).  
 
The way an individual participates in the political life of the community can, arguably, 
be likened to African familial relationship and concern for each other as conceived by 
Nyerere’s philosophy of Ujamaa56. Communalism should be appreciated as a relational 
bond of association and obligation necessary for political action. This is to argue that an 
individual cannot live a detached life from that of the community. An individual is “part 
of the community insofar as he/she is integrated in a complex system of authority, 
deference and participation” (Chabal, 2009:48).  
 
In this regard, the significance of communalism to political participation in integrated 
consensual democracy is hinged on the fact that relationships go beyond any social 
stratification to link up the rich with the poor, the powerful with powerless, the learned 
with illiterate village dwellers, et cetera (Chabal, 2009:46). As such, African 
communalism affects socio-political relations in the sense that it is what defines justice 
and equality among the members of a society as such. It is in this respect that I opt to 
advance further that communalism “must be conceptualized as that part of identity 
which confers value, legitimacy or merit to political action” (Chabal, 2009:47).  
 
                                                 
56 Nyerere’s Ujamaa philosophy is anchored on traditional African values. It emphasises familyhood and 
communalism. It is basically supposed to embrace African cultural concepts of mutual respect; common 
property as well as common labour (see Nyerere, Julius. On Socialism, O.U.P.: Dar-es-Salaam, 1969).   
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In view of the foregoing, in an integrated consensual democracy, communalism is 
relevant in two respects. Firstly, what the concept of democracy entails is filtered 
through a system of values relating to the common good. I maintain that a viable and 
meaningful democratic practice in the post-independence period of Africa sustains the 
common good of which the main aspect is occupied by a communal network of 
obligation. If this admissible, then my second point, following logically from it, is that 
the legitimacy of those in positions of leadership – political leaders – must be predicated 
upon their meeting the obligations for which they have responsibility within the political 
constituencies or associations – the community – to which they belong. This implies 
that even if political leaders – or members of parliament – acquire more demanding 
national duties, as is the case in most modern democracies, they cannot exempt 
themselves from the requirements and obligations of the local public good. It is in this 
respect that commitment to the common good will ensure that the political chasm 
between the leaders and the populace in contemporary democratic practice in Africa is 
bridged since “it is simply not possible to opt out of one’s community and continue to 
[politically] belong” (Chabal, 2009:50). This is a case of political communal 
belongingness, which is required for good democratic practice in contemporary Africa, 
and, which defines how and to what extent an individual should be concerned with the 
good of the other.  
 
All in all, communalism plays a significant role in enhancing the sense of political 
communal belongingness by raising the individual’s participation in and contribution to 
the common good to the level of what economists would call ‘positive externality’. That 
is, whether rich or poor, literate or illiterate, big or small, an individual’s personal 
contribution – as one individual – can only afford him or her lesser benefits than when 
the “same” contribution is compared to the communal or societal contribution. This 
means that when the same individual effort is applied in collegiality with other people’s 
efforts, the benefits turn out to be much more for the individual, and the societal 
wellbeing is also realised.  
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5.4 On political representation and accountability 
 
 
 
I have already pointed out that African countries are ethnically heterogeneous societies 
and that the kind of democracy that they require must appreciate this reality and give 
expression to group identity and actualisation. Nevertheless, the question that emerges 
with regard to the reality of heterogeneity, and which relates to political participation 
in contemporary Africa, is that of representation. Within such a complexity it is not 
possible to have direct political participation of the populace in all matters that concern 
the polity as would be the case in much smaller and less complicated societies. Thus, 
the possibility of attaining equal representation remains highly doubtful. Given this 
concern, I seek to argue that, with reworking of some institutions of democratic 
representation, my proposed theory of democracy is likely to promote a deeper sense 
of unity in diversity and an atmosphere of working in close proximity between the 
populace and the political leaders.  
 
 
As I had argued earlier, it is to be noted that in most cases many of the arguments that 
are under the negative approach view Western democracy – or liberal democracy for 
that matter – as being so vast and complex in nature that the ordinary people within a 
polity are neither able to relate to it nor feel they have an influence upon its government. 
This is what has rendered the practice of Western democracy in contemporary Africa to 
be both ineffective and illegitimate, leading to a widening disjuncture between the rulers 
and the governed. In other words, ordinary citizens do not see the significance of their 
participation in decision-making in the practice of Western democracy. There is apathy 
on the side of the populace, which is not healthy for democracy at all, since it is a 
manifestation of the people’s lack of power. That is, people’s participation is limited to 
a mere exercise of voting after which, any other form of participation is representational 
– indirect – influence exercised on their behalf by the elected representatives.  In 
consequence, decision-making is left only to a few people; and the populace can only 
hope to exact indirect influence through voting in an electoral system.  
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Dahl observes that the fact of there being vast numbers of voters in itself makes the 
influence exerted by any particular individual’s vote miniscule. This is why he ably 
points out that one of the greatest problems of “the Democratic Leviathan” is that of 
sheer numbers – that is to say, severe upper limits are set on effective participation in 
“democratic” decisions by the sheer number of persons involved (Dahl, 1970:143, 145).  
 
It is in line with the foregoing that Wiredu argues that the current forms of democracy 
are systems that are generally based on the majority principle as opposed to the Ashanti 
system that is based on consensus (Wiredu, 1996:186). He contends that such 
majoritarian systems cannot pass as true democracy. In keeping with the Ashanti 
consensual democracy Wiredu even  points out that majority opinion is in itself not a 
good enough basis for decision-making, for it deprives the minority of the right of 
representation in the decision in question (Wiredu, 1996:186). He succinctly points out 
that this perpetual exclusion of the minority from the decision-making processes that 
affect their lives is responsible for political instability in contemporary Africa. He 
writes:  
 
One of the persistent causes of political instability in Africa 
derives from the fact that in ever so many contemporary 
African states certain ethnic groups have found themselves in 
the minority both numerically and politically. Under a system 
of majoritarian democracy this means that, even with all the 
safeguards, they will consistently find themselves outside the 
corridors of power (Wiredu, 1996:188).  
 
 
In view of the above argument, to my mind, the general underlying principle is that true 
democracy – democracy sui generis requires a measure of equality. This is arguably so 
because the effects of the phenomenon of inequality in Western ‘democracies’ is too 
widespread and too profound to warrant them to be termed true democracies at all. In 
this context, integrated consensual democracy advocates for institutional reform 
because what accounts for much of political inequality in contemporary Africa about 
which Wiredu is so skeptical is, to my mind, the kind of electoral system that most 
African states adopted, which as some scholars point out is “a first-past-the-post 
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electoral system” (Adejumobi and Burja, 2002:352). This kind of system promotes a 
winner takes all game and increases stakes in politics such that those who win, do so 
handsomely, and those who lose, are in fact, bad losers (Adejumobi and Burja, 
2002:352). The resultant feature in such a scenario, as Adejumobi and Burja point out, 
is normally a tendency of marginalizing small political parties as well as the inequalities 
of political resources suffered by specifiable minorities – including those of material 
wealth that are required to influence people – since no party will be prepared to lose 
(Adejumobi and Burja, 2002:352).  
 
To my mind, this is a case of disenchantment with the state that often expresses itself in 
the thought that those who wield the power of the state are in most cases not accountable. 
I argue that this can be mitigated by redesigning political institutions such that they 
demand accountability of those who sanction them. In this respect, I am of the opinion 
that a critical distinction should be made between seeing elections as a device to sanction 
behaviour of the incumbent political office holders, and seeing them as screening device 
for selecting the best candidates for such offices. This is a call for transparency, which 
requires responsiveness on the part of the political leader (Mehta, 2003:131).  In fact as 
Mehta points out: 
 
 
A proper discussion of accountability requires that, at a 
minimum, attention be paid both to formal institutional 
mechanisms by which sanctions can be effected and the 
collective action required to ensure that these sanctions are 
effected (Mehta, 2003:131).  
 
In view of this, the electoral system in contemporary Africa should reflect the social 
realities of the people themselves. As Newman argues, parties should not exist for the 
sole purpose of seeking power for power’s sake but to “organize the public will and 
thereby bring order out of chaos of the multitude voters” (Newman, 1969:71).  
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If parties are organised on the grounds of public will then they may lead to greater 
democratisation by extending participation of the populace in decision making. It is the 
extension of socio-economic and political participation in the affairs of the state by the 
populace – participatory communality – that should become the rallying-cry of political 
reformers of modern Africa, and upon which the formation of political parties as 
vehicles of political participation should be based. This is to say, the extension of 
people’s participation is and should be sine qua non, a necessary condition for 
meaningful democratic practice in contemporary Africa. Political parties should have 
meaningful and sufficient tolerance of each other. Such tolerance may aid them in 
incorporating relevant policies from across the political divide for purposes of 
promoting the common good. This can be validated in two aspects: first, such attitude 
of tolerance affects the political power structure of a polity by enabling the populace to 
take “control” of their affairs. This means that participation goes beyond mere 
‘consultation’ to a full and meaningful sharing in decision-making about matters that 
affect the lives of ordinary citizens. Full and meaningful sharing in decision making 
means that the populace can access the necessary information about which a decision is 
to be made and is offered a chance to deliberate on the issues that affect their lives at 
whatever level of their existence.  
 
The second aspect, in which extension of participation is to be understood, is that of 
restructuring the political life of Africa’s modern democratic practice. It is in this 
context that I advocate for “association” or “community politics” (Wingo, 2004:454-5). 
If democracy in contemporary Africa is to be both viable and meaningful, then 
increasing people’s participation by means of devolving power to the communities 
cannot be ignored. Such an approach will ensure people’s actual sharing in the socio-
economic and political activities of their communities. This is a way of appreciating 
communitarianism’s role in enhancing the political life of the state. In this case, 
participatory communality entails the fact that political power is decentralised to allow 
for increased and inclusive participation of the populace as much as possible.57  
                                                 
57 See Olusegun Oladipo’s article on “Tradition and the Quest for Democracy in Africa” (2014) at 
http://them.polylog.org/2/foo-en.htm.  
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In view of the foregoing, the complex political nature of Western democracy should be 
broken down into smaller “communal” units. This will facilitate the transfer of functions 
from the national level to local communities, thus ‘bringing government back to the 
people’, and thereby bridging the disjuncture between the rulers and the governed.  This, 
in essence, will evoke a genuine political involvement necessary for a meaningful 
degree of political participation. By bringing government back to the people, the 
hostility of political inequality will be extinguished – or at least minimised – so as to 
allow the people to realise and experience both true and meaningful democracy. That 
is, true and meaningful democracy emerges as a government of man by man as opposed 
to a socially, economically and politically hostile system of Western ‘democratic’ type. 
As a consequence, while some governments have tried in post-independence Africa to 
devolve governance, for instance, South Africa and Kenya, the influence and dominance 
of policies that actually affect people’s lives by the central government is still very 
rampant.  It is high time that regional governments are left, in consultation with the 
community “elders”, to design and implement welfare-oriented policies for their people.   
 
In sum, what we are to make of these criticisms against Western democracy is the simple 
fact that the concern with sheer numbers makes the realisation of true democracy a 
complicated exercise. It can be argued, therefore, that while the majority’s opinion does 
actually affect policy in Western democracy and that the electoral process does allow 
for some form of political influence, such opinions of the masses are only reflections of 
ideological indoctrination by the political elite; and, therefore, they do not reflect the 
wishes of the people. This argument makes integrated consensual democracy a viable 
option for it prefigures ‘the rock bottom identity of interests’58 where divergent interests 
– of both the minority and the majority – converge for the realisation of the common 
good.  
                                                 
58 The argument about the rock bottom identity of interests has raised serious debate and objections. I 
primarily have in mind Emmanuel Eze Chukwudi’s article “Democracy or Consensus: A response to 
Wiredu” (1997), and Benard Matolino’s “A Response to Eze’s critique of Wiredu’s Consensual 
Democracy” (2009). It is not within the scope of this study to offer an in-depth response to such 
objections and/or responses.   
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Resultantly, this is why Wiredu correctly argues that “majority opinion in itself is not a 
good enough basis for decision-making, for it deprives the minority of the right to have 
their will reflected in the given decision” (Wiredu, 1996:186). It is in this connection 
that my earlier argument that Western democracy in its majoritarian context increases 
the sheer competition – struggle – for power without increasing inclusiveness should be 
understood. In consequence, lack of inclusiveness undermines the realisation of true 
democracy, and leads to pursuance of self-interest, thereby sacrificing communal ‘rock 
bottom identity of interests’ on the altar of political expediency.  
 
Eze denies the existence of “the rock bottom identity of interests” of Wiredu by arguing 
that some members may intend to dominate others for the purposes of naked power 
enjoyment (Eze, 1997:318). While Eze’s argument is permissible, it is to be noted that 
the pursuance of such jingoistic interests cannot by any chance be the people’s wishes. 
I am persuaded to maintain, therefore, that the “rock bottom identity of interests” refers 
to the common good, which commands and directs consensus, and which is well known 
even by those who try to outdo and dominate others for political gains. In fact, those 
who try to dominate others thrive dangerously on the premise that political elites know 
better than the populace, and can therefore decide and dictate what is good for them, 
which is analytically illogical.  
 
While I concede that what leaders think citizens will respond to normally has some 
bearing on their conduct (Mehta, 2003:133), what is urgently at stake is the need to 
redesign political institutions to provide the populace with opportunities to hold leaders 
more accountable. I contend that public action outside the formal confines of institutions 
is significant in shaping institutional behaviour. Such behaviour, if informed by the 
common good, will in a sense ensure that politics is not so much about factions or 
patronages but rather about policy implications that have a long-term impact in the 
society. It is in this respect that I am of the opinion that the character of the state should 
be institutionalised as an instrument of the common good (Mehta, 2003:134).  
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As such, it would be wrong to explain the “rock bottom identity of interests’ by merely 
wishing it away. It is important to note that self-centered interests aimed at dominating 
the rest for the sheer enjoyment of power are not and cannot be a reflection of genuine 
choices of the people. Genuine decision-making by the people entails genuine choices, 
which, in consequence, provide an opportunity for the advocacy and effective 
presentation of the divergent viewpoints to encompass the common good. This, in my 
view, is why Matolino correctly points out that:  
 
 
The possibility and attainment of consensus lies in the process 
of dialogue....the dialogue is aimed at rendering bare the 
opposing views, understanding their content and aims; and 
most crucially the dialogue would be directed at building 
bridges between the disparate opinions (Matolino, 2009:40).   
 
 
In view of the foregoing, the justification that this study advances for integrated 
consensual democracy is that while consensual democracy appreciates divergent views, 
it goes beyond the appreciation of divergent views to not only advocate but also cater 
for the “real” needs of the populace and to hold those in positions of political leadership 
more accountable to their needs and aspirations. As a result, any system which 
advocates for the real needs of the people but ignores their declared views must be 
rejected for it amounts to the same fallacy of political elites knowing better than the 
populace, and deciding for them. As such, citizens must appreciate and acknowledge 
each other in a true democracy. This explains why Mehta ably argues “A society in 
which citizens do not acknowledge each other is likely to be a society which cannot get 
the government to acknowledge them” (Mehta, 2003:139).   
 
In consequence, while democracy poses significant difficulties with regard to 
representation, I have established in the course of analysis that such challenges can be 
surmounted by taking recourse to the traditional democratic mode of governance. This 
study, therefore, assumes the position that integrated consensual democracy within the 
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deliberative and consensual contexts, and incorporating certain elements of Western 
democracy that are in line with modern political demands, is the best form of 
government for Africa in contemporary times.  
 
 
5.5 Conclusion 
 
The cultural context of democracy tells us that, like the institutional framework, culture 
has been adversely ignored as if it has no role to play in the strategies for successful 
democratic development. I argue that while the norm has been to theoretically discount 
culture in the practice of democracy, it is indeed a costly error. There is a need to learn 
from history that “African culture has fiercely resisted and threatened every project that 
fails to come to terms with it, even as it is acted upon and challenged” (Ake, 1996:15). 
Such resistances gave rise to calls upon Africans to modernise their attitudes and culture 
as a way of dealing with cultural resistance; in fact, as a way to abolish the traditional 
culture.  Nevertheless, those components of culture that can aid the practice of true 
democracy should be meaningfully integrated into components of Western democratic 
practices that contemporary socio-economic and political realities demand. 
 
Communalism, for instance, should be a fundamental element upon which true 
democracy ought to be grounded in contemporary times since it does not only entail 
revising the concept of development, but also those of political engagements to mean 
collective wellbeing (Fayemi, 2009:120).  In essence, communalism entails the 
establishment of true democracy – a pro-people type of democracy – where the populace 
is at the centre of economic development. As such, they would seek nothing less than 
their collective wellness, which entails their sharing of material and non-material 
benefits, mutual trust, citizenship, participation in decision making processes as well as 
enhanced accountability and responsiveness of the state to the general public (Fayemi, 
2009:120). That is to say, in contradistinction to Western democracy, which is defined 
by individualism, majority rule, and autonomy of elected leaders in making decisions 
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for and on behalf of the citizens, communalism and other traditional African values 
command the democratic theory that demands commitment to communalistic spirit in 
social organisation and state management (Fayemi. 2009:121).   
 
Whereas economic development is key to the practice of democracy, meaning that each 
democratic theory should have a correlated economic system,59 it would be wrong for 
an African theory of democracy to adopt hook, line and sinker liberal democracy with 
its economic correlate and homology of advanced capitalism. Arguably, African 
democratic theory should have a balance between democratic ideals and economic 
requisites. It should have a mixed economic correlate that entails socialist and 
capitalistic orientations. In sum, African indigenous democratic institutions values and 
attitudes cannot be ignored if Africa is to realise true democracy that meets the demand 
of contemporary times.   
 
Thus, inasmuch as Africa is democractising in the modern – or international – context, 
as Ake argues, in which there is apparently no allowance made for the fact that liberal 
democracy is a historical product (Ake, 2000:30), there should be major attempts to 
separate values and principles of democracy sui generis and liberal democracy from 
particular historical practices, which operationalise such values and principles in 
specific historical circumstances (Ake, 2000:30). The greatest task towards the 
feasibility of democracy in Africa rests, therefore, upon the fact of operationalising the 
principles and values of democracy in historical conditions that are markedly different 
from those of established democracies.  This should be the case because as Ake rightly 
points out: 
 
[…] liberal democracy is a child of industrial capitalism, a 
product of a socially atomized society where production and 
exchange are highly commodified and thus of a society which 
                                                 
59 Matolino ably argues that the economy is a crucial element that determines the quality and disposition 
of a polity. He, however, points out that African egalitarianism has failed in this front by engaging in 
anachronism; that is, by simply eliminating capitalism and replacing it with those economic systems that 
Africans had enjoyed in their traditional set-ups (Matolino, 2012:121).   
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is essentially a market. It is the product of a society in which 
interests are so particularized that the very notion of common 
interest becomes problematic, hence the imperative of 
democratic participation (Ake, 2000:30).   
 
If my reading of Ake is correct, then it is plausible to conclude that true practice of 
democracy in Africa needs to borrow a leaf from liberal democracy with some degree 
of caution. This is because, in contemporary Africa, primordial loyalties and pre-
capitalist social structures remain very strong such that, apart from the urban enclaves, 
her rural societies are still constituted in communal solidarity. This, to my mind, 
explains why Ake finally makes the assertion that “it is communalism which defines the 
people’s perception of self-interest, their freedom and their location in the social whole” 
(Ake, 2000:31). It is for this reason that even the political party system, as I have pointed 
out, should be redefined to reflect Africa’s sociality since liberal democracy as practiced 
in contemporary Africa presupposes individualism which, I contend, is a very rare 
phenomenon in the communal societies of rural Africa. The feasibility of democracy in 
contemporary Africa must, therefore, be rightly conceived as a project of historical 
significance.  
 
 
As far as accountability is concerned, there should be a reworking of government 
institutions so that governmental structures enable routine interaction between the 
leaders and the populace. I have argued that this is possible if actual power is devolved 
to political associations or to community politics – grassroots. This, to my mind, will 
enable the citizens to observe individual characteristics of their leaders. As such, in a 
true democratic practice, accountability acts as a stimulant for public interest, for as 
Nyasani argues, it assumes a peculiar characteristic of throwing open the floodgates to 
an atmosphere of transparency (Nyasani, 2010:250). Arguably, therefore,  if the citizens 
act communally in the sense that they are inspired by their commitment to the common 
good, then it is very possible that accountability will result in a more effective and 
legitimate democratic governance in contemporary Africa. It is in view of this that 
Nyasani writes: 
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Accountability therefore is the first and inevitable step towards 
the prevention and elimination of corruptive practices in any 
society. Accountability very effectively undermines, 
countermands and blinds human instinct towards mischief by 
setting a robust standard of lawful behaviour founded upon the 
principles of personal discipline and public morality (Nyasani, 
2010:250-1).  
 
 
In sum, my reading of Nyasani is that the feasibility of democracy in Africa requires 
values of commitment to the common good as well as self-discipline on the part of the 
leaders to be responsive to people’s needs and aspirations about which contemporary 
Africa is so incredulous.  
   
 
 
 
 
 
  
  
162  
  
 
 
CHAPTER SIX 
 
 
 
 
SUMMARY, CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATIONS 
 
 
 
It requires no great leap in imagination to understand that Africa’s 
extreme problems require – dare I say – extreme solutions. There are 
times in history when change becomes imperative and nothing less than 
a revolution in attitudes will suffice. Such a time is now. The 
reconstruction of a new African leadership is set on the agenda of history.   
 
[Kofi Buenor Hadjor, On transforming Africa:  
Discourse with African Leaders, 1987] 
 
 
 
6.1 Introduction 
 
This study sought to investigate the institutional failure of democracy to function 
properly in post-colonial Africa, at least according to the formally established 
procedures. This was informed by the fact that most political regimes in post-colonial 
Africa have consistently claimed to be “democratic”; and yet their rule has been largely 
characterised by political authoritarianism, illegitimate seizure of power, massive 
corruption, assassinations, escalating insecurity, et cetera. In view of this, it was noted 
that what has now become the norm of democratic practice in Africa is largely 
indicative of the lack of consonance and congruence of Western democracy with 
African political values and attitudes. In effect, the current “democratic norm” can 
hardly be said to derive from African traditions.   
 
In view of the foregoing, failure of democracy in Africa is largely characterised by the 
fact that the practice of Western democracy failed to generate sentiments of personal 
commitment to the state, which is diametrically opposed to African humanism. Thus, 
the extent to which Western democracy satisfies the basic fundamental functions of a 
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government – effectiveness - and the capacity to engender and maintain the belief that 
it is the most appropriate political institution for contemporary Africa – legitimacy - 
were critically analysed. It was underscored that the history of the emergence of 
democracy in Europe, and its subsequent establishment outside Europe, are responsible 
for democracy’s apparent illegitimacy and ineffectiveness on the African continent in 
modern times.  
 
Historically, European democracy emerged from moments in the revolutions of the 
1840s when new regimes temporarily installed both representative legislatures and 
general male suffrage with authoritarian regimes taking over and sapping legislative 
power (Tilly, 2004:214). In consequence, European democracy ranged from 
authoritarian government – high governmental capacity combined with little protected 
consultations to fragmented tyranny (Tilly, 2004: 214, 27). Outside Europe, as David 
Albernethy argues, European democratization was carried out through colonisation, 
conquest, confrontation and revolution that promoted both democracy and tyranny 
(Albernethy, 2000:55-60). In view of this, it can rightly be inferred that the 
establishment of Western democracy in contemporary Africa was wrapped within the 
history of European violent colonisation under the guise of the mission to politically 
civilise Africa60. As a result of this it has yielded to authoritarianism without any 
meaningful outlets for political expression which characterised colonial rule. 
 
In view of the foregoing historical development of European democracy, it is argued 
that the emerging problem of democratic practice in post-independence Africa is 
informed by such history and experience, which support the colonial mission by the 
universal claim that only European or Western democracy can yield better political 
governance. Contrary to the view that only Western democracy can effectively address 
Africa’s socio-economic and political conundrums, the study concluded that any effort 
by “foreign” or external governments, institutions, and agencies to direct political and 
economic changes in Africa is bound to fail insofar as it denies the natives – the peoples 
                                                 
60 See (Monica Flores, 2005) 
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of Africa and their representatives – the right to determine their own destiny61. This 
explains why Gyekye rightly points out that “political institutions that were bequeathed 
to the African people by colonial rulers…modeled on those colonial rulers, did not 
function properly (Gyekye, 1997:115).  
 
In the same vein, Africa’s dependence on European political paradigms can be said to 
have hugely affected the performance of democratic governance in Africa, and 
especially the concepts of consent, efficiency and political legitimacy. This is further 
compounded by the fundamental problem of disjuncture between the state and the 
society; and between the political class and the ordinary people, which manifests itself 
in alienation, disempowerment and low sense of ownership of the state by the masses 
as has been pointed out. As a result of this, failed states that cannot guarantee 
democracy, good governance and efficient service delivery to the people abound in 
post-colonial Africa. 
 
In order to philosophically establish the reasons that account for the fundamental 
problem that democracy faces in contemporary Africa as outlined above, the study 
stipulated the following four objectives:  
 
i) To philosophically appraise the practice of democracy in Africa; 
ii) To investigate the philosophical basis of traditional African democratic 
polities; 
iii) To examine democratic features in Africa’s indigenous government and 
explore ways in which they can benefit contemporary democratic practice; 
iv) To investigate whether Western notions of democracy are well-suited for 
African polities 
 
 
                                                 
61 See Samuel Makinda’s article on “Reclaiming Democracy for Africa: Alarming Signs of Post-
Democratic Governance (2003).  
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In line with the set objectives, the study analytically sought to establish the extent to 
which African traditional democratic principles can possibly contribute to the 
enhancement of democratic polities in contemporary Africa. It is in view of this central 
concern that the study addressed the following specific yet critical questions:   
 
i) What are the philosophical concerns about democracy in Africa?  
ii) What is culture and its significance within African philosophical debates 
around democracy? 
iii) Can a viable political structure be forged on Africa’s own tradition and 
political rule? 
iv) In what ways can the traditional system of government benefit the current 
democratic practice in Africa? 
 
It is on the basis of the set objectives alongside the study questions that the conclusions 
and recommendations for further research were drawn. Nevertheless, the study in the 
overall analysis established that African traditional democratic principles, institutions, 
values and attitudes can contribute to the enhancement of democratic polities in 
contemporary Africa; and ensure that the practices of popular authorization and 
consensus are entrenched in the exercise of power, thus producing a model of 
democratic governance that the populace can freely accept. Against this backdrop, I 
present thematically the summary, findings and recommendations of the study. 
 
 
6.2 Illegitimacy and ineffectiveness of democracy in Africa 
 
In the course of philosophical analysis, this study delved into the fundamental problem 
of the failure of democracy to function properly as hinged on the illegitimacy and 
ineffectiveness of Western democracy in post-independence Africa. It pointed out that 
Western democracy is an illegitimate colonial construct. Its illegitimacy is epitomised 
in the disjuncture between the state and the society; and between the political class and 
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the ordinary people. It manifests itself in alienation, disempowerment and low sense of 
ownership of the state by the masses. This renders the state invisible to the lives of its 
citizens to the point where it appears to abrogate its constitutional responsibilities 
through its sheer incapacity to act on its citizens’ behalf.   
 
The logic of argumentation here is that viable and meaningful democracy emerges 
according to the specifics of a community and is related to political power emanating 
from the community itself. Since power, it is argued, is inherent in the community, it 
requires no justification. Rather, what it requires is legitimacy. Power springs up 
whenever people get together and act in concert – but it derives its legitimacy from the 
initial getting together rather than the actions that follow. The question that challenges 
the legitimacy of Western democracy in Africa borders around the issue of justification 
of government. It can simply be put thus: Is a justified government ipso facto legitimate?  
 
When political legitimacy is challenged, on the one hand, it bases itself on an appeal to 
the past since it emanates from the initial getting together of a people to guarantee power 
to the government. On the other hand, when the justification of a government is 
challenged, it relates to an end in the future – what it hopes to achieve. A justified 
government is, therefore, not necessarily legitimate just as violence can be justifiable 
but can never be legitimate. Justification may follow the legal procedure such as 
majority voting-in a government but all it leads to is the exhibition of an ‘empty 
chimera’, that is, a non-conservative attitude and haplology that power is power.62 In 
this line of thought, legitimacy and effectiveness of democracy should not follow the 
path of arbitrary power. Instead, they should be defined by two fundamentals: first, the 
degree of governmental capacity and second, the extent of protected consultations to 
build consensus on governmental matters. These two factors intensely affect democracy 
as they reinforce each other for purposes of effectiveness and legitimacy (Tilly, 2004:7).  
 
                                                 
62 See (Hans Reiss, 1970:103, 113-4). 
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Nevertheless, Africa’s postcolonial democratic practice follows the features of colonial 
politics – state power and arbitrariness. The colonial situation is likened to the 
Hobbesian pre-political state in which all claims are arbitrary and all rights are only 
powers. Since the colonial state was an arbitrary power it failed to engender any 
legitimacy (Ake, 1996:3). Without legitimacy, democracy is deprived of the capacity to 
resolve any disagreements that may arise in a polity with regard to the question of 
political equality and justice as such.  
 
It is legitimacy that makes democracy a viable way of resolving disagreements while 
remaining faithful to public equality. In this sense, democracy leads to justice, which 
the populace requires in political governance. In the practice of Western democracy, 
legitimacy presupposes that political authority in a modern society must involve a 
democratic decision-making process. That is, the democratic decision-making process 
is the only public way of achieving equality of advancement of interests among the 
populace. What this signifies is that there is a tighter connection between legitimacy of 
political authority and its democratic pedigree.  
 
Western democracy holds that democratic legitimacy requires that political 
disagreements be resolved through a democratically legitimate decision-making 
process; and that each individual ought to be respected as a separate moral agent with 
his/her own sense of justice. Now, if democratic legitimacy requires that political 
disagreement be resolved through a democratically decision-making process, and that it 
must instantiate this as a fundamental democratic value, then legitimacy is unfortunately 
rendered a matter of democratic procedure, which is tantamount to establishing 
legitimacy on the convenience of majoritarianism.   
 
It is argued that it is wrong to determine democratic legitimacy on the basis of the 
majoritarian principle upon which Western democracy thrives. Majoritarianism cannot 
be juxtaposed with consensus since the value of democracy is that everyone be respected 
as a separate moral agent with his/her own sense of justice. If an entire segment of a 
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population, for instance, is being oppressed and exploited in the resolution of political 
disagreements, by fact of ‘majority decides’ or ‘tyranny of numbers’, then, even if the 
process used is ‘procedurally democratic’, the resulting decision cannot be genuinely 
democratic – or legitimate for that matter – given that an entire segment of the 
population is not being offered the equal respect to which it is entitled (Kassner, 
2006:485). 
 
To be democratically legitimate and engender respect for its directives, a decision-
making process requires more than democratic procedures. The values of democracy 
and the rights to which such values give rise must be respected and protected. Otherwise, 
the procedure becomes a mere pretext for undemocratic rule. Besides, there is an 
additional requirement for democratic legitimacy which goes beyond the normative 
adequacy. That is to say, in order for a state to rightly demand recognition of its 
legitimacy, it is not enough that its practices, ideals, and institutions at the present time 
only satisfy criteria of justice; it is also necessary that it answers to the injustice of the 
procedures through which it incorporated cultural groups within its boundaries 
(Valadez, 2001:9). 
 
In conclusion, democratic legitimacy is not just a matter of periodic elections and 
majoritarian endorsement. It requires a feeling of belongingness instantiated in the life 
of the populace, which guarantees consultation and taking part in the decisions that 
affect them in the ordinariness of their life – their life world, lebenswelt. In order to 
appropriately understand political legitimacy, it is not enough that a government 
provides resources and builds roads – for these are mere functions of government. We 
must go beyond functions of government with its respective capabilities, and consider 
the motivation for political participation and engagement.  
 
Against the foregoing, democratic practice in Africa can flourish in a cultural milieu if, 
and only if, the populace exhibits willingness to understand the perspectives and needs 
of others, and sense of solidarity (Valadez, 2001:1, 9). Since effectiveness of democracy 
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may also be undermined by a decline in civic character of social trust, the citizens should 
be allowed an enabling environment, which will address the challenge of developing 
and maintaining a civic virtue and solidarity. In essence, the communal or even 
consensual relationships within a democracy should not be through hierarchical 
relations of dependence and authority, as is currently experienced in Western 
democracies, but through interactions in which their status as equal fellow citizens is 
recognized and appreciated. This leads to a consensual way of practicing democracy 
where individuals learn to take the needs and interests of others into account and 
moderate their views accordingly.63 Members of a political community in contemporary 
African polity should be given an enabling environment at the grassroots level to fully 
participate in discussions and critical examination of collectively binding public policies 
with commitment to the common good as the guiding principle and the greatest good, 
summum bonum, of life.  
 
Since civic character and social trust form the common launching pad of democratic 
effectiveness, further research should seek to establish the commitment of African 
governments to the enhancement of civic virtue and communal solidarity given the 
phenomenon of rampant civil strife and ethnic conflicts on the continent. 
 
6.3 African communalism 
 
 
In the previous sections of this study, I strongly argued that for democracy to be 
meaningfully established in contemporary Africa, it should be hinged on political 
communal existence, which in effect relates to the equality within a polity. I have 
particularly pointed out that equality is possible because of the communal wellbeing, 
which is shared by all “regardless” of an individual’s own status or contribution. This, 
as I pointed out, should not be misconstrued to mean that the study advocates for a 
purely constituted consensual democracy. Rather, I submit that there is an imminent 
problem of understanding democracy in purely consensual manner since in such a 
                                                 
63 See Valadez’s argument on the same (2001:20).  
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democracy, the “voice of the individual is lost” and that there is a possibility of ‘mass 
man-ship’ in decision making. I contend that, contrary to such a view, true democracy 
must be at once practical and also respond to people’s needs in their ordinariness of life. 
It must affirm and not deny the legitimate moral claim of the individual nor have their 
status slighted.  
 
In consequence, it can be concluded that democracy sui generis denotes that form of 
government in which the ruling power of the state is vested not in any particular class 
or classes, but in members of the community as a whole.  It is, thus, essentially a matter 
of political method. In this regard, democracy is not a particular kind of civilization, but 
a civilized way of political action. As such, far from conceiving democracy in a purely 
consensual manner, I advanced that democracy should be a political system that enables 
the populace to live together for the pursuance of the common good. I pointed out that 
it is the communalistic living that can enable Africans to determine the course of 
political leadership that may pass as true democracy in the post-independence era. In 
sum, the kind of political aspirations required of democracy are only possible under a 
communal modus vivendi.  
 
It is in the same vein that I argued that within a communal set-up, individuals inhabit 
the world where they feel to a greater extent at home. In such a situation, I argued that 
the moral status of the person is acknowledged; it is a world in which an individual’s 
freedom is enabled to serve not only his or her personal interest, but also those of others. 
This is what this study termed the political communal belongingness. In such a world 
of political communal existence, the modes of interaction define people’s appreciation 
of civic friendship. As such, they relate with each other “not as competitors but in a 
relationship of reciprocal recognition and mutual respect” (Mehta, 2003:37). Besides, it 
was argued that pre-colonial African life was of a quotidian type with built-in practical 
and moral virtues education. As a result of this, political institutions were constructed 
around the moral value track of communal existential modus. It is in this context, as 
Ajume Wingo postulates, that social and political institutions were arranged so as to 
render the desired collective outcome – the common good (Wingo, 2001:157).  
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In consequence, in unravelling the relevance of communal life to the practice of 
democracy in post-independence Africa, the study addressed how pre-colonial African 
political arrangements and processes enabled people to deliberate and deal with rather 
vexing and divisive issues that raise complex questions with regard to what is just, what 
is fair, and what is good for the entire society. I argued that figuring out what was 
publicly regarded as good, fair and just was what was in the common interest of the 
community, and what the African public palaver was all about. The purpose for which 
people engaged in lengthy discussions at any level of their communal existence was to 
achieve nothing else other than the common good.  
 
In the foregoing respect, the community serves as the only place where, when people’s 
interests clashed, they talked for hours and hours to arrive at a consensual agreement 
(Wingo, 2001:156). In this consensual context, however, the role of discussion has the 
obvious affinities of appreciation by individuals of the viewpoints of other individuals 
and the community as a whole. It is against this backdrop that the study underscored 
that the African concept of community can help to animate both the theory and practice 
of democracy in Africa’s post-independence era.  
 
In the article “Society and Democracy in Africa” Wiredu argues that a communal sense 
of belonging was so strong in the traditional African society that people were concerned 
about each other. This was basically so because the individual identities were so nested 
within the fabric of the community. He writes:  
 
 
So strong, in fact, is the sense of communal belonging in the 
traditional setting that an individual’s very sense of self is 
contextualized not only to the fact of community but also to its 
values; so that a person, for all concerned, is not just an individual 
born of human parentage, but also an individual of that description 
whose settled habits evince sensitivity to the basic values of the 
community (Wiredu, 2001:172).  
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This is to say – as far as communalistic ethos is concerned – that it is imperative that 
the individual adjusts his or her interests to the interest of others. To this end, 
communalism could help in solving the rampant problem of corruption and the use of 
state resources for personal gain and enrichment by the political leadership. As Wiredu 
notes, it is in this context that the communalistic culture is compatible and analogous to 
the principles of the golden rule of doing to others what one would expect others to do 
unto him or her. That is, individuals in such a culture are enjoined to think about their 
contribution to the society, and not so much what gain they can obtain from the society 
(Wiredu, 2001:173). To my mind, Wiredu is making an ethical claim for the constraint 
and restraint on arbitrary use of power by those in positions of leadership. 
 
In line with the foregoing, the study advanced arguments that pertain to the concept of 
political participation. I pointed out that participation does not arise at the individual 
level only. As a matter of fact, individuals are conceived to benefit from participation, 
since there are benefits which accrue to the community; and which can only be obtained 
when one connects to and participates in the life of others – the community. In other 
words, it was argued that it is participation that links the individual with the community; 
and because the individual is involved in the governing of community, he or she 
identifies with it and comes to appreciate the claims of other individuals and of the 
community as a whole. Besides, since in a community every individual is respected for 
the simple fact that he or she is, the common man will have a chance to meaningfully 
contribute to the way the society is governed. It is in this respect that the study pointed 
out that integrated consensual democracy allows the opinions of everyone, including 
those of the common man, to prevail. That is, in integrated consensual democracy, 
citizens relate with each other not as competitors but rather by looking upon each other 
in the way of complementarity. That is, it is only in their sociality that the populace 
constitutes the fulfillment of democratic aspirations (Mehta, 2003:37). Thus, in a 
communitarian scheme, individuals inhabit a social world where they can genuinely 
claim control over the political circumstances of their lives. It is argued, therefore that 
it is in the communal context that democracy can be said to be both viable and 
meaningful in contemporary Africa.   
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Nevertheless, while I submit that there is a sense in which popular authorisation and 
elections may have degraded the exercise of power in contemporary Africa, further 
research should establish why even with communal solidarity that is still so widespread 
in rural societies of Africa, contemporary Africa is still far from producing the modes 
of governance that the populace can freely accept. 
 
6.4 In retrospect: Conclusion  
 
At independence, Africans looked to the future with hope and confidence. “The burning 
desire for change”, so Kofi Hadjor observes, “which swept the continent led to a 
flowering of new ideas and eventually forced the old colonial masters to make exit” 
(Hadjor, 1987:1). However, instead of Africa being in its rightful global place, the 
failures of today have proven the contrary. The democratic practice in Africa in modern 
times is worrying for it does not exhibit a sense of independence that Africans hoped 
they achieved. Democratic experience in contemporary Africa exhibits the bare fact that 
there are undoubtedly two worlds: one real and the other possible. It is taken that the 
‘real’ world of democracy exists “out there”. It is a world of established and flourishing 
democracies in which Africa is an unfortunate outsider. Africa can and should only 
strive to join this world – a world, anxious and with potentiality to play midwife to the 
birth of democracy in Africa.  
 
Jonathan Hyslop commenting on Africa’s reality in mid1990s observes that: 
 
While South Africa has produced a viable and vibrant set of 
democratic institutions, the encounter with the grim realities of 
post-apartheid society has led to an almost inevitable 
disillusionment. Democratisation in Zambia and Malawi has 
produced disappointing results. Nigeria’s escape from 
dictatorship is still in the balance.  Moi’s oligarchy hangs on in 
Kenya. Mugabe’s rule in Zimbabwe is increasingly ossified. 
Eritrea and Ethiopia are in conflict despite their common 
achievement against appalling dictatorship. The military 
configuration in Zaire, which threatens to draw in the whole of 
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central African region, may seem to point to an increasingly 
militarised continent (Hyslop, 1999:ix).    
    
While some of these realities that Hyslop underscores may have certainly changed in 
terms of those at the helm of political power and leadership, as in the case of Kenya that 
has so far had two other regimes from the time President Daniel arap Moi relinquished 
power in 2002, there could be a possibility that Africa’s underlying socio-political and 
economic challenges in the post-colonial period remain the same. This may explain why 
Hyslop is quick to conclude that “… advances to democracy in Africa will involve 
battles stretching over many years, rather than quick fixes” (Hyslop, 1999:ix). Against 
this backdrop lies the fact that in post-independence Africa, socio-economic and 
political challenges require African solutions as a way forward for the continent. This 
necessitates the mobilisation and deployment of positive aspects of African traditional 
culture into the democratic practice. Joseph Nyasani alludes to such a necessity when 
he writes that:  
 
Part of the problem…may very well have to do with human 
inability to discover, appraise and adopt positive values across 
cultures and, indeed know how to integrate them for the common 
exploitation in a spontaneous and humanistic manner (Nyasani, 
2010:291).  
 
 
In view of this, the study has provided an analysis of listing and explaining Africa’s 
democratic failure in the context of African cultural values. The study has pointed out 
that culture is Africa’s arsenal of the axiological, aesthetical and moral values required 
for addressing democratic challenges in the post-independence era of Africa.  Thus, the 
challenge  for philosophers and those who wield the political and economic destiny of 
Africa, as Nyasani points out, is to robustly articulate these values in order to make 
contemporary times for Africa a time of: 
 
…reassertion, re-adaptation and, indeed, self-reaffirmation having 
emerged from the ignominious state of political, mental, spiritual 
and material torture and deprivation brought about by 
circumstances well outside Africa’s control (Nyasani, 2010:295).  
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In view of the foregoing, conceptual analysis employed by this study helped to explain 
why contemporary democratic practice in Africa has failed both in its effectiveness and 
legitimacy; and why there are so many variations and ambiguous effects in its rule. 
Notably, the study underscored the fact that African traditional political values and 
practices ought to shape the actual configuration of political democracy. African social 
and cultural determinant – communalism – is necessary for the realisation of the 
common good; and, as such, should be the pivotal point for the establishment of a viable 
and meaningful democracy in Africa in the post-independence era.  
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